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Preface
~k'hv did I write a dissertation about trust within the militar~-~
In 1978 I joined the armj-. I had wanted to go to the militar}- academ~-, but as women
were not }'et admitted to the militan- academ}-~, I joined the women's armv corps. Onlv later
did I learn that a few women had been admitted to the academt- a month before I had joined
the women's arm}- corps. I must sa}- now that at that time this did not contribute to m}- tnist in
what the armv told me. VG1ien I asked m~~ commander when I could go to the academ}-, she
told me that "it was too earle to tell", so I, a bit naï~-e and patient (I was onl}- 19 years old) ga~-e
it another ~-ear. In September 1979 I heard that mure w-omen had been admitted to the
academ}- and mv trust in w-hat the}- told me in the arm~-, the institution I had chosen to make a
career in, was suffering.
In 1980 I joined the intelligence sen~-ice where I learned the Russian language, to be
an interrogator. I was also taught never to trust am'one to his word. I did not want to work in a
distrustful environment all mv life, so after a few }~ears I went to an infantry battalion as a
personnel officer. In an infantrv battalion, sen-icemen work and live like one big famil}-: thev
go on field exercises together, the~- train and thet- practicall}- live together. I had a great time
there, also because I found out that I could trust m}' colleagues. Some of the people I met
there have become life long friends. Vï1i}~ I trusted them~ TheS- were honest to me, the~-
followed up on what the}- told me. The}' also told me things the}' would not easilti- tell others,
which made me feel needed. The}- exposed a general interest in me, not so much as a woman
but as a valued colleague. This is valuable, as being a woman in the infantr}- was (and still is) an
exception: the infantrv is a men's world.
I found out how valuable this was when I became a compan}- commander in a
different infantrt- battalion. Here, the general attitude was one like "w~e do not want }~ou here
because }-ou are a woman". They gave me the feeling the}- did not trust me. I dare sati- now that
I often felt hopeless and lost, where to start if much of what }'ou do is explained in the wrong
direction~ Ne~-ertheless, one thing I learned from mv father is never to let them get the better
of ine and never to give up, which was what I did, and eventually it saved me. No matter what
happened, be it that things be}~ond mv control w-ent wrong (the depun- battalion commander
had a habit of finding fault with most of what I did, whether I could help it or not) or small
~ Thr :~ir Porce admittrd its tirct woman that cear, straiKht from school, and the armc admitted a feu- uomen who had
alreadc sen ed in the w~r,men's armv corps.
things went u-rong, I held up m}- head high and tried to do better next time. I told m}~ staff
openl}- and honest]}- that I ma~~ not be as competent as expected but that I had the intention to
make the best of it and that I expected them to assist me. After a}~ear one of the battalion's
clerg}-men told me that my personnel stood behind me in what I did. That felt good.
Apparenth., the~~ had some degree of trust in me and from what I know now, I guess it must
have been that I had been honest and bene~-olent towards them, in the mean time working on
m}- competence and predictabilitt-. One might sa~- that I ha~-e ~-en- different experiences with
trust within the militar}~, some good, some not so good.
Then how does one get from a compan}- commander in the infantr}- to a dissertation
on trust~ I started stud}7ng sociolog~- in 1995 and when I graduated from universit}~ proceeded
to a dissertation. As the subject of m}- final study at uni~rersit}- was trust, I took up this subject
as a dissertation subject as it was intriguing to me. I had encountered numerous situations in
which trust seemed absent, or in which trust was high and I wanted to know how trust
functions w~ithin the arm}-.
A dissertation is an individual project, but it cannot be done alone. There are man}~
people I should thank for their support. First of all Karin Sanders and ~~'ijbrandt van Schuur,
who initially encouraged me to start with it, w~ithout their enthusiasm I probabl}- would not
even ha~-e considered it ,~11so, Joseph Soeters who made a great contribution with his wide
research experience in the armed forces. F.speciall~- in the first }'ears I had to work mostl}~ in
my own time, and I thank John Terpstra for his generosit}- to give me one da~- a week "during
the boss's time" to work on this book. In general, the facilities provided b}- the Roy~al
Netherlands Arm}- have been ven~ generous throughout the process of writing this book. I
greatl}- appreciate René Moell:er, not onl`- because he is good colleague, but also because he is a
man of bright ideas who ga~-e me a great leap forward with this book. A dissertation reyuires
mam- background studies, and I thank Coen Terpstra and his crew of the librar}- at the militan-
academ}- to alwa}-s assist me in finding books and papers. ~s for the coeer, I thank Rop
~'illems for his creative design. Hennie Rozengarden deserves m~- thanks for rescuing mt.
computer several times from breaking down.
This book was written in English, but as I am not a nati~-e speaker, m`- texts needed to be
corrected before I had the heart to have them published. I thank DirkJan Smit, iurgen Gruson
and Harn- Kirkels for correcting all m~- awkward English.
Two indi~-iduals are special in m~- life. The first is m}~ partner Hans. Hans has alwa}-s
supported me, he would cheer me up ~ti-hen I w-as down and help me where he could, drau-ing
from his personal experience with writing a Ph.D. I am deepl}- grateful to him for that. The
second individual lives in a stable. She gives me man}- hours of joy and as being such a reliable
friend and companion, she made it possible for me think over in the afternoon, when gentl}-
being rocked back and forth on her back, what I had written down earlier that da}~. Yes, some
of the better ideas arose on horseback, thank }~ou very much, Kiona.
I will not mention m}- friends and colleagues who have supported me, as I am afraid if I





Although most people mac not alway-s be aware of it, trust forms an essenual part of human
eacistence. People will make assumptions about how other people react to them, but as one
cannot be totally~ certain how others interpret the world around them, other people can also be
a source of insecurity-. ~~'ith many- people around, the world could become a complex place and
the need to reduce this complexity. and uncertainty arises.
According to Luhmann (1979), people reduce uncertaintt- about others b}' assuming
that other people's actions w-ill not be detrimental to their own well being, though a certain
amount of uncertaintv will remain. The assumption that other people's actions will not harm
one's own interests, and the uncertaint5- connected w-ith this assumption, forms the beginning
of trust (Luhmann, 1979).
B~~ trusting, the decision is taken that another person will not harm one's ~-alued
goods, although one is well aware that the other person has the possibility- to do so: there is no
certainty-, as the reduction of risk is an assumption. In fact, the actual risk may- not decrease.
Howe~~er, under risky- circumstances a trusung person may be w-illing to take part in acàons he'-
might not undertake in the absence of trust. Hence, the well being of one's valued goocís
comes to depend on the trusted person (e.g. Luhmann, 1979; Baier, 1986; Lane, 1998,
Sztompka, 1999). VG11at those valued goods are can differ: they- may be material goods, but
could also be one's health, or one's life that is at stake.
Trust is present in e~-er}-day life, and this is no exception in the workplace. In many
workplaces, people depend on each other for good organizational results. This
interdependence demands co-operation, where the success of each worker depends on the
willingness of others to do their work. This incorporates a risk and uncertainty. Trust is needed
to enable co-opcration under these circumstances of risk and uncertaínty- (Sztompka, 1999), as
in the total absence of trust, conditions would ha~-e to be made up in a contract in order to
protect oneself against unwanted beha~-ior from fellow workers. This way, co-operation w-ould
not arise or onlv w-ith great difficuln-.
Particularly- in a workplace where people do work that maj~ endanger their lives, think
for example of the tlre brigade, the police or the arm}-, this connection between trust and co-
operation becomes extremely- salient: employ-ees depend on each other, and non-co-operation
' Tliroughour [hr book the male form is used, huwe~ er what is said in the book refcrs to men and u~omen.
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betu~een emplo}-ees ma}- cost li~-es. In this book, trust at the workplace, the arm}- to be more
specific, is the central topic.
There are ~-arious reasons why- trust in the workplace is a rele~-ant subject. Firstly-, in
the workplace, interdependence demands that people need to co-operate with each other to
accomplish their tasks, but other people's acti~5ties cannot alway~s be controlled (Luhmann,
1979; McAllister, 1995; Sheppard 8c Tuchinsk}-,1996; Sztompka, 1999; Dirks ~ Ferrin, 2001).
In this interdependence, one risks that a fellow emplovee may- not perform as expected and
could harms one's own actions, but control of someone else's actions is a costly and time-
consuming activitt- that is ~~rtuall}- impossible to maintain (Miller, 2001; Yukl, 2002). Hence, in
order to start co-operation trust is needed (Ma}~er, Davis á Schoorman, 1995).
Secondl`-, man`- organizations are becoming flatter nowadays (Lucas, 1996). The
number of management lay-ers is reduced and with delegating authorit}-, organizations more
and more depend on the workers' initiati~~es. ~k~ere supervision by~ managers recedes, trust bg
those managers in their subordinates is bound to take its place. It is here that often a problem
is found as organizacions reduce their management lacers but maintain their "old" coercive
nature (Adler 8c Bory-s, 1996; Adler, Goldoftas 8c Levine, 1999). Hence, workers get the
impression that thet- are not trusted because the organization keeps issuing coercive orders, on
the other hand the}- are expected to work quite independentl}. and be resilient in the `new'
organizauonal culture. t11so, less managerial supervision calls for trust among emplo}.ees as
thet- need to deplo~- their own initiav~-es for co-operation rather than depend on what they- are
being told to do (Lucas, 1996; Kramer 8c T}~ler, 1996). This co-operation needs trust as not
every activin- b~~ a colleague can be monitored or controlled. IVforeover, complexity of tasks
also makes it more difficult to monitor co-workers' tasks (Hardin, 2002). Once there is trust,
opportunities arise to extend the co-operation as there is willingness towards each other to co-
operate (Dirks Sc Ferrin, 2001; ~~'illiams, 2001; T}-ler, 2001).
In the third place, organizational settings could be thought of in which it is ph~-sicallt-
impossible for a manager to monitor emplo}-ees' acrions. Take for example such instances
where emplovees do their job out of ey-esight of supervisorti- levels, at a geographical distance
not easil}- bridged. ~X1lereas it is difficult to monitor employ-ees' acti~-ities because of fewer
organizational levels and less hierarch~-, it will be e~-en harder, if not ph`-sically- impossible to
monitor their actions when thet- are geographicall~- distanced. Here, managerial trust in
emplo~-ees is necessan-, simpl}- because management has no choice.
R
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Last but not least, in organizations where the risks are high, the need for trust
becomes more relevant ~k'ithin the arm}-, where people are placed in riskti- situations,
super~~isors cannot alwa}-s have control over the actions of their colleagues, however they need
their colleagues to accomplish a mission. The decision to complete an assignment is only
possible if trust is placed in those who are also part of that mission (Coleman, 1990).
Risks in organizations mat differ. Much literature can be found about trust w-ithin and
between organizations (e.g. Cook 8~: ~'all, 1980; Boon 8c Holmes, 1991; Fuku}-ama, 1995;
Mayer, Davis 8c Schoorman, 1995; Mc ~1llister, 1995; Itiramer 8c T}-ler, 1996; Lane 8c
Bachmann, 1998; Mcluught, Cummings 8c Chervany, 1998; Costa, 2000; Dirks 8c Ferrin,
2001). Often a connection is made between trust and risk, still empirical studies about trust
within organizations that traditionall}- work in high risk environments are rarely found.
Although risk is so ob~-iousl}- connected urith trust (e.g. Luhmann, 1979; Coleman, 199(l; Boon
8z Holmes, 1991; Lewicki óc Benedict Bunker, 1996; Lagerspetz, 1998; Lane, 1998; Sztompka,
1999), this is quite surprising. Coleman (1990) in this light discusses the role of trust within an
army, stressing that trust is necessary as not e~-ery actor can fully observe the actions of others.
Paparone (2002) discusses the nature of soldierly trust, therebti~ referring to the possibilin- of
more freedom of action for organizational members under conditions of trust, which in turn
encourages innovauon and professionalism. But these are feeble results in the yuest for the
connection between trust, risk and co-operation in high risk organizations.
Concluding, co-operation and increased interdependence as well as changes in
organizational settings, such as situauons w-ith higher risks than usual, might reyuire a more
prominent place for trust. The central research problem in this book is to examine and explain
trust w7thin the Ro}~al Netherlands Arm}-. The central research yuestion is:
How can the development of trust among servicemen in the various stages of their
longer lasting mutual relationship be explained?
What is trust?
This stud}- refers to trust in co-workers in the organization and trust in leaders in the
organization. Trust has been defined b}~ using a model about initial trust formaáon in new
organizauonal settings b~- McItnight, Cummings and Chen~any (1998). As trust in this studv
does not particularl}~ pertain to initial trust formation, not all elements as mentioned bt.
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1~lchnight et al. have been included in the studti-. Belo~i~, a description is given of those
elements that pertain to trust as used in this stud}-.
Di.rpo,rikon to trurt. ~n indi~-idual learns from earl`- childhood what to expect from his social
context, like in situadons in which positi~-e actions are desired from other people because one
is in need or because a future situation ma`- demand it. The extent to w-hich expectations are
met la~-s the foundation for developing a trusting orientation. This trusting orientation, also
called disposiuon to trust, forms the basis for further trust development in others. Hence, it
can be considered as an anrecedent of trust, rooted in a person's character (Rotter, 1991; Boon
8z Holmes, 1991; IVfa~-er, Da~~is 8c Schoorman, 1995; Couch 8z Jones, 1997; I~1cKnight,
Cummings c~ Chen-an}~, 1998; Costa, 2000).
l~ule maintenance. Organizations create safeguards against untrustworth}- beha~-ior b~- imposing
rules on emplo~~ees to attain organizational goals, but also to displa~~ transparenc}- in
organizational management towards emplo}-ees. Emplo~-ees are expected to follow these rules.
Pro~-ided that an organization is consistent in its retribution if rules are broken, the
organization displa~-s trusnvorthe behacior and thus pro~-ides a safet,- net for emplo~-ees if one
breaks rules in ~-iolation of another's interest (see for instance Baron Sc Itreps, 1999),
irrespective of the fact whether that other parri- is the organization or another emploi.ee. As
such, emplo~-ees are kept from displa~-ing umL~anted or unexpected beha~~ior in favor of ~~~anted
and expected beha~-ior and emplot.ees learn that rules should not be broken (e.g., Fuku~-ama,
1995; Horgan c~ ~fuhlau, 1998). The leacíers in the organization are expected to take decisions
in accordance ~~~ith these organizatiunal rules. Leaders ma~- sometimes be reyuired to bend the
rules a little to attain organizational goals (Adler cX Bon-s, 1996; .~ldler, Goldoftas 8t Le~-ine,
1999; Soeters, ~t'inslow Sc ~'eibull, 2003). .~n enabGng organization, in which this rule bending
is accepted, is likelt- to im-oke leaders' tnzst in the organization, as the~ know their actions will
be appreciated. In a coerci~-e organization this tule bending mat' not be appreciated, and
leaders' trust ~~rill not easilt- arise.
Disposition to trust and maintenance of rules are expected to precede trust formation
and thus are called antecedents of trust. Trust in itself ma~- be assesseded bt- four elements that
w-ill be discussed below, and are called components of trust (í~fater, Da~~s 8t Schoorman, 1995;
~1cIuught, Cummings ~ Cheraan~-, 1998).
Competence belieJ: Competence belief concerns the belief in a person's abilities for a task (Cook 8c
~Y'all, 1980; Butler, 1991; tifc:lllister, 1995; :~fishra, 1996; Lane, 1998). It is task-specific and
im-oh-es a certain skill, trade or profession and is therefore also specific for a person. .~ person
to
Introducáon
ma}' be competent at, for example, repairing computers, but this does not imph- that he can
maintain a garden as well. Hence, trusting someone unth one set of ~-alued goods does not
impl}- that this person can be trusted with another set of valued goods. Trust depends on what
one believes the person is capable of handling. This demands thinking about what to entrust
someone with, and as such entails a cogniti~-e choice, a rauonal belief that a trustee has the
capacities necessarti-.
Predictability belief. In his standard ~rork on trust and power, Luhmann (1979) mentions
reduction of uncertaint}- as a precondition of trust. Some certaint,- can be derived from
previous interaction with the trustee, in which his reactions to different situations are assessed.
Hencc, a trustor ma`- be able to predict a trustee's beha~~ior to some extent and the risk
im-olved in trusting this person. Being able to predict another person's actions may go a
positi~-e or a negati~-e wa}-. r1 person ma~- be known to act in favor of other persons, but a
person ma} also be known to act in his own interests against a trustor's interests. B}~ the abilitt-
to predict a trustee's behavior, the trustor can assess if his own interests will be violated if he
entrusts the trustee with ~-alued goods. The trustor's conclusion ma}' be that the trustee does
indeed act in favor of the trustor, but the trustee may also often act in violation of the trustor's
interests. In the former case, the trustor ma~- trust the trustee, but in the latter case the trustor
will not trust the trustee, whereas in both cases the trustee is predictable to some extent.
f~onest~~ bek'ef. Honest}~ refers to sa`-ing what one stands for and following up on agreements
(Butler, 1991; h1a}~er et al., 1995). 1~1ora1 standards come to surface here. An honest person
does not lie or cheat, or steal (Fuku~-ama, 1995; Lagerspetz, 1998). If a trustor believes a person
to be honest, the trustor has positive expectations about the trustee and will believe him to
communicate openl}-, and behave according to generall}' accepted moral standards w-ithin the
organization. Honestv belief incorporates an attitude on the part of the trustee to be truthful
towards the tnzstor and is thought to be indispensable for trusting another person. A trustor
who gets the impression that the possible trustee is truthful in what he sa}-s and does is likel}- to
trust that person because he seems honest. The opposite mat. also occur. The reader w-ill
recognize the feeling that one cannot la~- a finger on another person's behavior but ha~-e the
feeling that the other person has a hidden agenda, or is not truthful. In such cases, this person
will be thought of as not being honest, even though the monitored beha~-ior does not give
reason to think so.
Benevolerrce Gelie~ Benevolence refers to a person's voluntar}~ positi~~e intentions towards others,
where no egocentric intendons are incolved (Baier, 198G; Boon 8c Holmes, 1991; h1a}-er, Da~-is
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8c Schoorman, 1995; Dirks Sc Ferrin, 2001). If a possible trustor sees that a trustee shows the
intention to do well to the trustor's interest it is likely that the trustor may ask the trustee to
look after the trustor's valued goods. For example, if the trustor lends a car to the trustee,
benevolence belief implies that the trustor thinks that the trustee w-ill treat the car well, not
bump it into a wall because of carelessness, and will retum it as it was gíven to him.
Benevolence belief incorporates a sense of assumed altruistic behavior on the part of the
trustee. The trustee does not have a personal interest in acting beneaolently towards the
trustor, but does it because he is willing to do good.
The four a.cpectr are related. A trustee's competent and predictable behavior can be regarded as
cognitive aspects of trust. It is a rauonal decision to decide if a trustee is competent and
predictable, as this can be derived from previous monitored behavior. On the other hand,
honesty and benevolence cannot be so easily~ assessed in a cognitive wa}.. Of course, honesty
and benevolence can be derived from beha~nor in the past, but these aspects also often include
a"gut feeling" about a trustee's behavior and are therefore referred to as emotional elements.
Again, the example of the hidden agenda is mentioned: one ma}- actuall}- see how a person acts
in accordance with what he says, but still have the feeling that the person has a second agenda.
This is obviousl}- an emotional aspect.
The cognitive aspects should be coupled with favorable or harmless intentions. Not doing so
would give the possibilit}- that a trustee is capable of caring for a set of calued goods and
predictable in his actions, but that does not implv that this person wrill look after the valued
goods quite well, or be truthful in telling what happened to it. Take fnr instance the earlier
mentioned example of the car. A trustee ma}- be a good driver and be known to return the car
on time, but he mav have left the interior of the car a mess, or lie about the contents of the gas
tank. This boils down to the fact that competence and predictability should be connected with
honest}- and benevolence. To take onlv honest}. beief or benevolence belief for assessing trust,
w-ithout competence belief or predictabilit}- belief, is not sufficient either. For example,
benevolent behavior alone does not show proof of the trustee's capabilities of not hamung the
trustor's interests. Moreover, the trustee ma}- have good intentions now, but if in similar
situations he behaves as expected one time, and in an unexpected manner at another, this will
not lead to a trusting belief with a trustor. Hence, competence belief, predictabilit}- belief,
honest}- belief and benevolence belief cannot be seen separatel}. from one another.




Four studies on trust
Trust will be addressed from various points of view. First of all it is essential to examine how
trust between servicemen is assessed. Onlti~ after that has been done, a follow-up can be made
upon trust in longer lasting relationships and the explanauon of it. This means looking into the
aspects servicemen consider when it comes to trust, but also looking into their disposition to
trust. IVloreover, the organizational context maj~ pla}' an important part in their trust assessment
in thc sense of rule maintenance. That is the reason wh}~ the first stud}- addresses components
of trust. The stud}- addresses how soldiers assess their interpersonal trust, and what precedes
trust. The main question in this studt- is:
Hou~ can tru.rt among .rolclier.r in tbe RoyallVetherlands Army be a.r.re.r.rerl, arrdhotv can it he e.x~lained?
After defining components of trust, the question is how trust develops over time, as the central
question mentions a longer lasting relationship. Uoes the order in which the components of
trust appear change, or does it remain the same? V~1iat is the role of antecedents of trust over a
longer period of time? To get a better insight into the longer lasting relationship among
servicemen, six units have been followed throughout their deplo~~ment abroad. The central
question in this study is:
How doe.r trurt develojr over a.rix-rrronthmi.c.riorr, and bow can thi.r der~elopment be e.~c~lained?
In a hierarchic organization, leadership is the spine. Leaders give the direction the organizauon
is going into and followers, as the word says, are supposed to follow. Followers, such as
employ-ees in an organization (sen-icemen in an arm~~) must follow but their w-illingness to
follow also depends on their trust in their leader (Gabriel and Savage, 1978). A decrease or lack
of willingness is not likel}- to end up in smooth co-operation in the future, and may- eventually
lead to a failed operation, which mac result in a further decrease in willingness to follow that
leader or eventuall}' a refusal to do so. In an armt', this ma}. cost lives. Since leadership seems
so essential (see, among others, Hunt 8c Phillips, 1991, and Yukl, 2002), two studies address the
role of leadership in trust formation. The first stud}. addresses leadership under dangerous
circumstances. The main question in this stud~- is:
It there a connection betu~een potential ri.rks, leadexrhip .rtyle and .rubordinate.r' tru.rt and bou~ can thi.r connection
he e~lained?
13
A Soldierl} Perspectiee on Trust
Trust in leadership also pertains to trust in superior levels in the organization, the highest
ranked staff, where decisions are taken that influence all organizational members. An
organization develops rules and procedures and writes them down into what is called
management (see also Herse`- 8c Blanchard, 1977). The purpose of management is in general to
achieve effectiveness and efficiency, and also to make sure that everyone follows the same
procedures. 1~lanagement decisions drop down into the organization through various hierarchic
la}-ers. If employees at any level within the organization do not trust the organizational rules
and procedures, or more broadly speaking, the way the organization is run, they are likely to
find different ways to attain their goals than by the rules prescribed. The fourth stud`- refers to
the peacetime situation where units within the RNLA need to work according to the rules of
management. The way commanders feel about management is examined, as well as their trust
in their immediate superior level and the extent to which they follow rules. As communication
is likelv to be of influence, this is included in the studv as well. The central research question in
this studv is:
Hou~ do organi~ational marragement and compliance :vith orga~ri~ationa! rules influence tru.rt in higher levelt
u~ithin the o~aniZakon and u~hat i.r the role of cornmunicatzon in thi.r connection?
These four studies have been done over the course of four vears. The research yuestions as
mentioned above u7ll be examined in the consecutive chapters of this book.
The Royal Netherlands Army
This section will deal with the RNI.A to give the reader some insight into this organization.
The RNLr, faced hea~~}- storms in the past 15 years. In 1989, when the East Bloc fell apart, the
RNL~1's original task of defense in the east under NATO flag was no longer necessar}-. The
nation's security remained important, but apart from that, other militan- acti~zties became
salient (Landmacbt Dortrine Puhlicatie-I ~llilitaire Doctnne, 1996). In this view one should think of
humanitarian assistance throughout the world, help in the case of natural disasters, peace-
keeping and peace-building operations;. To participate in such operations, the arm~- needed to
' These operations are called ,liilitan Operations Othcr Than ~t'ar (~tOOTI~). The ti:1T0 detinition of ~fOOTI~'
differs from the RNL.~ detmition of ~fOOT11~: ?~i-1T0 regards ant non-combat operanon in ~~hich militan means
are used for other than large scale combat as ~fOOT~~ ,~chich includes counter-rerrorism, counter-drul,n and counter-
guerrilla operations. In the R1VLA detinition, counter-cerrorism and counter-l,~uerrilla operations are seen as combat
opcrations (LnndmarhRdoctrinepubtiratie 1f7, 1999).
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be reduced and restructured, restructuring and reductions that have taken place since 1990
because of the changed assignments and due to financial cutbacks. The aim was a more
efficient and more effective arm}~. This has resulted in an all-volunteer army with new
equipment, different training than before, and man}- servicemen being deplo}~ed. As it is toda}',
man}~ ser~-icemen are operating abroad. For military operations other than war, one should
think of peacekeeping in C}-prus, humanitarian aid and peacekeeping in former Yugoslavia,
mine clearing in Mozambique and r~ngola, to mention a few. National tasks are operations that
take place on the national territore (for instance assisting the police in controlling animal
transport during the foot-and-mouth disease outbreak in 2001).
Another important change that has taken place in the RNLr~ is the abandonment of
conscription. As of 1995, the RNLA became an all-volunteer army. Young men and women
are now recruited from civil societ}- and as an emplo}~er, the RNLA must compete with other
organizations in recruiting }-oung people for vacancies, and must have something special to
offer in order to attract applicants. The RNLA offers training, pa}- throughout training and
work in the army, study facilities and adventure (deployment abroad).
Along with the changes in missions and structure the army went through, it pa}~s
increasing attention to the human aspect in being a ser~7ceman. Senicemen are surrounded
with care when the}- are being sent on a mission. The}~ get stress prevention training and learn
what to do after they have been through a stressful experience. Among aspects for the human
being behind the sen~icemen, a place has been found for trust. The RNLr1 expects flexibilits-,
initiative and commitment from its personnel. Constant monitoring of its personnel is bound
to have a negatiee effect on personnel, it will loose initiative and commitment to its job
properl}-. It is because of this particular initiati~.e and commitment and the idea that all
personnel should value the organizational targets, that trust is seen as an increasingly important
factor for organizational functioning (Handboek Leidznggeven in de ld., 2002).
L'nits that are sent on a mission are basicall}. existing units. However, not all positions
required in the area of operations are originall}- present in a unit, which means that many
ser~-icemen are added from ~arious units to the unit about to be deplo}-ed. Sometimes
ser~-icemen from as many as fiftt- other units are added to a deploved unit. Where the
ser~-icemen from the original unit know each other, the newcomers need to acclimatize in the
unit and get to know their colleagues with whom they will serve in the area of operations for
the next four to six months. They go through training prior to depio~-ment, ín which
sometimes not all servicemen assígned for the mission participate, thus mutual trust does not
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alw~a}-s get a chance to be built up prior to deplo~-ment. Sàll, in order to accomplish the mission
well, trust seems necessary-.
~~1ien in the Netherlands, in a peaceàme environment, units train, maintain their
eyuipment and often find themselves in the barracks. But it is not only operaàonal units that
are part of the arm~-, there are also man}- training centers and personnel at various le~-els in the
organizaàon. Their main dut}. is to prepare servicemen for their jobs or support the operaàonal
units. There are many procedures and rules that serve as guidelines for this support. Some rules
have been developed b}- the arm}- itself, others have been derived from civilian law. Rules
derived from civil law are, for example, the law on HACCP~, the law on working condiàons
and the laws concerning the presemaàon of the environment. Although staff as such hardl}-
operate in crisis areas, smooth co-operaàon, with in its slipstream trust, is essenàal for this staff
as well.
The RNLA is also a hierarchic organizaàon, especially- when seen from the outside:
formall}-, it is a highly hierarchic and bureaucraàc organizaàon. A replacement for trust, like
control, could easih- be applied, as it seems. However, subordinates who do not trust each
other w-ill not share informaàon or co-operate, and a commander is not likel}- to delegate
authoàt}- to subordinates who do not trust each other (Yukl, 2002). Due to a high level of
interdependence in the workplace, both in the Netherlands and abroad, trust within the RNLA
is necessan' between leaders and subordinates, among subordinates and within the organization
as a whole.
~7zat are the situaàons commanders and subordinates ma~- find themselves in~ A
commander is the linking pin into the higher levels of command. Commanders from battalion
level and higher have a staff or group of people for personnel matters, securitv and intelligence,
operaàons and training, logisàcs, communicaàon and civil militan' co-operaàon. The staff
members advise the commander, but the}- also often take a decision or issue orders to lower
command levels on the commander's behalf, as the}- have the authoritt- to do so.
Units can be placed under a different command than their iniàal organizaàonal command. For
example, an air mobile unit, usuall}- under the command of the Air i~lobile Brigade, can be
assigned to the staff of Naàonal Command in the case of, for example, an outbreak of a
contagious animal disease, such as foot and mouth dísease (2001) and fowl pest (2003). Units
are then assigned to set up checkpoints on roads to prevent animal transportaàon, to prevent
' Hazard :lnalcsis Critical Control Points, a la~c that looks after thr h~giene, for esample as maintained in preparinK
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spreading of the disease. Although this is not the first main task of the RNLA, it is one of its
tasks.
In all these cases, co-operation is necessary, with other sernicemen, civilians or people
from other naáonalities, even in other countries. This all boils down to the fact that the
serviceman who is posted in one unit today, can be assigned to another unit for a specific task
tomorrow, or be sent on a mission, or be posted in another unit for a next term of three y-ears.
Hence, trust is an issue within the army, and the importance of the trust relaáon between
commanders and their subordinates and among soldiers is emphasized (HandGoek Leidinggeven in
de KL, 2002), but one can yuesáon if this is enough. Sen'icemen, being sent on missions
abroad, find themselves in situaáons of high risk. Since the end of the Cold War, Dutch
ser~'icemen have parácipated in missions in Bosnia (since 1992), Kosovo (1999), élfghanistan
(since 2002) and Iray (since 2004) (Klep 8c Van Glls, 2000). All these operaáons contained a
relatively high to ven' high level of risk. IVlutual dependency and co-operaáon were highly at
stake in these operaáons. Nevertheless, an extensive study into the role of trust within the
army as a high-risk organizaáon has so far not been done. This study intends to fill a part of
this gap.
Method
The method used in this research is mainh~ sun~e`'s. These survevs have either been handed out
personally or sent by surface mail.
For the two studies on components of trust and development of trust the surveys
were added to surve}'s on morale' that were handed out to field units. The surveys were either
handed out by the researcher personall}', and collected afterwards, or sent to the units, handed
out by the commanders, collected and sent back to the researcher. For the study on the effect
of leadership st}'le on subordinates, through a network of friends some units were found
willing to participate in the study. These sun-eys were handed out personally and collected by
the researcher. The commander in chief of the RNL.r1 ordered a study into compliance with
rules, to be done by the researcher. In this study, other subjects were added such as
communicaáon, consideration and trust. Through random sampling in a list of all commanders
fc~od.
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w-ithin the RI~'L~1 the respondents for this stud~- w-ere found. These sur~-e}-s ~~-ere sent bt~
surface mail. In all cases random sampling was used.
Sun~e}s need background information, the~ need some stud}. in adrance, and w-ith the
background of being a sen7cew-oman it was not difficult to get access to mam- publications
about the RNL.~~. Some inter~~iews ha~-e been done for the stud}~ into the development of trust
and for trust and management. Background information for the missions abroad was needed to
get a general impression on what had happened during the missions. If se~-ere incidents had
occurred, this might have influenced mutual trust. No incidents were found that could account
for se~~ere changes in trust, but still the inter~-iews gare an impression of how the situation was
in the deplo}'ment area. For the stud}~ into trust and management some background
information was acquired in ad~ance to get a general idea what to ask in the sume`-.
Man}- questions in the survevs were deri~-ed from esisting questionnaires, but
sometimes quesàons were made up because no e~sting applicable questions could be found in
existing yuestionnaires. The latter also applies to the open questions, that are primarih-
applicable to the militan- situation. There are not man}- surve}'s in the literature about militart-
personnel, but often, e~sting surve}-s from ci~-ilian studies were translated and modified to the
militart- situation.
Various scaling anah-ses were applied. Often, a D4okken Scale Procedure (1~1SP:
Mokken, 1971) was used, as this has not often been used in studies before. In man}- studies,
reliability or factor analt'sis is used. 1~lokken Scale anal}-sis differs from reliabilitt' anal}-sis, as in
MSP a scale is built up from one item to as man} that will fit into the scale. The procedure of
:~íokken Scale anal}-sis closel}~ resembles a Guttman scale, and is built on this principle.
Reliabilitt- anal~-sis works the other wa}- around, here a scale is given and is indicated which
item should be deleted from the scale in order to get a better scale. If an item is deleted, a
better (more reliable) scale is giaen. Both procedures are good, but reliabilitt- analt-sis is much
wider used than i~fokken scale analt-sis. But not onlt- iViokken scale anah-sis is used, reliabilit}-
anal}-sis is used as well, in addition to factor anal~-sis, though the latter has onh- been used once.
Various anal~-sis procedures were used, but most of all the program SPSS (Statistical
Package for the Social Sciences) has been used to anah-ze the data. In chapter three :~lultilevel
Anah-sis for ~'indows (i~íL`x'in) has been used, as two nested organizational levels are subject
of this stud}-. hTultile~-el anah-sis is used when nested sources of ~-ariabilitt- are anal}-zed, such as
` titorale studies are done amon~ units prior to, during and after deplocmrnt.
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students in classes, emplo}-ees in firms, soldiers in platoons. The variability- of each level of
anal}sis is taken into account in mulálevel anal}'sis, there is variabilin- between students within
classes, but also between classes. Vi71en one of these npes of variability is ignored, the wrong
conclusions can be drawn. Basicallv, a multilevel anal}-sis as used in this book is much like a
regression analysis, with the random effects at each level of analvsis taken into account.
Outline of the book
The book reports on the emergence and development of trust w~ithin an organizaáon that is
built to operate in an en~ironment of high risk and uncertaináes. The book is made up of four
studies, laid out in chapters. Each chapter is a separate study- in itself. Some of the studies
discussed in the chapters have been published as articles or are under review for publicaáon. It
is therefore not surprising if the reader has read one of the chapters elsewhere. 1~foreover, as
each chapter contains a separate study, overlaps between theory discussion are likel}~. The
discussion on trust as found in one of the previous paragraphs can also be found in the
chapters, but it was given in this introducton. part to give the reader some idea about what to
expect.
Chapter one starts with the components and antecedents of trust among sen-icemen.
In chapter two, the results of the stud}~ in chapter one are elaborated upon in examining the
decelopment of trust among servicemen on a deplo}~ment mission. Chapters one ancí two
contain notions about trust at the interpersonal level, among colleaques.
Chapter three deals with trust in the immediate superior leader, where a situaáon of
risk is incorporated in the model. Chapter four deals with commanders' trust in leaders at
higher organizaáonal levels.
The chapters are followed bt- discussion, conclusion and recommendaáons,
limitaáons and a~-enues for further research.
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Chapter 1. Assessing Interpersonal Trust within an Organization~
1. Introduction
In recent years organizations have changed from hierarchical structures into flatter,
decentralized organizations with a closer focus on nenvorking and personal contacts (~X'ickens,
1995). Formal organizational change often invoh.es changes in the informal organizational
social order, which then calls for more personal interaction. Social relationships evohring from
this interaction create a need for trust, especiall}- in situations in which co-operation mav put
parties at risk (Lewis 8z VZ'eigert, 1985; i~la}-er, Davis 8c Schoorman, 1995; Luhmann, 2000). r1n
individual that engages in a trusting action must take the risk that either positive or negative
outcomes mat- occur, this is likelv to be reduced b}- perceived or assumed behavior of the
trusted part}~ (Cook 8c ~~'all, 1980; Coleman, 1990; iVlaver, Da~-is t~ Schoorman, 1995;
McItnight, Cummings óc Chen~an}-, 1998; Rousseau, Sitl:in, Burt cX Camerer, 1998). Trust is
not essential for co-operation as long as there is no risk in~~olved in it (hlat-er, Davis 8c
Schoorman, 1995; Luhmann, 2000), but it cannot es:ist without risk: if there were no risk, trust
would be unnecessan- (Lagerspetz, 1998; Luhmann, 2000). Trust is thus essential when people
co-operate in riskv operations under life-threatening circumstances. For that matter, trust is
especiall~~ important in organizations such as the fire brigade, the police and the armed forces.
In this chapter the focus lies on trust within one such organization, the Ro}~al
Netherlands Armt~ (RNI~1) (but the purport of this stud}- can apph. to an}- organization).
Soldiers need to co-operate, a co-operation which ma}~ involve risk, and it is this that makes
trust so essential for soldiers. After all, when it comes down to it the}~ ma~- have to entrust each
other with what is their most precious good: their lives.
~1 large reorganization has taken place in the past fourteen vears wtithin the RNLA.
rlfter the collapse of the Ví'arsaw Pact in 1989, the tasks of the Dutch armed forces
significantl}- changed from general defense against a Vi'arsaw Pact attack to participation in
peacekeeping, peace-enforcing and humanitarian operations all over the world. The
conscripuon phased out in 1995 and a force reduction from more than 80.000 to 23.000 troops
'~ Thc author~ of this chapter are Irene Ii. can der hlrxt, harin Sanders and ~~'ijbrandt H. ~-an Schuur. This chapter has
been .ubmitted as an article to the journal Human Reladons.
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was carried out (Van der List, 2002). These changes were accomparued b}~ a different
command structure. The RNLA had alwa}-s maintained a strictlt- hierarchical command
structure, but operations b}~ smaller units in remote areas call for a command structure which
allows militan- personnel in the field to make the final decision about what to do, judging b}-
the situation. This "mission-oriented command" structure puts quite some responsibility on
the shoulders of arm}- personnel at lower levels, who carry out their tasks in a relativelv
independent manner, walking or riding patrols in deplo}-ment areas and reporting on incidents.
Where superior commanders, sometimes located many miles awa}- (from their subordinate
commanders), need to rely upon their subordinate commanders, the latter commanders, in
their turn, need to rel}- on their personnel in the field for the latest update of information: a
close monitoring of personnel is hardl}~ possíble as the}~ operate be}'ond the commanders'
scope. As these situations incorporate close co-operation, trust is in~-oh~ed: between
commanders at the different levels, between commanders and their personnel, and among
soldiers.
The change in the soldiering tasks, which often brings militar~- personnel into contact
with cicilians, local workers, or other people outside the RNLr~, necessitated a guideline for
beha~rior (e.g., see Paparone, 2002). A Code of F.thics (in Dutch "Gedrag.rcode") was introduced
in 1996 from the point of view that soldiers deal with ci~-ilians during peacekeeping or
humanitarian operauons or national crises like foot and mouth disease (Van Iersel 8c Baarda,
2002). The Code reflects four components of trust that are considered its main elements:
competence belief, predictabilit}- belief, bene~-olence belief and honesh- belief (e.g. Lewis c~
~'eigert, 1985; Boon 8c Idolmes, 1991; McAllister, 1995; 1`1cKnight, Cummings 8c Chervan}~,
1998). Rule number six concerns equal treatment of all people and respect for human rights.
i~toreo~-er, rendering assistance to those in need, if possible, is an element of this rule. The rule
clearl}- reflects tw-o components of trust: honesn- ancí bene~-olence. The former is found in the
statement that all people w-ill be treated equallv. Treating people differently from others in the
same group is discrimination, and dishonest towards those from whom assistance is withheld.
Rendering assistance to people in need reflects benevolence: a soldier in a deplo}-ment area
who comes across an injured cieilian is expected to help u~thout orders from above.
Rule number se~-en requires soldiers to complete their tasks professíonall}-, eren under difficult
circumstances or in life-threatening situations. 1n order to do this, the~- must be competent at
~ See .~ppendix :~.
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their task. Rule number eight savs that everv soldier can count on his fellow servicemen to be
determined and tenacious. If this is so under all circumstances, so this soldier ma`- be assumed
to be predictable in his acrions, provided that, in compliance with rule number seven, he has
maintained his competence.
Rule number three emphasizes team members' responsibilit}- towards each other, and their
need to contribute to the team's performance. If the}- trust each other, this will be easier to
accomplish.
The Code serces as a guideline for behavior that is best described b}' the definition of
Gaumnitz and Lere (2002) for ethics: "... A framework for human conduct that relates to
moral principles and attempts to distinguish right from wrong", but it also emphasizes how
soldiers need each other. This is especiallv applicable in a deplo~~ment area, where there is no
one else to turn to but one's mates. The lack of alternatives calls for the need for trust
(Coleman, 1990). Although the Code is incorporated in arm}- training ancí in arm}~ life, the wa}~
in which the Code was introduced has made its acceptance rather difficult ~'an Iersel 8e
Baarda, 2002), so the assurance that soldiers do live up m the Code is still a matter of trust,
imrolving the element of risk (Lagerspetz, 1998).
Trust incorporates cognitive and emotional aspects (e.g. Lewis 8c ~'eigert, 1985; ;`lc
Allister, 1995) and influences task-related beha~~ior (Dirks 8c Ferrin, 2001), which makes it so
essential to identify its antecedents and components. Antecedents are elements that precede
the formation of interpersonal trust. As antecedents, or preconditions for trust formation,
previous studies have t-ielded a general attitude that others can be trusted (e.g. Rotter, 1991;
Couch 8c jones, 1997; Costa, 2000) and institutional arrangements, like maintenance of rules
(Lewis Rc ~k'eigert, 1985; Fukuyama, 1995; Horgan ác Muhlau, 1998; Paparone, 2002).
Dispr7sition to trust entails the general assumption that another person can or cannot
be trusted. It is believed to be formed from early childhood and precedes general beliefs about
another person's actual trustworthiness (e.g. Luhmann, 1979; Lagerspetz, 1998; Costa, 2000).
As such, disposition to trust is part of an individual's personalit}-.
For a real indication that someone can be trusted, I:nowledge about the other person's
actual behavior is indispensable. Beliefs are formed about the other person concerning his
competence, predictabilitt~, honest}- and benevolence. Positive beliefs about these four
components espress trust (1`Zayer, Da~7s 8c Schoorman, 1995; McKnight, Cummings 8c
Chen~an}-, 1998). But trust is a sensitive subject and measuring trust directl}~ is likel}- to }7eld
sociall~~ desirable results. Therefore, an indirect wa}~ of ineasuring interpersonal trust is
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proposed by measuring competence belief, predictabilirc~ belief, honest}- belief and bene~-olence
belief Although these components can be subject to social desirabilit5- too, at least no direct
questions about trust are asked. Therefore, an indirect way. to discover interpersonal trust is
more ]ikeh- to `7eid reliable results. The studies b`- D4at-er et al. and b}- iVfchnight et al. strongl}-
point in the direction of these beliefs as components of trust, and as far as could be
ascertained, they~ have not pre~-iousl}~ been empiricall}- tested.
~~at disdnguishes a component from an antecedent is, that the latter can be present
without a person haeirtg formed actual beliefs about another's competence, predictabilit}-,
honestt~ and benevolence. A component is formed after beliefs about another's competence,
predictabilin-, honesn- and benevolence hace emerged. The central research yuestion therefore
1S:
How can trust among soldiers ín the Royal Nether~ands Army be assessed, and how
can ít be explained.~
2. Theory
In this section some definiuons of trust u-ill be looked into. Next, components of trust will be
discussed, or in other ~~~ords: ho~~- do soldiers in the 1ZNL~~ assess their trust in other soldiers,
subseyuentl~-, the step to antecedents of trust will be cíealt virith. The discussion of components
of trust w-ill be linked with the presence of a code of ethics in organizations.
If'bat is mearrt b} trrf.rt? Going through definitions of trust, some elements appear time and again.
Vulnerabilitc- is one of them, as in Baier's definition: "... Accepted wlnerability to another's
possible but not expected ill will (or lack of good will) toward one."(Baier, 198G) or in ".. :~
state comprising the intention to accept wlnerabilin- based upon positive expectations of the
intencions or beha~~or of another." (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt á Camerer, 1998). In trusting, the
trustor is vulnerable because it is not certain whether the trustee ~~~ill act in good will. It is
therefore that trusting alwa`-s entails an element of risk (Boon Sc I-Iolmes, 1991; Coleman,
1991; Lagerspetz, 1998; ~k'eber 8c Carter, 2003). .~ risk is taken when the trustor la}-s immaterial
goods, like his life, into the hands of a trustee, belie~-ing that he is u-illing and capable of
treating these goods well, but ne~-er being sure (Luhmann, 2000). This uncertainn- is espressed
in detinitions ]ike "... Trust refers, in the main, to the extent to ~~-hich one is ~~~lling to ascribe
good intentions to and haee confidence in the words and actions of other people" (Cook ác
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VG'all, 1980) or "... The willingness of a part}- based on the expectation that the other ~ti-ill
perform a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the abilit)- to monitor or
control that other party." (May-er, Davis, Schoorman, 1995).
These definitions are presented not with the intention to improve them, as they~ do not warrant
that, but to express what is meant by trust. In trust, there are always at least two parties
involved, and a valued good: there is the trustor, intending to leave a valued good into the
hands of a trustee over whom he has no control, but of whom he believes that he (the trustee)
will not damage it, and that his interests will not be violated (Baier, 1986). The reason why- a
trustor would do this is that he depends on the trustee, or else he could do whatever needs to
be done himself. Several studies have inspired the way- in which soldiers assess trust (e.g. Cook
8t Wall, 1980; Johnson-George c~ Swap, 1982; Baier, 1986; Butler, 1991; Mishra, 1996). Various
factors of trust were idenufied in studies on, among others, trust within organizations, affective
trust or trust in leadership. Mayer, et al. (1995) have listed a number of these studies (table 1).
Later Mchnight, Cummings and Chervany (1998) identified four beliefss essential for trust:
competence belief, predictabilityT belief, honesty belief and benevolence belief. They are
discussed below.
Competence óelief. Competence belief concerns the belief that someone has the mental and
physical capacities to perform the task concerned ( Cook 8c Wall, 1980; Butler, 1991;
McAllister, 1995; Mishra, 1996; Lane, 1998). Competence is task-specific involving a certain
skill, trade or profession. For example, the fact that soldiers believe that their fellow soldiers
are competent in typical soldier skills like shooting, running the obstacle course, patrolling,
standing guard and reconnaissance does not impl}~ that these soldiers are competent in writing
letters, repairing a car or installing a new program on the computer.
Competence belief incorporates a cognitive choice, a raàonal belief that a trustee commands
the capabílities necessary- to perform the task. Trustors believing in trustees' competence also
believe that the risk is reduced that in a cooperative situation where skills are needed the
" The term "belieP' is used as a subjecàve evaluaàon b}- the actor. Other terms, like "percepàon" or "convicàon" are
equallc appGcable.
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Table 1. Trust antecedents bc ~Iacer, Da~ is c~C Scht
Authors
Bo~-le cC Bonacich (1970
Buder (1991)
Cook Hc ~~'all (1980)
Dasgupta (1988)
Deutsch (1960)




Hart, Capps, Cangemi á Caillouet (1986)
Hovland, Janis 8c Kellec (1953)
Johnson-CGeorge 8c Swap (1982)
jones, ~ames 8c Bmni (]975)
Kee 8c hnox (1970)
Larzelere á Huston (1980)
Lieberman (1981)
~lishra (1996, comment b~ ~'an der hloet))
Ring 8c ~'an de ~'en (1992)
Rosen 8c ~erdee (197~





Past interactions, index of caution based on prisoners' dilemma
outcomes
.~~~ailabilin, competence, consistenc}-, discreemess, fairness,
integritc, lo}-aln, openness, promise fulfillment, recepti~-in
Trustworthc intentions, abiliri'
Credible threat of punishment, credibilin of promises
Abiht}, intention to produce
Openness, ownership of feelings, experimentation u~th neu
behac~or, group norms
Openness, preczous outcomes
Expertness, reliabilin as information source, intentions, dt'namism,
personal attraction, reputation
,~bilitc, intention, tmstees' daims about hoa- (thev) u~ill behave
Openness~congruih, shared ~-alues, Autonomc~feedback
Fspertise, moti~-ation to Ge
Reliabilin'




Competence, openness, caring, reliabilin
9foral integrin, goodwill




Source: An integrati~-e model of organizational trust, Roger C. Afacer, james H. Dacns, F. Dacid Schoorman. Academ~
of Sianagement Revieu 1995, ~'ol 20, No 3, 709-734.
trustees do not master these skills and trustors will be harmed. For example, soldiers getting in
the back of a truck will assume that their colleague, the driver, can actuall~- dri~-e the truck and
will not get them in~rolved in an accident b`- his own doing. Belief in the dri~-er's competence
will attribute to trust in the dri~-er in his role ofdri~-er.
Predictability bek~ef. Luhmann (1979) mentions reduction of uncertainn- as a precondition of trust.
In order to reduce uncertainn' about a trustee, a trustor wants to be certain about his intentions
and beha~-ior. This certainn- can be derived from fre9uent interaction and co-operation in
which reactions to different situations are assessed. Complete certainn- is, as ~x-as alread`-
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discussed, impossible where trust relations are concerned: in trust, there is alwa~~s the risk that
realitc might turn out different from the assessment. However, it will be possible to predict a
trustee's beha~~ior or reactions to some extent after a while, which vields information about the
extent to which the trustee can be trusted: the more a trustor can predict a trustee's actions, the
better the trustor can assess if his own interests are violated. This discussion ma~- lead two
ways: higher predictabilin. does not necessaril}- impl}- that more trust can be given to the
trustee, as it can be predictecí that a trustee consistentl}- acts in violation of the trustor's
interests. As such, a trustee can be quite predictable but his beha~rior is harmful. In order for
higher predictabilit}- to be a component of trust, positive behavior of the trustee is expected.
This implies that not onlj- a trustee's consistent behavior is necessary for trusting beliefs, but it
should also be coupled with favorable, and at least harmless intentions. In other words,
predictability should be connected with a certain degree of benevolence.
Both competence belief and predictabilit5. belief are cognitive aspects of trust in others, as a
rational choice is made in the assessments of fellow soldiers' competence and predictabilit}.,
but as seen above, emotional elements are indispensable to the formation of trust (Mc~llister,
1995).
Horle.rty Gelief. An honest person acts in accordance w~th his honor, an activity directly related to
moral behavior. It implies that a person's actions are in accordance with agreements, or even
promises (Butler, 1991; Mayer et al., 1995). L}-ing, cheating and stealing are out of the question
as they are a serious ~7olation of the trustor's interests (Fuku}.ama, 1995; Lagerspetz, 1998).
Honest}- relates to positive expectations, open communication, sa}-ing what one stands for, and
behavior according to generall}~ accepted moral standards within the organization. Honestt~
belief implies that a trustor believes that a trustee will follow up on his promises or agreements,
and that the trustee is willing to act in accordance with generall}- accepted moral standards
witlun the organization, implicidy or explicitl}-. Not following up on agreements or promises
would violate the trustor's interests and therefore not contribute to trust formation. Honest}-
belief is closel~- related to benevolence belief as both incorporate a positive attitude b}- the
trustee towards the trustor. Although both beliefs can be built up onl}- by monitoring another's
behavior, and as such could be regarded as cogniuve, they are viewed here as emotional aspects
of trust as the}- do not alwa}-s contain a rational choice b}~ the trustor. For example, a soldier
newl}. placed w7th a unit can be ininall}- welcomed b}- his colleagues, to learn later that those
colleagues urho pretended to be of good u-ill, open and friendl}~ have told negative stories
about the soldier behind his back. The soldier does not make a rational choice to regard those
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other soldiers as dishonest and non-benevolent, but he is bound to feel quite uncomfortable
about them and get feelings of not trusring them.
Benevolence belief. Benevolence is "... The extent to which a trustee is believed to want to do
good to the trustor, aside from an egocentric profit move"(l~fa}-er et al., 1995). Benevolence b}'
a trustee towards a trustor impGes that the trustee has positive intentions towards the trustor, a
view supported b}- Baier (1986), Dirks 8c Ferrin (2001) and Boon 8t Holmes (1991). r~ trustor
assessing the behavior of a trustee as bene~-olent is likel`- to develop a trusting belief towards
the trustee as the chance of the trustor's interests being harmed is reduced. Benevolent
behavior tou~ards a trustor gives rise to some trusting belief but as long as it is uncertain
whether the trustee is indeed capable of certain activities, benevolence belief is not sufficient.
1~loreover, as alread}- discussed in the previous section, benevolence is a necessar~- precondition
coupled with predictabilit}-. If good intentions exist, but in similar situations the trustee
behaves as expected one time, and in an unespected manner at another, this will not lead to a
trusting belief with a trustor. Benevolence belief is more than just urillingness; it is voluntart-
willingness to do good on the part of the trustee, incorporating a sense of altruistic behavior.
Pertonality anA rrrle.c. An individual's personalin- is formed from earh- childhood, when he learns
what to expect from his social context. For example, an infant has certain inbern expectations
of his caretaker, like being fed when he is hungr}-. If he is always fed, he will assume that
whenever he is rn-ing in need, his expectations will be met. If he is not alwa}-s fed, his
expectations will be uncertain about being fed: he wrill not trust his caretaker. This general
expectation sets in his mind and become, so natura] that he is not even aware of it the
expectation has become a part of his personalin-. The extent to which expectations are met
shape la}-s the foundation for developing a trusung orientation. This trusting orientation, or
disposition to trust, forms the basis for further trust development in others, and is thought to
be an antecedent of trust, rooted in the personalit}- of a person (Rotter, 1991; Boon 8, Holmes,
1991; Ma}-er, Davis óc Schoorman, 1995; Couch 8c Jones, 1997; b4cltinight, Cummings 8~
Chere-an}-, 1998; Costa, 2000; Van der Kloet, ~'an Schuur ác Sanders, 2001). The expectation is
based on the extent to which other people in general are believed to act in accordance ~~~ith his
interests and u.ill regard his well-being. If one holds a general attitude that others can be trusted
it is likel}- that the belief that a specit7c other, or others, can be trusted uill occur sooner. The
general attitude that others cannot be trusted will lead to low trust in others. As such, the
disposition to trust is a personalin- element of trust On this basis the follo~~ing h}-pothesis can
be formulated:
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The higher di.rpo.ritiai to tiz~.rt, the higber tru~t (h~pothe.ri.c 1).
Organizations impose rules on employ~ees, and emplot-ees are expected to follow them. Rules
are meant to influence employ~ees' behavior in accordance with organizational standards and
goals, and pro~~ide transparenc`-. If organizations are consistent in their manner of maintaining
rules, retribution will alwa~-s follow a breaking of the rules, regardless of who broke a rule (see
for instance Baron 8z hreps, 1999). Consistent retribution is supposed to restructure unwanted
or unexpected behavior into wanted and expected behavior. It also sen-es as a signal to other
employ-ees that rules should not be broken. The way in w-hich rules are maintained thus shapes
a ~7ew with the emploti-ees about what to expect from their colleagues and from the
organization (e.g., Fuku~.ama, 199~; Horgan 8c Muhlau, 1998). The management is expected m
take decisions in accordance w-ith the rules. Different decisions taken against persons in similar
positions w-ill break trust down, or prevent trust from arising. For example, two women and a
man apply- for one job in a higher position. The management has stated the general rules that
are applicable for this position, and they meet all three of them. In the course of the
application, the management changes its standards for the best applicant for the job time and
again, in faeor of the man. This behavior w-ill not in~-oke trust among the women, neither
towards the management, nor towards their male colleague who ma}- be suspected of keeping a
secret agenda with the management. iVloreover, transparenc}- is broken down. This leads to the
belief that an organization can use rules as incentives for trust among its personnel. By~
consistendy- maintaining rules, no emplo~~ee is likelj- to suspect a colleague of secret
arrangements with management and transparency- is maintained (Lewis ác ~G'eigert, 1985). In
fact, the organization pro~~ides a safety- net against harmful beha~-ior (hZcKnight, Cummings 8c
Chervany-, 1998). This leads to the next hy-pothesis:
The more consi,ctentl}' o~ani:~ation.r maintain rule.r acroJ.r allperronnel, tfie more emj~loyee.r tru.ct theirfellow
employeef (hypotberir 2).
Summarizing, the four beliefs are supposed to be components of trust. By- measuring these
four components, an underly7ng element is measured: trust. Disposiuon to trust as a
personaGty- aspect is supposed to reflect the general attitude soldiers hold towards others, and it
is an antecedent of rrust. lfaintenance of rules as an organizational aspect is supposed to reflect
an instrument that can be used by- the armc in order to raise trust among solders, and it is also
an antecedent of trust The research figure is as follows:
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This model was inspired by- McItnight, Cummings 8t Chervany ( 1998) but it has been
simpGfied as some elements in the original model were more suitable for a laboratory- study-
than for the present kind of research (as stated by- McKnight et al.). In this place it is
emphasized that the model is used in this stud`~ to measure trust among soldiers, but it might
as well be used to measure trust among any- group of employ-ees in an organization. In no way
is it suggested that the model is soleh~ suitable for militart organizations, but as trust is so
essenual in organizations that operate under risky~ circumstances and because of an easy access
to the militan' organization, it was onh- logical to perform this study- within the arm~-.
3. Methodology
Ke.cportdent.r. The data for this stud`- were collected from 355 soldiers from seven units in the
RNLA. All soldiers had served at least three months within their unit; the average time soldiers
need to get accustomed to their comrades and commanders, and to life in their unit'. There
" Data from morale stndies shou. that soldiers du nut feel comfortable in their unir up to three months sening time,
u hereas from three months thec like being a member of their unit. The~' probablc need three months to get
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were 214 soldiers and 125 corporals, 16 did not report their rank (5 0~0). 319 were men, 25 (7"-ó)
were women, I1 (30~0) did not report their sex. The aeerage ume served was tu-o years and four
months, 19 (50~0) did not report their time served. The average age was 22 }~ears, 11 (30~0) did
not report their age"'. On average, the}- had semed nine months within the unit in w-hich the
sun-e}- was submitted, 27 (80~0) did not report how long thev had served within this unit. Their
education ranged from (lower or ad~-anced) elementary education (114; 32 0~0), vocational
school (181; 510~0) or general secondart- school (43; 120~0) to college or universit}- (2; 10~0). Nine
persons (30~0) reported a different school (unknown); six (20~0) did not report their education.
As man}~ as 255 soldiers (910~0) had never been deployed before, whereas 91 had and nine did
not report about it.
The respondents sen-ed in units that were about to be deplo}~ed in C}-prus or in
Bosnia. In the group, 300 soldiers were about to be deployed in Bosnia, and 55 in C}Prus. As
the soldiers were not }~et deplo}~ed and man}~ had not been deplo}-ed before, no distinction will
be made between the different groups.
Procedum. The Behavioral Sciences Division of the RNLA submits a morale surve}~ prior to,
during and following deplo}~ment to each unit that is about to be deplo}'ed. The purpose of this
sun~e}- is to inform the commander about the morale of his unit. The commander can use the
results of the surve}' to improve morale where necessary. The surce}. is submitted companv-
wise: members of the compan~- are placed together in a classroom to fill out the surve}'. 1he
trust surve}- was added to the morale surve}~. The current data pertain to the moment prior to
deployment. To avoid social desirabilit}-, no mention was made of it that the sun~e}- dealt with
trust. The response rate was high, 950~0, and probabl}- due to the wa}- the surve}' is submitted.
Non-response was incidental and concerned primarily random item non-response.
.Sun~ey. The items for the surve}- came from different sources. For disposition to trust, items
from existing surve}~s from Rotter (1967) were used, and from Johnson-George and Swap
(1982) and ~'rightsman (1991) for components of trust. Adjustments needed to be made, as
these items did not refer to militar}- situations, and a number of items needed to be
developed~~. The items about components of trust were aimed at trust in colleagues within the
same platoon~'. As a platoon has a maximum size of 34 soldiers and corporals, the items refer
accustomed in their unit. The authors thank Ctril can de `'en of the llutch Arm~ Behavioural Sciences Di~ision for
pro~iding this information.
"' Of 1 I persons a ho did not report their sex, five also did not repott their age.
~' The complete Dutch questionnaire is available from Irene ~-an der }tloer. Ifivd.fUoet~a mindef.nl.
'' Three platoons form a compam..
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to a maximum of 33 colleagues in the platoon. The items for competence belief refer to skills.
The le~-el of other soldiers' skills is assessed b~- le~-el of training of other soldiers in the platoon,
bt. the qualin- of work the}- deliver and b~- the opinion w~hether their colleagues are professional
in their work. The items for predictabilin- belief refer to the belief that soldiers know what
other soldiers will do in a various situations. This is expressed in the assumption that they- can
count on each other. Honesh- belief is expressed in believing that other soldiers w7ll do as the`-
sa}~, and that soldiers can openl}~ discuss all kinds of subjects with each other. Beneeolence
belief is assessed b}' the expectation that others will be read~- to help, and a general belief that
even'one does his best and does not spoil work for which another mai- ha~~e to pa}- the price.
For scale anah-sis Mokken Scale Anal}~sis~' was used (hlokken, 1971). First the negati~-ely-
formulated items were recoded. The analisis y~elds a four-item scale for disposiuon to trust.
Four negatively- formulated items were rejected due to a negative homogenein--coefficient (H-
coefficient) w-ith one or more of the other items. One item was excluded as its H-coefficient
was lower than the lower bound~~ (see appendix B table B1). For maintenance of rules a scale
of three items was used, out of an initia] group of nine items. The six items w.ere excluded as
their H-coefficient is lower than the lower bound (appendix B table B2). Three items for
competence belief scale well (appendix B table B3). Out of five items for predictability belief,
two items were rejected due to a negative H. ~lliat was left is a three-item scale (appendix B,
table B4). The three items for honest}~ belief scaled well (appendix B table B5), but out of four
items for benevolence belief one item w-as rejected due to a negative H-coefficient. Here too,
three items were left in the scale (appendix B cablc B6).
One Mokl:en scale analvsis for all tifteen items of competence belief, predictabilitt~ belief,
honesn- belief and bene~-olence belief together ~-ielded one scale with the same twelve items
included and the same items three rejected or excluded as w~hen performing analt-ses on thc
separate beliefs (appendix B table B7). hloreover, a Mokken scale anali-sis on the four sets ~ ~f
items of trusting beliefs separatel}- also }-ielded four good scales. This leads to the con~-icnon
that, apart from three negati~-eh- formulated items, the scales for the four trusting beliefs w-ere
"Some references: ~'an Schuur, ~~~.H. (2O0.3j. ~[okken scale analcsis: bettieen the Guttman scale and parametnc Item
Response Theort'. Polàtirul.4nnh~rir, 11, 139-163. Or Sijtsma, Iti., and Dfolenaar, L~~'. (2002). IntroAuctron to nonpnrametnr
Item Rerfionre Tbear~. ~'ol 3 of alearurement ;lletbodrJór tbe Soriul.Sr7enret Thousand Oaks: Sage.
" The lower bound in ~tokken Scale analcsis is usualh set at 0.30. Items with loa-er than 0.3o are escluded from a
scale.
36
lssessing Interpersonal Trust u.ithin an Organization
good from ~-arious points of view. For the results of the scale anal}~sis and some discussion
about these results, the reader is referred to appendix B~'.
4. Results
First, a correlation analysis was conducted on the four obsen~ed beliefs and the tu-o obser~-ed
antecedents (see table 2). Table 2 shows significant correlar;ons (at the .01 level, one-tailed)
between all four components, and an insignificant correlation benveen the personalin. and
rules aspects, dispositir7n to trust and maintenance of rules. Furthermore, it can be seen that
the correlation benveen the beliefs and disposition to trust is significant, as well as the
correlauon between maintenance of rules and the beliefs, except for predictabilit}. belief. To
test the model regression analysis was used. As a dependent variable trusting beliefs was taken
as one scale, with disposition to trust and maintenance of rules as independent variables. The
results of the regression anal}~sis are presented in table 3.
Both independent variables are good predictors of trusting beliefs: disposition to trust
has a significant beta of .28, so hy-pc~thesis 1 can be confirmed. The beta of maintenance of
rules is lower, but still significant at .19. H}-pothesis 2 can be confirmed as well. The R-square
is .11, meaning that 110~0 of the ~-ariance in trust is explained b}- disposition to trust and
maintenance of rules. The demographic variables of age, time served at the present post, time
served in the army and education, were added in the regression anal}-sis to check their influence
on our modeL Age has a negative significant effect on trust with a beta of -.16, but not
significant enough to cause a change in the R-square. Time sen~ed at the present post, time
sen-ed in the arm~- or education level bear no effect on trust.
15 Cpon exatruninK the scales uith reGabilin~ anal}~ses, almost the same results can be reported as with ~fokken scale
anah sis. The best scale Eor competence belief is the same three item scale as in ~(SP, w.ith an alpha of 0.63. The best
scale for predictabilin beGef is the same three item scale as in ~[SP, uith an alpha of 0.73. The best scale for honesn.
betief is the same three item scale as in `[SP uith an alpha of 0.65. T`he best scale for bene~-olence belief is the same
three item scale as in ~ISP u ith an alpha of 0.?6. ~C~hen scaling all fifteen items together, thc best scale is achieved With
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Table 3. Re~ession analti~sis of disposition to trust and maintenance of niles on trust
Bèta
Disposition to trust 4.1'
Sig
.000
Maintenance of rules 187'
.I1
Signiticant betas are marked uith an asterisk.
2.83 .005
5. Discussion, conclusions and recommendations
Drawing from theoretical studies b}-, amongst others, Ma`-er, Davis and Schoorman (1995) and
b}~ McIinight, Cummings and Chen~an}- (1998) it was tested how four beliefs, competence
belief, predictabilit}- belief, honestv belief and benevolence belief together are components of
trust Components of trust are essential as trust is a sensitiae subject and, as such, likely to be
subject to social desirability in sun-e}~s. B}- indirectl}- measuring trust, using these four
components, it can be expected that more reliable answers are given pertaining to trust.
Soldiers assess if the}- can trust other soldiers b}' other soldiers' perceived
competence, predictability, honest}- and benevolence. Skills are learned during training through
w-hich soldiers go together. As the}- cannot constantl}- monitor their colleagues' skills, at some
áme they ~uill haae to assume that their colleagues are skilled. This is done b}- level of training
of other soldiers in the platoon, b}~ the qualit}- of work the}~ deGver and b}- the opinion that
their colleagues are professional in their work. Soldiers assess other soldiers' predictabilit}- b`-
the assumption that the}~ can count on each other, but also b}- the wa}- in which the}- expect
their colleagues to react in different situations. The`- know where they stand with each other.
Other soldiers' honesri~ is assessed b~- the extent to which soldiers think other soldiers follow
up in doing what they sa`.. This honest}~ belief is also assessed by the openness of soldiers
amongst themselaes: whether they sa~- what the}' think about each other. Ideas and
expectations are openl}- discussed among soldiers, again expressing honest}- among them. The
39
A Soldierlc Perspecti~ e on Trust
fourth aspect, benevolence belief, is assessed by the extent to ~~.hich the}- expect their
colleagues to work accuratel}-, bt~ their ~tirillingness to help each other and the general opinion
that the`- co-operate yuite well in the platoon. This aspect incorporates an extent of altruistic
behavior, as the ~~Tillingness to assist does not require reciprocity from the recei~-er.
~s a first interesting result, the stud~- shows that trust is well measured b~. a t~z~elee
item scale, so social desirabilit}- directl}. related to trust, quite Gkeh- when trust is measured b~~
asl~ing the direct question "do }~ou trust }-our colleague?" is ruled out. However, it cannot be
rules out that some social desirabilitti~ ma}~ remain when questions are asked about these four
components. .
Furthermore, what is strilcing is that the four components reflect aspects mentioned
in the Dutch arm}- Code of Ethics. This Code of Ethics is intended as a means to an end of
moral conduct bt- arm~- personnel . In this wa}~, the arm~- can promote trustworthy behavior bt-
its personnel in educating it in the Code of Ethics. ,~1n}. soldier can talk to an}~ other soldier
about his conduct and base himself upon these general rules that everyone needs to abide b~-.
Ofticers and non-commissioned oftlcers can promote this b}- setting a good example and
addressing their personnel about the Code as well. ~1lthough the Code of Ethics had a difficult
start in the RI~Lr1 and ne~~er reall~- got the place it deserved, army ethics get increasing
attention ~~~ithin the arm~- (Van Iersel 8~ Baarda, 2002). r1 more prominent role for the Code of
Ethics in amz}- training and da~--to-da}- rourine is therefore encouraged. Other organizations
that have adopted a code of ethics can follo~~. this procedure and thus promote interpersonal
trust among its personnel. ~1s such, a code of ethics ser~-es more organizations than just the
arm~-.
A second interesting result from this studj- is that organizations can promote
interpersonal trust b~- maintaining rules consistenth- across its personnel as maintenance of
rules precedes trust This contributes to transparenc~-, which is likeh- to drown in the man}-
mergers of organizations in the past ~-ears. Interpersonal trust is bound to contribute to a better
functioning of these organizations. This is also important information for ant organization:
maintaining rules in a consistent manner promotes transparenc}' "-ithin an organizauon.
Organizations, the arm~- included, ha~-e an excellent instrument here to lac do~~~n a solid
foundation of trust among its personnel.
Trust formation is also preceded b}- a general belief that others can be trusted, often
called disposition to trusc This personalin- aspect seems hard to influence b~- an organization.
The influence of soldiers' age, time sen-ed in the present post, time ser~-ed in the armc and
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soldier education was also considered, but none of these demographic aspects influences trust
in other soldiers.
Apart from disposition to trust and mainrenance of rules, it ma~~ be expected that
other elements are likeh- to precede the formation of trust, as the amount of explained ~-ariance
in trust did not appear to be quite high. A search for these elements opens fields for further
studt-: how can trust be esplained further, apart from maintenance of rules and disposition to
trUtií.'
As was alread}' said: not onl~" the arm`. can draw its conclusions from this stud~-, but
other organizations as well. Vil~ere more organizations ~'alue ethical behavior b}~ its personnel,
trustwortht' behavior, as part of ethical bcha~-ior, can be promoted bt- maintenance of rules and
maintaining a code of ethics.
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Chapter 2. How Trust develops among Soldiers on a Mission'~~
1. Introduction
A Dutch say-ing runs that 'trust arrives on foot but leaves on horseback', meaning that it takes
time for trust to emerge, but a breach of trust is easil}~ brought about. This easy- breach of trust
is caused because of its ~~lnerabílity (e.g. Luhmann, 1979; Coleman, 1990; Boon 8c Holmes,
1991; Lewicki 8c Bendict Bunker, 1996; Mey-erson, Weick 8c Kramer, 1996). Trust is important
because a trusting person assumes that the risk of being taken advantage of or the risk of being
damaged by another person's actions is minimal, and this stimulates co-operation. In
organizations where risk taking is part of the dail}~ work and smooth co-operation is necessarv,
such as the military, trust is essential.
Studies of trust often concern components of trust and are based on a one-shot
measurement only, that is, trust is examined at one moment onl}~ (e.g. Melohn, 1995; Lewicki,
McAllister 8c Bies, 1998). This study-, however, encompasses three consecutive measurements
of trust within the same units and focuses on the development of trust after its emergence ancí
on possible influences related to its development. Other research (Van der Kloet, Sanders 8c
Van Schuur, forthcoming, see also chapter 1 of this book) showed that trust consists of the
following four components: competence (are colleagues capable of fulfilling their tasks?),
predictabilitt. (to what extent can a colleague be counted on?), honesty (indispensable, because
it incorporates following up on promises) and benevolence (the probability that someone will
help, even when not asked but of his or her free will). Soldiers need these components to
reduce their uncertainn. about other soldiers' behavior and to lower the risk that the}- will be
harmed. A certain amount of risk and uncertaint5- will remain, or else trust would be
superfluous (Lagerspetz, 1998).
Two elements are known to precede trust (Van der Kloet et al., forthcoming, see also
chapter 1 of this book). First, consistent maintenance of rules b}' unit command gives soldiers
the feeling that they are treated equally and that rewards and sanctions are distributed equall}..
'~ The authors of this chapter are Irene E. van der Kloet, Joseph L. Soeters and Karin Sanders. 11us chapter has been
published in a special issue of Srnall ~'ars and Insurgencies ( in print).
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Consistent sanctioning and rewarding makes e~-ert- soldier aware of his rights and it ma`-
function as an incennve for proper beha~-ior, reducing uncertaint,- about other soldiers'
beha~~or. Second, disposition to trust is generall~~ assumed to be an antecedent of trust, i.e. a
`stable w-ithin-parn- factor'~- (e.g. ~1a}-er, Da~~is 8c Schoorman, 1995; Van der Itloet et al.,
forthcoming).
Trust is important for the armc for an external and an internal reason. The external
reason relates to the ~-arious situations that servicemen ma}- tínd themseh-es in during peace
operauons. The~~ contact the local population and ser~~icemen from other countries, people
from ~-arious cultural backgrounds. The~- ma~- come across minefields, or be confronted with
suicide attacks. In all these situations the~- need to act with competence and predictabilin-, and
thet- must count on each other, w-hich relates to benevolence and honestt-. In such situations
the}- need to hang on to their mutual trust to sun-i~-e.
The internal reason relates to the fact that the~- li~-e closelti- to each other for a longer period of
time in the deplo~-ment area, on the base. Living so closeh- together, tensions eventualh- seem
una~.oidable, but as they ha~-e to co-operate during their mission, trust seems a solid base.
1`loreover, soldiers ma~. need to operate independentl}-, in small groups, and their beha~-ior
cannot constanth~ be monitored, so their supervisors must trust them.
~forale studies in Israel and the RNL:~ mention trust as an element of morale (Gal,
1986; ~'an Tintelen, Tibboel, Swanenberg 8~ ~'an de Ven, 2001). rllthough the importance of
trust in militar~- operations is ~~-ide1~- recognized (e.g. Lairdmachtdoctnnefiub{icatre II, DeelA, 1998),
none of these studies digs into the deeelopment of trust during missi~ns and factors that may
influence this development. ?~s it is unknown how trust will develop during a deplo}-ment, the
present stud~- is as unique as it is explorati~-e, in that it examines:
How does trust develop over a svr-month mission, and bow can this development be
explaíned.~
Belou-, some general theoretical nouons on the formation of trust will be presented
and the de~-elopment of related subjects will be discussed in order to explore the time-
dependent development of phenomena, such as cohesion and solidaritt-. Subsequent]}-, the
method emplot-ed in the stud~- at hand w-ill be described, after which the development of trust
w-ill be extensicelt' examined from several angles. Trust as a w.hole, but also its separate
components, competence, predictabilin-, honesn~ and benevolence, w-ill be dealt w-ith.
'- Trust thus assessed consists of four components and nro antecedents. Bc components an indi~-idual assesses tntst in
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tiioreover, a distinction u-ill be made between cognitive components on the one hand
(competence and predictabilitt-) and emotional components on the other (honest`- and
benevolence). The chapter closes with discussion, conclusion and recommendations.
2. Theory
A po.rriblej~atterrt of trust development. Time is essential for the de~-elopment of trust, as it is needed
to build up beliefs about each other's beha~-ior. The longer people interact, the longer their
"shac}ow of the past" (Axelrod, 1984; hfeyerson et al., 1996; Raub, 1997). Time also pertains to
future co-operation: the prospect of cooperating in the future casts a shadow upon the future
trustworthiness of the other person, and yields ample possibilities to monitor an individual's
beha~rior. Bartone and Adler (1999) present an example of both the impact of the shadow- of
the past and the shadow of the future in a stud}' on cohesion among soldiers during a
deploy~ment mission. In this study- cohesion was found to be low in the beginning of the
deplo`-ment, when soldiers were just beginning to co-operate. Towards the middle of the
deplo}'ment, when both the shadow of the past and the shadow of the future met, cohesion
increased. Towards the end of the deplo}-ment, when the shadow of the past was long but the
shadow of the future became short-li~-ed, cohesion was found to decrease again. A similar
in~-erted t?-pattern - starting out low, reaching a high point around the middle and decreasing
again toward the end- is found in a stud}- on the development of solidarity' among Ph.D.
students (Koster, Sanders 8t Van Emmerik, 2002). Both the shadow of the past and the
shadow of the future were shown to be important for solidar}- behavior among these students.
Of course, trust, cohesion and solidarit}~ are not the same. However, trust tnight follow a
similar pattern as trust, like cohesion and solidarin-, indicates relatively strong, direct, intense,
frequent or positi~~e ties between people (Collins, 1988; Manning, 1991; Bartone 8c Kirkland,
1991; Faust 8c ~X~assermann, 199~.
There is another possible de~-elopment, though. A stud}' mainly- concerned with
cultural issues sheds a different light on the possible development of trust oeer time. More
often than not, it appears that soldiers ha~-e high expectations about a deplovment (Van
Geloo~-en 8c Van de Bos, 2000), but these expectations are not alwa}-s met: sen-icemen ma}-
another person, u hereas antecedents precede trust formation.
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believe the}' are going to do exciting work, but in realit~. what the}- do most is patrol areas and
gather information from the local people and sometimes experience boredom (Harris ác Segal,
1985). Actuallt-, the~- often do social work rather than soldiers' work. Disappointment, as a
consequence, is likely. Hofstede shows this in his acculturation curve, shown in figure 2
(Hofstede, 1991).
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Hofstede, G.H. (1991) Cnlturer and O,AaniZatronr. S'ojtu~are ofthe Mrnd, í~kGraw Hill, London.
In the beginning there is a feeling of euphoria (phase 1), caused by the excitement of seeing
another countn-. rlfter arrival in that other country a culture shock follows as the values,
customs and rituals in the new countn- appear to be totall`- different from what people are used
to at home (phase 2). Even if people have been prepared for this in information meetings,
reality may- prove different. This ma}~ be parah-zing and lead to feelings of fear and hostilitt-
towards the new environment This phase changes into a phase of acculturauon, in which the
soldier learns to adjust to the new circumstances (phase 3). Eventuall`- a new balance is found
(phase 4) in which the new environment ma}- be experienced worse than home (level a), just as
~o
Hou Trust Develops among Soldiers on a 1lission
good as home (level b) or even better than home (level c). This cun~e may apply- to the militarv,
as soldiers to be deplo}-ed get information about the deplo}-ment area and are trained for
various situations. C)nce in the deplo}~ment area, realit}- ma}- prove differentl}-. Moreover, the}-
are separated from home, famil}- and friends. Anxiety about the upcoming mission can turn
into disappointment and feelings of distress once they are deploy~ed, initiallt~ causing a
reduction in trust in terms of competence belief, predictability- belief, honesm belief and
benevolence belief. However, after a certain period a recovery will take place as they get
accustomed to their new situation and get to know their fellow sen~icemen better.
In summan', different curves, a U-pattern or an im-erted U-pattern, mav be expected
as the missions examined are different, but other possible patterns -'half U's` or no changes at
all - are not a priori excluded.
Before presenting the results, the various aspects of trust will be discussed at greater depth,
first. Trust is formed in interpersonal interaction and may or may~ not arise when co-operation
has lasted for some time (1~leyerson et al., 1996; Raub, 199~. As mentioned above, four
components appear prominent in the formation of trust: competence belief, precíictability~
belief, honest}- belief and benevolence belief (e.g. Cook Sc VG'all, 1980; Lewis cSt VC'eigert, 1985;
Gambetta, 1988; Good 1988; Butler, 1991; McAllister, 1995; Melohn, 1995; Lagerspetz, 1998;
McKnight, Cummings and Chervan}., 1998; Van der Itloet et al., forthcoming).
Competence belief. Competence belief concerns the belief that someone else has the capacities to
perform a task. This assumption can onl}- hold if a soldier knows or may assume that other
soldiers indeed possess militan- prowess. Soldiers have trained for a deplo}-ment, increasing
their competence, and also form beliefs about their fellow soldiers' competence. During
deplo}~ment soldiers continuously- practice what they have learned. Their competence must
help them to fulfill the assignment, but also to sun7ve during a crisis. Soldiers who believe in
their colleagues' competence are aware that the}- are capable of protecting them in difficult
situaáons. This competence belief is part of their trusting belief in their colleagues.
Predictability belief. During arm}' training, soldiers learn how to deal u~th various circumstances.
Their fellow soldiers must know how the}- will react, so a certain amount of predictability~ is
needed. The actions to be taken are standard procedures: if A happens, you do B. The reason
for this is that soldiers, who operate in teams, u-ill know what to do themselves and what they
can expect from their fellow soldiers, and it makes each soldier's action rather predictable.
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During their mission-oriented training soldiers refine their skills and train for the w-orst-case
scenario. This is like1~- to increase their predictabilin- and mutual trust.
Hone.rt)- belief und benevolenre belief. Close co-operation betu-een soldiers necessitates an open
relation and a follow-ing up on promises, which reyuires honesri~. Also, thec will want their
comrades to help them when needed, even when not asked for, which calls for benevolence.
Honestt- and benevolence belief can be formed during mission-oriented training. For some
soldiers this mission-oriented training is a group training, but for others it is an individual
training, dependent upon their task in the deplot~ment area. C)ne conseyuence of this is that
during mission-oriented training honesn- and benevolence belief can sometimes be difficult to
build up. This is different for the build-up of competence belief and predictabilit}~ belief as
these latter components can at least be assumed to be built up as a result of going through
training together. .~1s such, competence belief and predictabilitt. belief are cogniti~-e
components, where honesrt- belief and benevolence belief are more emotional components.
Competence belief, predictabilin- belief, honest}~ belief and bene~~olence belief are components
of trust, as a person's (a soldier's) trust in others is composed of these four aspects. If someone
is asked whether or not he trusts someone else, the answer ma~- be that he does so, because he
has noticed that this person is competent, predictable, honest and benevolent. Components
reyuire actual recognized actions be another person and differ from antecedents, as
antecedents precede trust formation and as such can be present before someone has had time
to get to kno~c colleagues better. Disposition to trust and maintenance of rules are seen as
antecedents of trust (see also Van der Itloet et al., forthcoming).
Di~po.ritiofr to mr,rt. The disposition to trust is the trusting attitude an indi~7dua1 has deaeloped
since childhood, influenced b~- how others have treated him (1~1cKnight et al., 1998; Costa,
2000). Ma}-er calls it "...a stable w-ithin-partti- factor that w-ill affect the likelihood the part}' will
trust"(~fa~-er et al., 1995). Soldiers w-ork closel}- together during a deplot-ment in a foreign area.
The~- have no one else to rurn to but their fellow soldiers, with whom the}~ work during the
da}-, recreate when off dun,- and share their sleeping yuarters. Interpersonal incidents like
arguments and disagreements that lead to a breach of trust u~ill happen, but w-ill the~- influence
their disposition to trust~ If trusting beliefs become more positive, the general belief that other
people usuall}- can be trusted ma~- become more positive too. Likew-ise, if trusáng beliefs in
other soldiers decline the general belief that other people can usuall~- be trusted ma}- decline as
well. This raises the yuestion whether disposition to trust is reall}- stable, or that it can be
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influenced b}. trusting beliefs. If the latter is the case, there is a two-way ínteraction bettveen
disposition to trust and trusting beliefs: the}- influence each other.
~~farntenance of rules. The armv is a hierarchic organization that heavily- leans on rules and the
structuring of processes. Rules give structure and certainty to an organization and its
environment. The army- rules prescribe not only army- activities in detail, such as how to
maintain vehicles, how to stand guard, how to write letters, how to dress in various situations,
how to hoist the flag, but also how to learn shills and maintain drills. Rules are an important
part of the functioning of the arm~-. Armv units maintain rules to give c~irection and structure
to their operations. Commanders will tr}- to reduce uncertainty- as much as possible during
deploy-ment by apply-ing the rules strictlv, thus trying to attain maximum securit}' for their
people. This may be especially applicable in a deploy-ment area. Rules are also meant to be
maintained in an even-handed manner for all unit members, and consistently- over time. If a
soldier behaves in an untrustworthv wav towards his comrades and such behavior is
consistently- sanetioned by~ unit command, his colleagues will get the impression that
trustworth`~ behavior is promoted and that untrustworthy beha~~or is discouraged. .~s such,
maintenance of rules bv unit command serves as an incentive for trust in other soldiers. It is
the task of the leadership, officers and non-commissioned officers to see to it that these rules
are maintained by. every-one. Still, the maintenance of rules can differ among units, because
some officers and non-commissioned officers are more lenient than others, allowing a greater
flexibility- in rule application than others. Hence, development of trust may- differ between
units, depending on the wav in which rules were maintained.
Above, the components of trust, as essential elements in assessing trust in other
people, were discussed along with the antecedents of trust, aspects that precede trust
formation, even when interpersonal interaction has not ~~et taken place. The follouring section
deals with a descripuon of the samples and the way in which the data were collected. Besides,
the areas in which the units were deplo~-ed are described.
3. Methodology
A questionnaire was submitted to groups of servicemen at three moments, the first time being
just after the units had finished their mission-oriented training and prior to their departure for
the deploy-ment area, the second time more or less halfway- their deplovment, which is on
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average after having been in the deplo~-ment area for three months, and the third time
immediatel}. after their post-deplo}-ment leave, whích is around two weeks after the}- had
returned from their deplovment. The data are not panel data: although it would have been
interesting to have the respondents' armt- numbers and compare pre-deplo}~ment (tl), mid-
deplovment (t2) and post-deplo}-ment (t3) at the indi~~idual level, this was prohibited by- arm`-
command for privac}. reasons. Therefore, averages of unit data have been used. The entire
group of respondents consisted of six units: r1 and B are the first two units that went to
Bosnia, C, D and E are the three units that succeeded them, and F is a unit that went to
Cyprus.
341 soldiers and corporals responded to the questionnaire at pre-deplo}-ment (tl), 352
soldiers and corporals at mid-deplo}-ment (t2) and 272 soldiers and corporals responded at
post-deplot'ment (t3). The number of respondents ís much lower at post-deplovment mainly
because in unit C onl}~ 11 respondents filled in the questionnaire at t3. Therefore, the results of
unit C at t3 must be approached with cauuon. .~s mentioned, the samples differ in size
benveen the three measurements, because sometimes soldiers were on leaae, awa}~ on dutv, sick
or absent for other reasons, and could not t1ll in the sun-ev.
The response throughout the stud~- was generall`- high, on average 900~0, though there
is high item non-response in maintenance of rules at t3: more than 500~0, on average, in all
units. The results of maintenance of rules at t3 therefore must be considered with caution.
Most of the soldiers and corporals were men, 940~0, and óoio were a~omen. Their
average age was 22 }-ears. IV1an}- of them (73`i'o) had never been deplo}~ed before. Their
educauon was mainlti~ lower general secondan- educadon (310~0), lower vocational education
(294io), intermediate ~-ocational education (22`Yo), or high school (l00~0). On average, they had
been in the arm}- for almost 3}-ears (33 months, minimum 6 months and maximum 9 vears)
and a little over a}~ear with their own unit (15 months, minimum 3 months and maximum 6
y-ears). Table 4 gives an oven-iew of the main demographic data per unit at pre-deplovtnent.
Apart from the surveys some inten~iews were conducted with servicemen of various ranks that
went to Cy-prus and to Bosnia, after return from their deplo}-ment. In addition, the first author
eisited one of the deplo}-ments in Bosnia and observed e~-er}-da`- life in the deplo`~ment area ,
and also took the opportunin- to talk to sen-icemen from different ranks.
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'fable 4. DemoKraphic data of six units on deplovment abroad.
L'nit and unit size at tl, Sex (ml~ Average age average tíme served in the Average time served
t2, t3 arm}~ w~ithin the unit
A(n-52 1 58 1 72) 94 ~ 6 22 32 months 10 months
B(n-71 ~ 84 1 40) 88 ~ 12 21 35 months 17 months
C(n-53 ~ 65 ~ 11) 100 ~ 0 21 31 months 15 months
D(n-77 ~ 68 1 64) 96 ~ 4 21 32 months 15 months
L. (n-33 ~ 31 ~ 26) 100 ~ 0 22 33 months 19 months
P(n-55 ~ 4G ~ 45) 91 ~ 9 23 35 months 12 months
Deploymerrtr, deployment urea.r ane! unit .ri~e. r1 unit's deplo}~ment formation takes place four months
prior to deployment. The basic unit to go on a mission is a battalion. t1s not all personnel
needed in the deployment area is originally present in the battalion, personnel from as many as
fifty other units may be added. This is important to know as it implies that many soldiers do
not know each other well until brieflv prior to deployment and this may influence their trust in
each other. This moment of unit formation is also the start of a four month- mission-oriented
training, during which the unit is prepared for the worst possible situations. In this training
basicallv everyone going on deployment with the unit participates. However, some soldiers are
added to the unit only shortly before deployment, due to their indispensabilitv in their own
unit, late notice, or other reasons. After deployment not only do the soldiers from other units
return to their own unit, but also manv soldiers belonging to the battalion leave the unit as
their contracts expire~s, which often results more or less in a decomposition of the unit. This
may influence their trust towards the end of the deployment as their shadow of the future
becomes quite short.
Over the past ten years many Dutch troops have been deployed in Bosnia and
Herzegowina (usually referred to as Bosnia, in former Yugosla~~ia). During the war in Bosnia,
these troops were deployed as United Natíons forces (UNPROFOR, United Nations
'" Soldiers in the RNLA sigrt a contract for a limited number of }ears, from three to five ~ears. Sometimes the}' can
extend the contract, sometimes they have to leave the atm~~ u hen the ecmtract expires.
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Protecáon Force), but after the Davton Peace Agreement the} were deplo~-ed as forces under
command of the North Atlantic Treatti- Organization (NATO), first as Implementauon Force
(IFOR), then as Stabilizaáon Force (SFOR). The size of the Dutch troops in SFOR is a
battalion, apart from some smaller groups and indi~-iduals that are located at ~-arious places in
Bosnia. The Dutch battalion in Bosnia operates under combined~~ command ( BiH-command)
but the battalion commander can operate yuite independently. The battalion's tasks are to
patrol the areas, gather information among the local population, disarm civilians (manti~ ci~-ilians
in Bosnia kept a weapon at home at that time), keep relations between the different groups
(Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croatians, Bosnian i`luslims) stable, locate mines, clear minefields,
and generall~- help to rebuild the countrt-. The units patrol in small groups on foot, or b`- car,
and thev are the eces and ears of the battalion commander and his staff. Thev hand out leaflets
to inform the local population about their activiáes. lisuall}-, the contacts bet,veen soldiers and
locals are intensive and rated positiveh-, as one SFOR commander stated in a briefing. The
training, a preparaáon for the worst possible situations, ma}- have given rise to expectaáons of
exciting work. It follows a regular schedule and adjustments can be made if the Operationa]
Staff of the Rrn-al Netherlands rlrmt-, the bodt- that monitors all deplopments of the RNL:~,
deems it necessarv.
During deplovment the tasks are not considerecí ~-er~- exciáng b}~ the soldiers, but as
the patrolling area is large, boredom does not easilv de~-elop, in contrast to other peacekeeping
missions (Harris 8c Segal, 1985). No matter how yuiet a deplo~~ment ma}~ seem, incidents
happen. Towards the end of the tlrst deplo}'ment in Bosnia, tensions among the local ethnic
groups grew because of upcoming elections in the area. In order to gain voters' support mant'
poliácians tried to discredit their rivals using a language of hatred'-". The deplo~-ed units had to
work dat- and night to secure strategic positions in their area, and instead of thinking about
returning home, securitt- in their area was their main focus. ~lfter their rotation their successors
had to conánue this hard work. ~Toreover, the general atàtude towards Muslims resulting from
the attacks on the ll"orld Trade Center in New York Citc made them more alert as tensions
grew among the local population, mam- of~ti-hom are ~fushm.
The other deplovment area in this studv is Ctprus, an island in the i~lediterranean and
a Briásh colon~- until 19G0. Its populaàon comprises a Turkish minoritt- (20"'0) and a Greek
'" Combined operaáons are operaáons that are carried out b~ several countries together under the flag of an
internaáonal organizaáon, such as N.1T0.
"'ht~t :~lu~ti~c.ihf-hr.org~~àe~cbinar~~ciewdocument.php~doc id-1971
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majority- (800~0). In 1963 archbishop l~fakarios of C~prus proposed reformations, which caused
military- violence between Greece and Turkev over C}-prus. In 1964 the United Nations
Peacekeeping Force in Cy-prus (UNFIC~~) ~vas deplo~-ed in order to keep Turkish and Greek
populations on C}'prus separated. Its task was to see to a cease-fire between the Greek and thr
Turkish Armies. UNFICI'P was placed under Briush command, but supported b}' other
countries. The RNI~ has participated in L?NFICYP during six consecutive rotations,
deploying one company (about 100 men and women) ever}- six months. The commander of a
Dutch L?NFICYP compan}~ did not haee the same autonomv as a Dutch SF(~R battalion
commander , as the L:NFICYP company. commander operated under direct command of the
British commander. British and Dutch forces closele co-operated ancí the Dutch operation was
strictl}~ supen-ised by- the British. The compan}-'s platoons all had an area in the neutral zone
between the Turkish and the Greek part that they had to patrol on foot, by- bike or b}~ car.
Each area contained a number of manned observation posts. The patrolling areas were quite
small, so soldiers li~-ed and worked closel`- together. The obsernation posts were in the neutral,
UN controlled zone benveen the Turks ancí the Greeks. At some places this zone w.as a
kilometer w-ide, but at other places it was aen- narrow, sometimes no more than 20 meters.
Incidents happened dail`~, such as Turks and Greeks throwing stones at each other, one of the
parues moving the barbed wire, or pointing a loaded gun at the other part}-, or both parties
challenging the L'N soldiers. In all these incidents, UNFIC~~ soldiers were literally- in the
middle, and needed to negotiate between the parues, the Dutch soldiers as well. The Dutch
soldiers initiall}' found it difficult to negotiate, but by- getting into a dail}- routine thev even got
quite good at it. The unit in Cy-prus worked under a strict British rule, evert-thing had to go b}-
the book, a strictness most Dutch soldiers were not reall~. familiar w~th. Howe~-er, Dutch
soldiers stated in inten~iews that the strictness of the British rules was only- on the outside: if
}-ou did not stick to the rules ~-ou could get aw-a}' with it if y.ou were not caught, a ~-iew openl}.
expressed b~~ British officers and non-eommissioned officers. Dutch soldiers were not used to
this, and the}- were appalled b`- it, which caused a feeling of togetherness and an incentiee to do
better than the Briàsh (e.g. Soeters Sc Bos-Bakx, 2003).
Due to the different characteristics of the deplo}-ments various outcomes may- be
expected. In Bosnia, there had been a war, quite recentl}-. Soldiers who went to Bosnia would
ha~-e heard stories about it. The}- could work rather independentlc and worked in a large area,
but the}- ma~- have been cíisappointed about the mission because the~- might ha~-e expected
more excitement.
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The soldiers in Cyprus worked under close supen-ision of the British armv. It was not the first
time a Dutch unit was part of UNFICYI', so it mav be assumed that they had heard stories
about Cyprus before they- went there. The situaáon in Cyprus had been stable for decades.
Moreover, unit command had emphasized that it certainl`- was no holida}-, although they~ were
going to a holiday- island. Iniáall}- their expectaáons of the deployment would not ha~-e been
too high.
4. Results
The four beliefs, competence, predictability, honesty and benevolence, as well as
disposiáon to trust and maintenance of rules were measured at three moments. Competence
belief, predictabilitv belief, honest}- belief and benevolence belief together represent trusáng
belief and as the intention was to test the development of trust as a whole, these components
separately were not onlc measured at three moments, but also the scores for the four beliefs
were added up into one. Besides, an overview was made of the changes in the four
components (table 8).
Trust was assessed b}- four beliefs: competence belief, predictability- belief, honesty
belief and benevolence belief. In a correlaáon anal}-sis of the four beliefs, of all units together
and per unit, as well as per moment - pre-deplo~-ment (tl), mid-deplo}~ment (t2) and post-
deploy-ment (t3)- it is shown how these four relate to each other at the three measurements
(table 5). i~foreover, the four beliefs form a i~fokl:en scale (1~lokken, 1971) at tl, t2 and t3.
Table 5A shows how the correlaáons betw-een the four components of all units together are
significant at the .Ol le~-el. The correlaáons between the components per urát at the three
measurements are also shown. Nearh' all correlaáons are signitícant, w~ith the excepáon of the
correlaáons between competence belief and the other three beliefs in unit C at t3. This bias in
results ma}' be explained by- the small number of soldiers in unit C at t3. The correlaáons in
unit E are not significant between competence belief on the one hand and honesn- belief at tl
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Table 5: Correlations betu~een the four beGefs at pre-deplo}vient (tl), nud-deploy.ment(t2) and post-deployment (t3).
Table SA: Correlations between the four beLefs for all units together







rl 8.98 (1.6oj 582"
t2 8.83 (1.G~) .G21"
t3 8.78 (151) .673~`
Honesn belief
tl 9.11 (150) .588'~ 629"
t2 8.90 (1.48) S56" .697~x
t3 8.80 (1.51) ;54~~ 658"
Beneaolence beGef
r1 9.39 (1.59) 589:: ~75`~ G1G~x
t2 8.85 (1.75) .G80~~ .?03~` .632'~`
t3 fi.94 ( LGf1) G~~~„ .703" .G84"
'" correlation is significant at the .Ol le~.el
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Table SB: Unit A( tl n-52; t2 n-58; t3 n--~







tl 8.71 (1.40) 42?"
t2 8.69 (1.88) 642"
t3 8.89 (1.52) 72i1~~
Honestt~ belief
tl 89G (1.39) SS?"~' 6U2"
t2 8.86 (1.541 GU 1~' 741 `~
r3 8.89 (1.3G) 64'2" 604"
Benevolence belief
tl 9.20 (1.30) .518" .4G3" .552"
t2 8.66 ( 2.1I) 82~'~' .719" 629'~
t3 8.79 (7.G8) -8-" ?i18" G4i'~
" correlarion is sigtuficant at the .U1 le~ e1
and t3 on the other, between competence belief and benevolence belief at tl, and between
predictabilin~ belief and benevolence belief at t2. Howe~~er, judging bp the overall correlations
between the beliefs in the units it mav be said that these beliefs together represent trusting
belief in other soldiers throughout deplot-ment yuite well, which also implies that trust is quite
stable throughout the deploy-ment insofar as all four components fairlt- equall`- comprise trust.
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Table SC: Unit B(tl n-71; t2 n-84; t3 n-4U)







tt 8.64 ( 1.64) .516~'
t2 8.76 (1.80) .709`"
t3 8.70 (L54) .696"
Honestt' belief
t1 8.86 (1.39j .649': 641"
t2 8.83 (L47) 715" 764"
t3 8.97 (1.37) 533'~` 513~'
Benevolence belief
t1 8.96 (1.52) 47s{f .522~" .624"
t2 8.94 (LG4) 711~~ 736" ?24~'
t3 9.25 (1.39; 6~,4" 566`~ 6n5`-
~' correlation is signiEicant at the .O1 level
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Table SD: Unit C(tl n-53; t2 n-G~: t3 n-11)







tl 9.48 (1.64) G49"
t2 8.73 (1.5~ 551'~`
t3 9.09 (1.14) 433
Honesn' belief
tl ).12 (1.G4) 516" 6~9"
t2 8.84 (1.61) .5~2" ~?t~"
t3 9.18 (1.2~) 432 832"
Benevolence belief
tl 9.7G ( 1.61) 669~`" J20" 602`~
r2 8.66 (193j 53?" 747~~ G64"
v 9.45 (1.21) 345 ~~~~`- 599'
" cone]ation is sil,mificant at the .Ol level
` currelation is significanr at the .OS level
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Table SE: Unit D(t 1 n-77 ; t2 n-68 ; t3 n-64)







tl 9.04 (1.48) 641"
t2 8.88 (1.G4) .63G"
t3 8.75 (1.33) 567"
Honesr)~ belief
tl 9.42 (1.53) 741" 703`x
t2 898 (1.54) 523" 611"
t3 8.79 (1.44) 576~" .693~'
Benevolence belief
rl 9.68 (1.74) 677~' S62`~ G25"
t2 9.03 (1.80) 738" G93'" 723"
t3 9.14 (1.90) J09~~ íl4" G3'"
~`~` correlation is signiEcant at the .01 level
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Table ïF: Cnit H(tl n-33; r2 n-31; t3 n-26)
Belief M(S.D.) Competence Predictability Honesty belief
belief belief
Competence belief




t1 9J4 (159) 483"
t2 9.10 (1.4'j 346`
t3 8.75 (1.i3i G98~~
Honesa~ belief
cl 9.52 (1.43) .240 6ï0~'
t2 9.20 (1.42) 375' 8U1'~
t3 8.79 (1.44) 331 551"
Benecolence belief
tl 9.68 (l.?4) 182 ~ï3" 498"
~ R.'2 (1.51) 4~9" Gu~ 54G"
t3 9.14!t.~12) ;2R`. 7~}3.. 85~'.
`~` correlation is signi6cant at the .Ol level
' correlarion is sianiticant at the .U~ le~ el
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Table 8G: L'tut k' (tl n-5~; t2 n-4G; t3 n-45)







tl 8 ~0 (1.6~) .677"
t2 924 (2.11?j .657"
t3 8.8~ (LGO) 'IG"
Honesn- belief
tl 891 (I.S~ S73" .GUI`~`
t2 9.09 (2.OG) .448" .78GM~`
t3 8.98 (1.60) 661" 837~"
Benevolence belief
tl 9.21 (l.'8j 717" .592" Gi3"
r2 939 (2.88j 52G" .8GG" 787"
t3 8.~)G (1511; JGC,'~ 7G8" G84"
" eorrelation is sigrtiticant at the .Ol level
Table 6 shows how disposiàon to trust and maintenance of rules correlate with trust
(the four components taken together) at the three measurements, per unit.
The table shows man~~ significant correlaàons between disposiàon to trust and trust and
between maintenance of rules and trust, but there are excepàons: At tl units A and E show no
significant correlaàon between disposiàon to trust and trust. Moreover, unit E also shows no
significant correlaàon between disposiàon to trust and trust at t2. Unit C shows no significant
correlaàon benveen disposiàon to trust and trust at all.
As for the correlation benveen maintenance of rules and trust, unit D shows no significant
correlaàons at all. L'nit A shows no significant correlaàon at t2 and t3, unit C shows no
significant correlation at tt and t3, unit E shows no significant correlaàon at t2 and unit F
shows no significant correlaàon at tl and t2. Apparendt-, the correlarion bet~z-een disposiàon to
trust and trust is stronger than bet~-een maintenance of rules and trust. This implies that a
general belief that other people can be trusted contributes more to ínterpersonal trust than if
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rules are maintained consistentl~-. The contribution of disposition to trust and maintenance of
tules to trust wrill be closer examined in a regression analti~sis.
Table 6: Correlatíon of disposition to trust and maintenance oE rules w~th ttust Erom pre-deplotTnent through post-
deplo~-ment.
l'nit Time Disposition to trust Correlation u.ith trust
~fean (S.D.)
A t1 11.67 (1.84) 191
t2 11.27 (2.43) 588'~`
t~ 11.96 (1.75) 439"
B tl 11.24 (1.98) .4Oi"
t2 11.40 (1.59) .412~'
t3 ] 1.28 (1.G8) 40G"
C tl 11.55 (2.14) .201
t2 11.21 (1.~5j 144
t3 1 L73 (2.61) -.ii1d
D t1 11.80 (2.12) 42G`:
c? 11.62 (2.0~) G31'x
t3 I 13~ (L89) 398"
1: rl 11.R? (2.19) fïG4
t2 12.i3 (1.81) 312
ti I.'3(2.41) SH4~'
F tl 1 L94 (2.f14) 3~42"
t2 1195 (2. I 9) ', 68"
c3 1 L07 (1.84) .G22`~F
" correlation is significant at the .O1 lecel
' correlation is sigrtiticant at the .Oï lece]
(table ro be continued on next page)
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(table G conánued)
Time ~~(aintenance of ncles Correlaáon ~i~th trust
:~iean (S.D.)
A cl 9.09 (1.1G) ~'1"
c2 9A0 (1.20) 21 u
t3 9.15 (1.03) 2G3
B cl 9.24 (1.37) 534~`
t2 9.84 (1.08) 29nf-
t3 8.96 (1.33) 3i8~-
C tl 9.48 (1.12) -.034
t2 9.14 (1.23) A5u~'
t3 971 (l.l l) .241
D tl 8.91 (1.34) .028
t2 9.39 (1.53) .173
t3 9.50 (1.13) 2i)8
E tl 8.28 (1.3~ -389~`
t2 9.85 (1.29) 349
t3 8.62 (.7~ 590`
F tl 9.02 (1.3~ 219
t2 8.89 (1.59) 22U
t3 7.89 (1.50) 72t1"
'~ correlaáon is siF,mificant at the .Ol level
' correlation is significant at the .OS level
Table 7 shows the significant t-tests for the differences between the three measurements, per
unit and per antecedent or component'-~. These anal}~ses were performed with an alpha of .10
as the groups are small and b}~ using an alpha of .OS the rish of making a t}~pe I error (sa}~ng the
measurements differ when in fact they don't) is 9uite large. Using an alpha of .10 makes the
anal}~sis more liberal (Stevens, 1996). Significant changes are indicated in italic numbers. For
example, the change in maintenance of rules in unit B was significant benveen tl and t2 and
between t2 and t3, indicated b}- italic numbers in the "sig" column in that row under unit B. If
onl}- one change ~ti.as significant, onh. one number is italic and the pattern in the last column
'~ It was brietl~ exatnined if adding up the units together and then doing the analcses would make anc difference in the
patterns. There appeared to be minor, non-signiflcant changes in both che components and the antecedents u~hen
comparing pre-deplo}ment, mid-deployment and post-deplo}Trtent.
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refers to that significant change onlt-. The patterns shou- 21 flat lines, indicating that there are
no significant changes at all; no significant changes in development have
Table ?: Paired samples t-tests of six units brn~.een pre-deplo}-ment, mid-deplo}-ment and post-deplovtnent, per unit,
per component and per antecedent
:lntecedent or component tl-t2 sig t2-t3 si~ Pattern
~'nit r` Competence belief -.2i3 n.s. 58I ns. -
Predictabilitc belief 030 ns. -.G66 n.s.
Honrsn belief 842 n.s. 39G ns. -
Bene~olence belief 1.249 n.s. -.4G3 n.s.
Disposition to trust L3~0 n.s. -1.65 n.s. -
~faintenance of ndes ~3U n.s. -1.00 n.s. -
Trust in collea~ties ti15 n.s. 982 n.s. -
L'nit B Competence belirf 1.32 n.s. -.i58 ns. -
Predictabilitt~ beGef -.48(~ n.,. -.1 ~3 n.s. -
Honesa~ belief ~~U n.,. -.922 n.~. -
Benevolence belief 31 1 ns. -L(i3 n... -
Disposition to tnist -.8?R n.s. 2.~~2~ ns.
~Iaintenance of rules -?.8?1 06? 3.84~ 031 n
Trust in colleagues 4i8 n.s. i4' n.s. -
Cnir C Competence beGef 2.(64 0?6 -2.996 OiR U
Predictabilin~ belicf 4.(144 027 -.592 n.s. ~
Honeste belief 2588 OX1 -2.4?3 090 U
Benevolencr belieF 451)? 010 956 n.s. ~
Disposirion to trust 1.339 n.s. .208 n.s. -
;`laintenanceoFniles -.G2í n.s. -4.619 019 ~
Trust in colleagues 2.4G? .090 -2.913 O6? U
l~nit D (~ompetence belief ?42 n.s. 841i n.s. -
Predictabilin- belief 1.911 ns. 4G1 n.s. -
Honesh belief 3.902 030 2.3G1 09i -
Benevolence beGef ?.888- 0(j 1.6~9 n.~. `
Disposition to trust 1.- ïo n.,. 2.918 0G2 ~
Slaintrnance ~,f rulr~ -2.61? 0?9 -.488 n.s. ~
Trust in colleagues ~.?28 II?2 4'2 n.c. `
(table to be continued on next page)
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(table ? cuntinued)
l;nit L Competence beGef 4.283 023 -3.~76 039 U
Predictabilin beGef 3.094 Oid 126 n.s. ~
Honesn belief ?.848 06~ ~.853 017 ~
Bene~-~dence belief d339 IJ23 -4.938 .O1G ~
Disposition to trust 1SG6 ns. 3.884 030 ~
Aiaintenance of rules -10.294 002 3.876 030 n
Trust in colleagues 434d 023 2.G80 0?i ~
L'rut F Competence belief 2.744 071 3.800 03? n
Predictabilin- beGef l 1 i n.s. -328 n.s. -
Honesri belief 41~ ns. - L188 n.s. -
Bene~olencebelirt 284 ns. 2?2 n.s. -
llisposition ro trust 1.143 ns. .578 n.c. -
~faintenance of rules 2.054 n.s. 4.702 O18 ~
Tnitt in cr~llcal;ues ~23 n.s. L 119 ns. -
mostly been found in the four components, four times in disposition to trust and once in
maintenance of rules. Twe1~-e times there is a downward slope, a line going from the upper left
corner to the bottom right corner, mostlv found in the (emotional) components, once in
maintenance of rules ands twice in disposition to trust. Four times a L?-pattern, impl}~ing the
acculturation-mechanism, is shown, three times in the components and one time in trust as a
whole. Three times an inverted U-pattern is shown, two in maintenance of rules and one in
competence. Two times an upward slope, a line from the lower left corner to the upper right
corner, is shown in maintenance of rules. These results first of all impl`- that trust does not
change so much o~-er time, especiallc because out of the 21 flat lines, three refer to trust in
colleagues as a whole, i.e. in units A, B(both Bosnia, first deplo~-ment) and F(C}~prus), units
that clearlti- show the most flat Gnes. Unit C shows a mixture of patterns, ~irith trust following a
U-pattern and hardl}. changes in disposition to trust and maintenance of rules. ititoreover, this
significant change in maintenance of rules must be approached with caution as unit C was very
small at t3 (n-11).
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Table 8. Chan);es in order of beGefs per unit, throuKhout the deplovment. bleans are ~iven betu-een brackets.
Unit tl t2 t3
A H-~alue-.054 H-.ï(1 H-.7i
Benevolence (9.15) Honesp (8.93) Predictabilin (8.97)
Honesn- (8.85) Predictabilit,- (8.84) Honesn (8.89)
Predictabilin- (8.70) Bene~-olence (8.86) Benevolence (8.86)
Competence (8.51) Competence (8.70) Competence (8.70)
B H-.59 H-.75 H-.63
Benevolence (8.97) Bene~-olence (8.95) Benevolence (9.19)
Honesn- (8.89) Honesn' (8.83) Honest}' (8.97)
Predictabilitt' (8.73) Predictabilin- (8.79) Predictabilitt (8.70)
Competence (8.52) Competence (8.31) Competence (8.30)
C H-.69 H-.GG H-.78
Benecolence (9J7) Honest) (8.88) Benevolence (9.45)
Predictabilit} (9.41) Predictabilitv (8.83) Honesp (9.18)
Honesn' (9.10) Bene~-olencr (8.7G) Predictabilitc (9A9)
Competence (8.78) Competence (8.57)
D H-.G9 H-.71 H-.GG
Benevolence (9.77) Benevolence (9.03) Benevolence (9?1)
Honesn~ (9.41) Honesn~ (8.97) Honest)~ (8.85)
PrecGctability (9.10) Predietabilin~ (8.97) Predictabilin' (8.77)
Comperence (8.78) Competence (8.69) Competence (8.58)
L H-.46 H-SG H-.71
PredictabiGtJ (9.70) HonesTt (9.26) Bene~-olence (8.86)
Benecolence (9.67) Predictabilin (9.15) PredictabiGn- (8.G2)
Honesn- (9.47) Benecolence (8.74) Honesn' (8.43)
Competence (9.00) Competence (8.(17) Competence (8.14)
F H-.G3 H-S4 H-.70
Benevolence (9.31) Competence (8.95) Benecolence (9.14)
Honestt (8.92) Bene~-olence (8.95) Honesn- (9.02)
Predictabilin' (8.84) Predictabilitc (8.93) Predictabilin (8.98)
Competence (8.80) Honestc (8.82) Competence (8.95)
` competence belief was exduded from the analcsis.
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Units D and E(both Bosnia, second deplo}-ment) show many dowmaard slopes where most of
these patterns cannot be ascribed to a certain period in the deploy-ment as there is a mixture in
changes berween t1 and t2 and between t2 and t3.
This implies that generallv in units D and E trust is yuite stable as well during the
deployment. The order in which the components, cognitiee or emotional, appear with the six
units at these moments gi~-es a fairly constant pattern (table S). Twehre out of eighteen times
benevolence belief is the most prominent belief, and twelve times honesn~ belief is a runner up.
Apparend}-, in trusting beliefs emotional elements are regarded more important than cogniti~-e
elements.
In order to examine the effcct of disposition to trust and maintenance of rules on
trust on trust throughout deplovment a regression analysis was performed with disposition to
trust, maintenance of rules and duration of co-operation as predictors and trust in colleagues as
dependent variable (table 9). Disposition to trust and maintenance of rules account for 150~0 of
the eariance in trust at pre-deplo~.ment, 270~o at mid-deplo}-ment and 260~o at post-deplo`-ment.
This means that at pre-deployment, mid-deplo}-ment and post-deployment the disposition to
trust and maintenance of rules significantl}~ contribute to trust in fellow soldiers, but it also
implies that the contribuàon of these antecedents is much greater at mid-deplo}'ment and post-
deployment than at pre-deployment. ?~Ithough the contribution of the two antecedents is
significant, the impact of disposition to trust on trust is at the .O1 level and hence greater than
that of maintenance of rules (at the .05 level). 1~laintenance of rules can be influenced bti. the
arm~-, which gives it a tool to influence interpersonal trust. Trust needs time to deeelop, as
mentioned aboae, and therefore the duration of co-operation was included, but this has no
influence on trust in an}- of the three stages.
Table 9. Regession anal} sis of disposition to trust, maintenance of rules and duration of co-operarion on trust at pre-
deplo}-ment, mid-deplo~~rnent and post-deploctnenr.
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5. Discussion
In this stud}- six units on three deplo~ments were compared. Five units were in Bosnia on two
different deplo~-ments and one was in Ctprus on one deplo}.ment. It was examined how trust
among soldiers on a deplo~-ment mission develops. It was suggested that trust ma}- follow the
same pattern as cohesion in a stud~- bv Bartone and rldler (1999), which was an im-erted U-
pattern, but this is generallt' not the case. Another suggestion was the L'-pattern would be
found due to culture shock, as described bti- Hofstede (1991), but this is not the case either.
Trust appears to follow a flat line mainh-, i.e. a constant pattern: high trust in the beginning
implies high trust halfway- during deplo}~ment and at the end. Iskewise, low trust in the
beginning implies low trust halfwa}- during deplo}~ment and at the end.
It also appears that trust, assessed bv four beliefs, competence belief, predictabilitt'
belief, honesn- belief and benevolence belief, is fairl}~ constant in the order of these four beliefs.
The two emotional beliefs, honesn~ belief and benevolence belief, appear to be more important
throughout deployment than the two cogivtive beliefs, competence belief and predictabiin-
belief as the former are more prominent in the order of the beliefs over all measurements.
How can these different results be explained~ In Bosnia there had been a war not so
long ago: it had ended in 1995, whereas in C}prus there had been a conflict that had ended
decades ago, long before the soldiers were born, in the sixties (LundmachtrlortrinepxGlirake Dee!
777, T i~desoperaties, 1998). tiloreover, Ct~prus is well-known for being a holidae island.
One deplo`-ment in Bosnia, utvts A and B, does not show differences in trust over time, i.e.
trust follow-s a flat line. This deplo~~ment encountered hardl}- an~- difficulàes, apart from the
end of the deplo}-ment when tensions grew among the local population and the units needed
to work harder than usual and remain on edge. rlpparentl}- this did not influence their trust
levels. These units had had a fairl}. quiet mission in which no serious incidents happened and
the soldiers could perform their tasks quite well, patrolling the area and getting well acquainted
with the local situation. i~foreover, during all these months the~- had got to know each other
quite u-ell, eeen those who originall~- did not belong to the unit. Bt- their fourth month in the
deplo}-ment area rensions grew but at that time the}- knew quite w-ell 'w-here the}- stood w-ith
each other'. It mav be said that the unit and interpersonal relations in the unit were quite well
stabilized at that time and the local tensions did not change that. Considering the prominent
places bene~-olence belief and honestt- belief hold, it must be concluded that these elements
had w-ell de~-eloped at that time. This ma}- account for the stabilitt~ of trust in this mission.
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Things were a little different for the second deplo~-ment in Bosnia, units C, D and F:
again these were units composed of personnel from mam' different units, like the first
deploy'ment in Bosnia, and again most soldiers had not been on a mission before, but during
their mission-oriented training, prior to departure for Bosnia, these soldiers knew there were
tensions and irregularities in the deplot'ment area. The}- had to deal w~ith uncertainties about
their comrades as the}~ did not all know each other so well at that time, and about the area thev
were going to as the}' had not been there before. Units A and B did not encounter these
uncertainties as the`' knew each other and knew the area when the tensions started. ~llten the
situation stabilized the second deplo}'ment encountered a new stage, an adjustment to their
tasks in the area and to life at the base: not only was the area quiet and could the}- focus on
regular patrols without the need to be 'on edge' all the time, but the}' also spent more time and
in a relaxed manner at the base. This ma~' well have influenced soldiers' trust: whereas the first
deplo}'ment entered the mission in a stable situation which remained so for a long time, the
second deplo}-ment had to deal with more adjustments, and their trust development had a
difficult start and may' not have recovered from that. Nevertheless, though the differences in
trust are noticeable in this deployment, again the prominence of the emotional beliefs is quite
evident in these units.
The soldiers that went to C}prus (unit F~ also knew there could be tensions, but of a
different nature. Soldiers were taught about the situation, the neutral zone and how the~-
should work there. They knew they- would have to soh-e problems in the zone benveen the
Turkish and the Greek part, but they also knew that the risk of being caught up in a war was
quite low, much lower than in Bosnia, as the war in Bosnia had only- ended so recentlt- and was
so fresh in everybod}''s memon'. They had to work quite independend}~, which mat~ have
caused their competence belief to increase during cíeplo}'ment. It also decreased towards the
end of the deployment, though, perhaps because b}- that time the}- knew what their fellow
soldiers were capable of and ea:pectations ma}- have been a little too high. Soldiers also learned
about the strictness of the British rules, which was incomprehensible for mant- of them and a
reason to turn to their fellow soldiers, preferabl}- not the British. In unit F there is a prominent
role for the emotional beliefs at pre- and post-deplo}-ment.
Overall, throughout deployments emotional beliefs prevail o~-er cognitive beliefs. This
would implc that, though trust is assessed b}- both emotional and cognitive beliefs, it is mainh-
an emotional matter. This raises the question of how an organization like the army' can
promote trust. Perhaps maintenance of rules can contribute to this. It appears to be an
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antecedent of trust throughour deplo}-ment, though the results demonstrate that its influence is
smaller than that of disposition to trust. If leaders consistentl}' maintain the rules for all
personnel, they notice that trustworth}- behacior is rewarded and the}- trust their colleagues
more than if rules were not maintained eaen-handedl}-. This refers to cognitiee elements, but
also to emotional elements.
Inten-iews during deplo}-ment might ha~~e pro~zded information on the wa}- officers
and non-commissioned officers maintained rules among their personnel. Now, inten-iews were
conducted after the deployments were over. Disposiuon to trust usually has the same pattern
as trust. This implies that disposition to trust is subject to change, contrar}- to findings in other
studies, in which disposition to trust is believed to be stable (Ma}.er et al., 1995; Costa, 2000).
This raises the question of what influences the disposition to trust. As an example may serve
units D and E where disposition to trust decreases and trust decreases at the same time.
However, does a decrease in trust from pre-deploti-ment cause a decrease in disposition to trust
at mid-deplo}~ment~ If that were the case, trust at pre-deployment would be an antecedent of
disposition to trust at mid-deplo~'ment, whereas data from pre~rious studies have shown that
disposition to trust is an antecedent of trust. Further studies into the pattern of disposition to
trust should gi~'e more insight into the reason whti- disposition to trust changes.
It has been suggested in the theon~ that trust formation needs time, but the duration of co-
operation does not influence trust deeelopment, a finding in line with a pre~rious finding on
duration of co-operation between soldiers and their platoon commander and their trust in the
platoon commander (~~an dcr IUoet, Van Schuur, Sanders, 2001). Time is needed to form trust
Howeeer, it is not time but other elements that actuallt' contribute tot trust.
6. Conclusions and recommendations
In the introducdon to this chapter the wlnerabilit}- of trust and a breach of trust was
mentioned, and the present stud}- suggests that both circumstances and the extent to which
soldiers know each other influence trust. bíoreo~Ter, trust is assessed bt- emotions rather than
b~- cognition. The three deplo}'ments differ from each other in trust de~~elopment: neither the
first Bosnia deplo`-ment nor the C~~prus deplo`-ment show drastic changes in trust
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development. They are, howe~-er, found in the second deployment to Bosnia, supposedly due
to the circumstances soldiers had to deal with in Bosnia and of which the~- knew in advance
without ha~ring been in the deployment area before. This suggests that uncertainties about
upcoming missions and the conseyuences for trust development are most drastic in new
situations in an alreadj- familiar deplot-ment area such as Bosnia, or in new missions. V~'ith
regard to the latter, the first Dutch participation in Iraq after the war ended in 2003 comes to
mind. The three key factors seem to be that (1) soldiers do not know the area and that (2) the
situation they enter into is different from what their predecessors encountered when they first
arrived in the deplo}'ment area, and that (3) they have not sufficientlv practiced w7th each other
to get to know each other well, especiallv at the emotional level. These are likely fundamental
criteria for trust development.
The results of this study further imply that trust can generally be considered a fairl~-
consistent, stable but rather emotional aspect in e~dsting interpersonal relations, but it also
indicates that situations do contribute to trust development: one may be personall}- prepared,
but if interpersonal relations are relatively new and if irregularities are expected, this increases
uncertainty and it influences trust. These situations should be studied more closely in both a
sun~e}' and simultaneous inten-iews on the spot as inten-iews, as well as participating
obsen~auon, are likely to support findings in questionnaires. This is a tírst recommendation for
further stud}'. Disposition to trust influences trust, a finding in line with preaious findings (e.g.
Van der Kloet et al., 2001). Moreover, development of disposition to trust follows the same
pattern as trust development, but it remains unclear what influences disposition to trust, as it
can evidently be influenced. The second recommendation is to further study the intluences on
the disposition to trust. Consistent maintenance of rules gives soldiers an indication of support
for trustworthc behacior b`~ unit command and works as an incentive for them to trust their
colleagucs. The yuestionnaire implies more or less how rules were maintained, but it is
recommended to inten-iew sen-icemen on the spot to gather informatíon about the way rules
are maintained (recommendation three). The founh recommendaàon is that a new study had
better cover a larger number of soldiers. Unit C had a small number at post-deployment and
there was quite some non-response for the items concerning maintenance of rules at post-
deployment.
Good preparation for a mission is absolutely necessan- and perhaps a bit more could
be done than is already being done in the Netherlands rlrmy. As it is now, informadon to a
battalion about to be deplo}-ed is passed on by the Operational Staff of the Netherlands Arm}'.
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This is not surprising, since this bodt- has a lot of Mowledge about the deplo}'ments: it
provides information in advance, monitors even- unit during deployment and evaluates everv
deplo}~ment, and hence it has a lot of lessons learned at its disposal. The unit that is about to
return from deplo}-ment also has a lot of recent information about the deployment,
information the next unit could learn from. A suggestion is that the unit about to come home
sends a small advance part}~ of an officer, a few non-commissioned officers and soldiers from
the deployment area home to inform the upcoming unit directl}~ and extensively- about the
mission and what is going on in the area The only problem here is that "myths" about the
passed deplo~-ment are passed on from one deplo}'ment to another and will lead a life of their
own (Soeters 8t ?~loelker, 2003). It is therefore ad~~sable to let these sen~icemen from the most
recent deplo}-ment pass on their information to the next unit, in combination with staff
members of the Operational Staff, who have a broader ~~iew on deplo}-ments in general. This is
likele to reduce uncertaintt~ among the newcomers, because up-to-date information as well as
general informauon about deplopments is supplied.
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The Effect of Leadership Stcle in Potentiallc Riskv Situations on Soldiers' Trust
Chapter 3. The Effect of Leadership Style in Potentially Risky Situations on
Soldiers' Trust'-'
1. Introduction
The tasks and organizaàon of the Royal Netherlands ~1rmy (RNLr1) have considerablv
changed since the East Bloc fell apart b~- the end of the eighties of the pre~-ious centur}-.
Instead of focusing on Northern Germany as dieater of operaàons, the RNL.A now primarily
focuses on militarv operaàons other than war (1~fOOT`1~~, such as peace-enforcing, peace-
keeping and humanitarian operaàons, often with internaàonal allies'3. The RNLr1 has been
reduced to about one third of its Cold ~'ar size, and after abolishing conscripàon in 1995 it
became an all-volunteer army. These are fundamental changes causing changes in training
programs, as militar}- operaàons other than war cover a much wrider field than the peace-
enforcing operaàons the army trained for in the Cold War period. The duraàon of training for
arm}- officers has, how-e~-er, not changed, even more training goals need to be achieeed in the
same amount of àme.
These changes ha~~e affected militan' personnel's required atàtudes as their operaàons
ha~-e changed from relaàvely static ( Northern German}') to more ~-aried all oeer the world and
under ~-aàous circumstances. This is all quite demanding for commanders and subordinates.
The different circumstances in which such operaàons take place demand that commanders co-
operate well w~th their subordinates. One of the characteàsàcs of this co-operaàon is that
commanders and their subordinates operate quite independently. Commanders receive orders
that should be carried out, but the}~ are relaàvel}- free to choose the way- in which they carr}- out
these orders as thev know the situaàon in which the orders should be carried out best, and this
includes possibiliàes and threats-';. tiSore independent operaàons strongly decrease the
possibilitv for superior commanders to monitor subordinates' acàons and thus call for more
-- The authors of this chapter are Irene E. van der Kloet, ~l'ijbrandt H. van Schuur and Karin Sanders. This chapter
has been submitted as an artide to the .~tmed Forces and Socien~ JournaL :~ pre~ious cersion of this article a-as
published in 7~drrhrijt roorArbeidtrraagrtrrkken (2001) 321 - 332.
'' The so-called combined operations, see footnote 19.
-' This is called mission-oriented command. Commanders set the goals for their subordinate commanders but the wac
in ~rhich these goals are achieved is left to the discretion of the subordinate commanders.
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trust on the part of superiors in their subordinates. IVioreover, operations in remote areas,
where units are more or less isolated from other units, make that subordinates within those
units are more dependent upon their unit commanders. The success of an operation depends
to a certain extent on subordinates' trust in their superiors, calling for wa}~s for superiors to
in~-oke this trust. Trust is one of the pillars of good leadership, along with knowledge and
power(Zand, 199~, a pillar to which the RNLA attaches much importance (~Llilitaire Doctiine,
1996). Along with leadership sn~le, the circumstances in which a unit operates are likelv to
influence trust for a leader ma}- need to adapt his leadership style to different circumstances
whereas arm`- training, not surprisingly, focuses on dangerous circumstances.
Two kinds of circumstances are focused on in this chapter: high risk situations and
lou- risk situations. In high risk situations a task-oriented leadership st}-le seems more
appropriate because this situation reyuires yuick decisions focused on the task (Yukl, 2002). In
low risk situations a relationship-oriented leadership srt-le seems more appropriate because the
low need for alertness allows time to build up a better personal understanding w-ith the
personnel (Hunt Sc Phillips, 1991). The central research question in this chapter is:
Is there is a connectíon between potential risks, leadership style and subordmates'trvst
andhow can thís connection be explained?
The chapter is structured as follows: In paragraph nvo the theor}- is discussed and the
ht~otheses are derived, to be followed b}- the explanation of the methodolog}~ in paragraph
three. The results are reported in paragraph four whereas paragraph five contains the
discussíon, conclusions and recommendations.
2. Theory
Tbe platoon. As object of research the platoon was taken as it is the lowest level that can act
relativeh- independentlt-. ~~'ith the focus on platoon commanders and their subordinates there
are two nested levels of research units: the lowest level (the subordinates) who are expected to
trust their commander to a greater degree. Trust is measured on their le~-e1, it ma}- van' from
subordinate to subordinate a~ithin the same platoon. :~s the platoon commander is the one
appl}-ing a leadership st}~le, leadership snrle is on his level, the higher level. ~~s potentíal risks
apph. to all platoon members, this is on the level of the platoon commander as well: neither
leadership stt-le nor potential risks will vart~ over the subordinates u~ithin the same platoon as
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the platoon commander will aim to turn his platoon into a unit with a single wa}- of thinking
and acàng, so differences in leadership sn-le hehveen platoons will be bigger than uzthin platoons.
The stud}' aims at operational platoons, where basic training and specialist training have been
completed. In general, subordinates in these platoons have known their platoon commander
for at least three months, which is approximatel}- the period soldiers need to get accustomed to
working in their platoon (Van de Ven, 1998-2003).
Leader.rhip .rtyle and ~otentiu! ri.rk.r. ~1~en leadership st}-le is concernecí a disàncàon is made
between leadership style in the fielcí, with often high potenàal risks, and leadership stvle in
other situaàons, which shall be referred to as barracks situations, w-ith low potenàal risks (Hunt
c~ Phillips, 1991). Accorcíing to Hunt and Phillips (1991), task-oriented leadership would be
more appropriate in field situauons and relaàon-oriented leadership would be more
appropriate in barracks-situaàons. In situaàons of high potenàal risks there is no àme for
discussion about the best wav to handle the situaàon. The leader, being responsible for the
group, is the one making decisions about the group's task. This task-oriented leadership st}-le is
expected to posiàvelv affect subordinates in situaàons of high potenàal risks such as crisis
situaàons and battle circumstances (Yukl, 2002).
A leader appGes a relaàon-oriented leadership style b}' taking àme for personal attenàon to his
subordinates and supporàng them, inquiring after w~ork progress or personal círcumstances.
Relaàon-oriented leadership is more supporàve than task-oriented leadership, and ma}- also
involve a more paràcipaton- character. This leadership st}.le applies better in situaàons of low
potenàal risks such as barracks situaàons where there is àme for discussion. The focus on both
leadership stcles is important because arm}. personnel finds itself in both situaàons, not only in
high potenàal risk situaàons, but the main focus of arm}- training is on situaàons of high
potenàal risks. Both leadership styles contain interacàon between leader and subordinates, but
in a task-oriented leadership st}-le interacàon is expected to be brief, uni-direcàonal and mainl}-
concerns work, whereas in a relaàon-oriented leadership stt-le interacàon will be bi-direcàonal
and mav involve personal matters.
The literature shows some effects of leadership style in situaàons of high potenàal
risks. Vi'ithin the German ~X'ehrmacht cohesion was strong when officers were an example,
behavior-w-ise, to their men (Shils 8t Janowitz, 1949). The}- went up front in the battle, and had
to be stronger and more persistent in fighàng than their men, this npe of beha~nor is ttpicall}~
task-oriented. Findings from studies in the U.S. Armv in Vietnam show that group cohesion is
low if officers send their units on patrol with a non-commissioned officer and sta}- beíund in
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base camp themseh-es, but that cohesion is stronger if officers actualh- parácipate themseh-es
in these patrols (Gabriel 8c Sa~-age, 1976). However, none of these studies deals with the
connecáon between leadership sn.le and subordinates' trust. Onlti- one such stud`- was found,
in a gypsum facton- (Gouldner, 1954). One part of the factory- workers worked in the mine, the
other part in the office, so a distincáon could easily- be made between high risk (mine) and low
risk (office) situaáons. B~- applt'ing one (task-oriented) leadership sri-le to all categories of
personnel, trust among those working in the office was negaávelti- affected, whereas trust
among those working in the mine ~~~as posiáveh. affected. Although a connecáon was made in
this study~ between leadership style, trust and potenáal risks, it only concerns the task-oriented
leadership sty-le, whereas the focus of this study- will be on both a task-oriented and a relation-
oáented leadership sh-1e in various situaáons of potenáal risks.
lru.rt. A person beginning to trust others takes a wlnerable posiáon, and in doing so he
assumes others ~~till not take advantage of this ~-ulnerabilir,- if they- have the opportunit}- to do
so. The more often interacáon has taken place, the better one can judge if others will indeed
take ad~~antage of this wlnerabilit}-, and a`shadou~ of the past' is formed (Batenburg, Raub 8c
Snijders, 1999). This shadow of the past enables a person to make assumpáons about another
person's trusit~~orthiness, logically- trust ma}' then emerge and increase or decrease, or it may~
not emerge at all. Not onh~ the past but also the prospect of having to deal with others in the
nearby- future plati-s a part. In the prospect of having to co-operate with other soldiers for 9uite
a while, a soldier mat- refrain from opportunisác behavior - taking advantage of others - for
fear of retaliaáon, as a lengtht- co-operaáon provides ample opportunin' for other suldicrs to
retaliate. This shadow of the future ma~- influence trustworthy- beha~-ior posiáeelt'. IVloreover,
skill, honesTt- and openness are regarded as important elements for trust (l~tishra, 1996; Boon
ác Holmes, 1991). Among militar~- personnel in platoons, both the shadow of the past and the
shadow of the future occur: soldiers in the RNLr1 generallg sign a tw-o and a half y.ear contract,
with the possibiliri- ofextending the contract. After basic and specialist training, co~-ering about
half a y~ear, a soldier is placed in a platoon and has the prospect of working for some two `-ears
with his colleagues and his platoon commander, whereas a soldier having sen~ed in the platoon
for some áme is logically- more subject to `the shadow of the past' and thereby is facing
reposting and ha~ting to leave the arm~- soon. During their co-operaáon in the platoon, soldiers
get to know one another and their platoon commander better, both on a professional and a
personal leeel. The more soldiers show that they- regard other people's ~ti-ell-being e9uall~-
important as that of their own, the more thep are likeh- to trust each other. Likewise, if the~- do
x6
1'he EEtect of Leadership Stcle in Po[entialh~ Risky Simations on Solcliers' Trust
not abuse their comrades' openness, like w-hen the}' are entrusted with information, the}' will
more likeh~ trust each other. There will, however, be differences in the extent to which soldiers
trust each other from scratch: some soldiers generally- have low trust in others whereas others
generall`~ have high trust in other people. If after some time trust has emerged, soldiers who are
more disposed to trusting others will have more trust in other soldiers as opposed to those
who are not as trusting. This `disposition to trust' is seen as a situation-independent
characteristic that is basic for trust in others (1~fcIviight, Cummings 8c Chen'an}-, 1998).
Within their platoons, platoon commanders are first and foremost responsible for their
personnel's well-being, and in turn the personnel is highlv dependent upon their platoon
commander as platoon commanders in situations of high potential risks with their platoons
need to take decisions that affect the lives of their subordinates. Platoon commanders who use
a task-oriented leadership st}-le and who know what to do in dangerous situations show skill,
and will thus invoke trust among their subordinates. In other situations - low potential risks -
the platoon-commander's relation-oriented leadership st}-1e, in which he pa}~s attention to his
personnel and supports them, is expected to imroke their trust. Referring to the RNLA and
situations that platoons may find themsehres in, the following h~~pothesis is formulated:
The more the platoon-commander applies a ta.rk-orieitted leaderrhip-.rtyle i~t a field-operation, tbe more
.ruhordinate.rurfll tru.rt theirplatoon commasider (h~pntbe.ri.c 1). Howe~er, it has akead}' been mentioned
that platoons do not alway-s find themsel~-es in situations of hígh damage potential, hence the
following hy-pothesis can be formulated for situations of low damage potential:
The mom the platoon-commander applie.c a relation-oneirted leaderchij~ .rtyle i~r tbe Garrack.r, the more
,ruhoirlinate.ru~ill tru.ct theirplatoon cmnmander (hypothe.ri.r 2).
.1 number of odier aspects that ma}' plav a part in the connection between potential risks,
leadership st}-1e and trust in the platoon commander have bcen taken uito account as well. The
first two aspects are characteristics of the platoon commander, the other aspects pertain to the
subordinates or the interaction betw~een the platoon commander and his subordinates.
The first aspect is the initial function a lieutenant gets after completíng his education
and training at the Roy-al Netherlands i~filitan- Academv, that of platoon commander. Newlv
assigned platoon commanders ma}~ ha~-e had leadership experience prior to their Academv
training as a non-commissioned ofticer and therefore ma}- be expected to master interpersonal
relationships better and know better how to invoke trust among their subordinates. The
second aspect is the platoon commander's age. A voung platoon commander could be
regarded as a beginner, w-ith only. officer training experience, ~chereas an older platoon
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commander is etpected to master skills in dealing with people due to experience. Subordinates
ma`- be assumed to wait and see before the~- begin to trust a"fresh" platoon commander.
The next aspect is a characteristic of subordinates, namely trust in general, also called
disposition to trust. ~1 person w7th high disposition to trust has a basis for trust in the platoon
commander and from there on, trust in the platoon commander will or w~ill not develop. It is
therefore only- logical to assume that a high disposition to trust facilitates trust easier and
generates high trust in the platoon commander.
The last three aspects are characteristics of the relationship between a subordinate and
the platoon commander. First of all there is the amount of time that subordinates have known
their platoon commander. r1s the~~ know their platoon commander longer, they~ know better
what he is capable of This may become obvious in the way- the platoon commander deals w~ith
and takes care of subordinates. Better knowledge ma~- lead to higher trust or lower trust. The
effect of duration of co-operation is examined in the sense that better knowledge is expected
to lead to higher trust. Second, the experiences subordinates have had with the platoon
commandcr, for example platoon commander who are more or less open towards their
subordinates, or who look after work-related safett- matters for the platoon. These aspects are
related to a general concern bv the platoon commander for the platoon and ma~~ lead to higher
trust b`- subordinates. They- are also related to the platoon's work environment and day--to-day
activities. Last is the frequency- with w-hich subordinates interact with their platoon
commander, found in their housing situation. ~lilitar~- personnel stationed far away. from home
often lives on base during the week. It ma~- be expected that thosc who li~-c: on base will
interact with their platoon commander more frequently- than those going home eaen- day-, as
platoon commanders often work overtime and can thus be found in the barracks. More
frequent interaction ma~- imrolve more trust, also because this interaction at off-dutv hours is
expected to be more on a voluntan~ basis. Those who live on base mav trust their platoon
commander more than soldiers who live off-base, howecer the re~-erse may- also occur if those
living on base do not interact w-ith the platoon commander, perhaps because thet- do not trust
him. This aspect is included to examine if a positi~-e effect on trust can be found. The research
model is as f~llo~~-s:
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Figure 3: 1'he research model of the effect of leadership stt-le in potentiall}~ risk~- simations on soldiers' trust.









The data for this stud~- were collected in 1999 among 12 platoons and their platoon
commanders in the Roval Netherlands Arm~-.
Re.rpondent.r. All platoons in this study- belong to operaáonal units from various battalions and
companies. Each platoon consisted of sergeants, corporals and soldiers, and the total number
of respondents was 186: 185 men and one woman. For the analvsis no disáncáon was made
between sergeants, soldiers and corporals as the platoon commander's leadership st}-le for the
entire platoon applies to sergeants, corporals and soldiers fairly- evenlt'. A number of sergeants,
three percent of the respondents, had a long-term contract, and 970~o had a short-term
contract''. r1ll twelve platoon commanders were male. One platoon commander was an elderh-
warrant officer, one was a i-oung sergeant, all the others were lieutenants. Some respondents
had been sent abroad whereas others had not.
~ue.rkonnaire.r. Two ficátious situaáons were presented in the quesáonnaires''~. An example of
the items for task-oriented leadership is "He gives direcáons how to soh-e the situaáon" with
answering categoáes 2- y-es, he will do that, 1- no, he will not do that or 0- I don't know.
To the high potenáal risk situaáon quesáons about task-oáented leadership were attached
(Fleishman, 1969). To the low potenáal risk situaáon quesáons about relation-oriented
" A lifetime contract in the R~LA is a contract where one sigrts up to be in the militan' for life, until retirement. A
temporarc contract is a contract u-here one signs up for a litnited number of }-ears, and then returns to ci~-ilian life.
'-~The yuesdonnaires can be found in appendix E.
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leaderslvp u~ere attached (Fleishman, 1969). An example of the items for the relaáon-oáented
leadership is "He gives a compliment to someone who works well" with the same answering
categories as those for task-oriented leadership. The Specific Interpersonal Trust Scale by.
johnson-George and Su-ap was used as a basis for the quesáons about trust in the platoon
commander, as this quesáonnaire deals with one person's trust in a specific other person
(~ohnson-George 8t Swap, 1982). ~~n example of an item in this yuesáonnaire is "If the
platoon commander promises me something, I am sure he will sáck to that promise" with
answering categories 2- true, 1- not true and 0- do not know. For disposiáon to trust the
Interpersonal Trust Scale by- Rotter was used (Rotter, 1991). An example of an item is "Ne~~er
trust strangers" urith the same answering categories as those for trust in the platoon
commander. The experiences with the platoon commander as menáoned (stri~~ing for team
spirit, looking after safety- in the workplace) were deri~~ed from personal experiences of the
main author of this chapter and from her colleal,nxes. An example of the items in this
yuesáonnaire is "He lets the interests of the platoon come in the first place" with the same
answering categories as those for trust in the platoon commander. The yuesáonnaire further
included demographic yuesáons, and concluded with three quesáons concerning the extent to
which respondents thought the situaáons presented u~ere dangerous. The platoon commanders
were given the same yuesáonnaires as their subordinates. Apart from the demographic
yuesáons all yuesáons had two answering categories, true and not true, to make it easier to
disánguish sharpl~- benveen leadership sn'les.
Respon.re. 205 yuesáonnaires were handed out group-u-ise in the presence of the researcher. Of
the 205 yuesáonnaires, 186 were returned, tu~o others were returned blank, and the remaining
1? were not returned at all. The number of participants who did not respond was 9",'0, yuite
lou-. Vi'ith the yuesáonnaires themseh-es there was also some non-response urith regard m the
individual items, as a result of which the number of respondents in the vaáous analyaes varies
from 136 to 186.
Sraling anal}~.re.c In order to test reliabilin-, ~fokken Scale analy-sis was used (i~lokl:en, 19?1). The
1~lokken scale analy-sis is a bottom-up procedure, in which per analy-sis items are added''. The
)`fokken scale anah-sis ~-en- much resembles a Guttman sclae. There are tu-o le~-els of anah sis,
'- The follou-ing scale results u ere obtained from Dtokken scale anal} sis: Task-oriented leadership: four item scale, out
of 14 items (H-0.38, n-186). Relation-oriented leadership: six item scale, out of lÍl items (H-0.3', n-186). Trust in
the platoon-commander: seven item scale, out of eight items (H-0.36, n-18G). Trust in general: three item scale, out
of five items (H-0.40, n-l8G). Experiences uith the platoon commander: seven item scale, out of 10 items (H-0.47,
n-174). The scales can be found in Apprndix E.
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the level of the subordinates and the le~~el of the platoon commanders. For trust, disposition to
trust and experiences with the platoon commander the respective items were scaled using die
subordinates' items. For leadership styles a different procedure was followed. The items
concerning leadership style were submitted to both the platoon commanders and their
subordinates. Now the items needed to be scaled, but for the scaling procedure a substantial
number of questionnaires was needed to attain reliability. The number of platoon commanders
was too small for this and therefore the items from the subordinates concerning leadership
styles were subjected to a scaling procedure. The items that were included in the scale could
thus be regarded a reliable scale. As the platoon c~mmanders had been given the same items
concerning leadership sty'le as the subordinates, the replies of the platoon commanders to
those items included in the scales were used for further analysis to examine which leadership
sty-le was used by- platoon commanders. As such, there was a reliable scale for leadership sty~les
as the procedure was done with 186 respondents, and the scale was valid as well as the replies
of the platoon commanders. This procedure also reflects the two levels in this studj, which is
the reason why multilevel analysis was used for most of the analy-ses (Snijders8c Bosker, 1999).
4. Results
The 12 platoons varied in size between 6 and 26 persons. The 186 subordinates varied in age
between 19 and 31 vears. Table 10 giees an o~-er~-iew of the main demographic data per
platoon. In order to examine if trust in platoon commanders varied between platoons, a
variance analy-sis was performed using SPSS. There appear to be sigruficant differences
between the platoons with regard to trust in the platoon commander (F - 6.43, dfi-11,
df~-174, p ~ .01).
For the remaining data analysis bíultilevel for Windows 1.0 (1~1L~XIin) was used'". Since the
differences in platoon size were substantial, platoon size was included as a fixed ~-ariable
(Snijders 8c Bosker, 1999). At first, platoon size appeared to impact trust in the platoon
commander. Trust decreased as platoon size increased. In the remaining analy-ses, platoon size
was held constant in order to a~-oid its influence on the other results.
'" The method of Restricted Iterated Generalized Least Syuares (RIGLS) ~~as appGed, u-hich is more appropriate in
anal} ses uith fe~rer rhan 30 groups (platoons) than the usual option of Iterated Generalized Least Syuares (IGLS). In
the R1GLS method in the random intercept model the resul[s of the t-tests are specificall}' impottant, whereas in the
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A posirive significant effect (1.18 ~.62 - 1.90) of task-oriented leadership of the platoon
commander in a field situation was found as a result of which it can be concluded that task-
oriented leadership under high risk situations does influence trust in the platoon commander.
Relation-oriented leadership in the barracks does not influence trust in the platoon commander
(.22 ~.36 -.61, n.s.) as a result of which relauon-oriented leadership in the barracks was taken
out of the model (Table 11).
Next, the control variables were added to the model step by~ step with only- task-oriented
leadership in the field as predictor and platoon size was held constant. First the platoon
commander's initial function was added, then the platoon commander's age, then disposition
to trust, the amount of rime that subordinates had known their platoon commander,
experiences subordinates had with their platoon commander and last housing situation of
subordinates. The starting post, combined with platoon size and task-oriented leadership, had
no effect on trust in the platoon commander (-.48 ~.57 -- .84) whereas the platoon
commander's age had no effect either (.O1 ~.04 -.25).
IGLS method in rhe random intercept model the deciances are important as well.
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On the other hand, disposition to trust seems to have a significant effect on trust in the
platoon commander (.42 ~.13 - 3.23). The higher disposition to trust, the higher trust in the
platoon commander (table 12). The amount of time that subordinates had known their platoon
commander had no effect on trust in the platoon commander (.O1 ~.02 -.50). The
experiences however, such as being open to subordinates and looking after safet~- in the
workplace, had great impact on trust in the platoon commander, as the t-test trields a 10.6 (.53
~.05). ~X~ten the effect of the housing situation of subordinates was examined no effect was
found. If subordinates know their platoon commander better because they~ live on base, that
does not bear effect on trust in their platoon commander.
Finally- the extent to which the respondents judge the situations as dangerous was
examined. A t-test reveals a statistic significant difference for two out of three items"~. Still,
IOo~o of the subordinates looked upon the barracks situation as dangerous, and only- 300~0
considered the field situation as dangerous, however the overwhelming majority~ of the
respondents looked upon neither situauon as dangerous. The statement "everybody should
take extra care that thej- are not hurt" is confirmed in the barracks situation by- 220~0, against
730~o in the field situation. The majoritt- of the respondents agreed that great care should be
exercised in the field situation.
5. Discussion, conclusions and recommendations
In this stud~- the connect3on between potential risks, leadership stvle and subordinates' trust in
platoon commanders was examined. Task-oriented leadership in situations of high potential
risks situations appeared to generate trust in the platoon commander. This is not really~
surprising since soldiers learn from the beginning of basic trainiag that the task must be
fulfilled at all times. It is a process of internalization that becomes a guiding principle through
their entire militart- training and military- life. A leader responding to this expectation is likely- to
reflect soldiers' drills and invoke trust. This finding corroborates a previous finding on the
effect of task-oriented leadership (Gouldner, 1954) and further specifies findings of
'-~ The items were the follouing: 1'his situaàon is dangerous for all ini-oh-ed (aeerage barracks siniaàon .10, (s.d. .30),
acerage field situaàon .311, (s.d. .46) t-5.35); This situaàons makes ec-en one feel tense ( a~ erage barracks situaàon .~3,
(s.d. .30), a~ erage tield situaàon .52, (s.d. .801, t-.l~; E~ en one should be au-are that nothing happens to him (at-erage
barracks situaàon .22, (s.d. .41), a~-erage fïeld situaàon .73, (s.d. .99), t-6.80).
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appreciation of task-oriented leadership in situaáons of high potential risks (Kerr, Schriesheim,
Murphi 8c Stogdill, 1974). Leaders, also future leaders such as officer-cadets, should focus on
good task-fultillment. This is already an important part of the officers' training, but the specific
skills for arms and sereices now have to be mastered in six months, whereas this used to be
one year. It is strongly recommended that, to keep up the task-oriented skills, this training time
is not reduced any further but rather the opposite, extended with a few months.
Relation-oriented leadership in situations of low potential risks does not generate trust
in platoon commanders. This may imply that subordinates find task-oriented behavior more
important than relation-oriented behacior. Aspects such as the platoon commander's initial
function, age or the time that the platoon commander has worked with the subordinates does
not influence subordinates' trust in the platoon commander. Moreover, there does not seem to
be a difference between subordinates who live off-base and those who stav at the barracks
during the week, where they are likely to meet the platoon commander. Though this research
has mainly focused on leadership styles and trust, the length of co-operation and the stay in the
barracks were added purely as explorative aspects. However, it is recommended that they are
left out.
Other influences on trust in the platoon commander are the disposition to trust and
the experiences subordinates have had with the platoon commander. The effect of disposition
to trust is not surprising as it has been found in pre~-ious studies (see also 1~1cKnight,
Cummings 8c Chervan}-, 1998). Disposition to trust cannot be influenced as it is a personal
characteristic.
The experiences subordinates have had with the platoon commander pertain to the platoon
commander's general beha~rior such as looking after a safe workplace, complimenting a
subordinate on a good job, promoting team spirit within die platoon. These experiences
demand special attention as it is important for platoon commanders to realize that their
subordinates pay attention to all these supposedly small details in day-to-da}- acti~~ities and that
this helps to shape theír trust in the platoon commander. For the army, and especiall}' army
training, these experiences are important, recognizing the fact that these experiences can occur
an}~~here, in the barracks as well as the field, and units often find themselves in the barracks.
Yet many training situations pertain to field situations and these experiences indicate that
situations in the barracks can contribute to trust in the platoon commander as well, but quite
often this is not included in army training, again likely due to a limited training time for arms
and sen~ces. As said at the beginning of this chapter, more aspects need to be trained these
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da~-s than duting the Cold Ví'ar period, but the total amount of training time has not changed.
Officer-cadets get a bit of e~-en-thing in their training, but more training time would give more
opportunity to go deepl}- into all sl:ills and drills. Again it is strongh~ recommended that
training time is not reduced but e~-en e~tended ~~~ith a few months.
The studt~ ends with some comments. First, as the items to be used for the
yuestionnaires were derieed from F.nglish questionnaires, these had to be translated into
Dutch. Subsequently, a`translauon' towards a militar}~ situation needed to be made. This mat'
ha~-e negatively affected the validitt- of some items. Second, the scales for the leadership st,~les
ha~-e become yuite small. For e~-en more reliable results it is adeisable to use a larger scale.
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Consideration, CompG;mcr and Communication: Their lmpact on Commanders' Tmst
Chapter 4. Consideration, Compliance and Communication: Their Impact on
Commanders' Trust"'.
1. Introduction
In their management, supen-isors in an organizaàon give direcàons how goals must be
attained. Management encompasses working with and through individuals and groups to
accomplish organizaàonal goals (see Herse~- 8a. Blanchard, 1977), b}- planning, moàvating,
organizing and control. All together, management refers to the way in which superior levels
within an organizaàon give direcàons to lower levels and individuals within the organizaàon,
and how thev plan, moàvate, organize and control organizaàonal acà~riàes to accomplish
organizaàonal goals. This is also the wa}' in which management is addressed in this stud}..
One precondition for attaining organizaàonal goals is trust within the organizaàon
(Fukuyama, 1995; Smets, ~'els 8c Van Loon, 1997; Gambetta, 2000; T}~ler, 2001). Trust is
necessan' because the absence of trust would require managers to consistentl}~ monitor their
emplo}~ees' acàviàes, which is an ehpensive and almost impossible acàvin- (Miller, 2001; Yukl,
2002). Hence, superiors need to trust their emplo~-ees for the performance of organizaàonal
acà~7àes, and by- trusàng them, they depend on their goodwill, a goodwill that, in turn, has
been found to be Gnked to employ.ees' trust in their superiors (Ty.ler 8c Degoey, 1996). r~s such,
trust seems reciprocal: if superiors displa}~ trust in their management towards emplo}-ees,
emplo}-ees show their goodw-ill connected w7th trust in the superiors. The quesàon arises,
where emplo}~ees' trust springs from. According to T`-1er (2001) it springs from superior levels'
care about their employ~ees. This care bv superior levels could be seen as consideraàon for
emplo}-ees and a posiàve intent. It ma}- then be suggested that considerate management and
trust are essenàal for an organizaàon. This ma}~ be especially true for an organizaàon in crisis
situaàons or in situaàons ofdrasàc changes, like downsizing or changes in organizaàonal goals.
~~'eick and Suthcliffe (2001) argue that organizations need to reh- on their personnel in
unexpected situaàons, situaàons that can hardl~- be trained for. This reliance ma}~ depend upon
"' The authors of this chapter are Irene Fï. van der Kloet, harin Sanders and loseph L. Soeters. The chapter Nill be
subtnitted as an article to rhe lournal of ;~fanagement and Go~ ernance.
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trust in the organization, so that each member u-ill perform to the best of his abilities to reduce
hazard as much as possible, should a dangerous situation occur. Considerate management
would ensure that the emplo}-ees' interests are taken into account and would cause emplovees
to trust their superior levels.
The next yuestion is if considerate management and trust are sufficient to achieve
organizational goals. ~X'ould it not be so that organizations appl}- certain rules and procedures
that emplo}-ees should follow in order to get where the}- need to be? How else would
employ~ees know what needs to be done and how it should be done? This would call for a set
of rules, but also for some control s}-stem, as without a control s}~stem, emplo}-ees could do as
preferred and no correction would take place, resulting in, possibly., poor organizational
outcomes. This would imph- that organizations need to set rules and procedures for their
emplo}-ees, but also that thev need to crust that employ-ees perform these tasks because fu11
control over emplovees' beha~rior is an almost impossible task (1~liller, 2001). In order to make
themselves trustworthy-, superior levels in the organization ma}- need to be consistent in
maintaining rules. Suppose that superior levels want to be consistent in their management, how
would employees know about it? r~nd how could superior levels know if their employees trust
them? This would have to be communicated within the organization, for ea:ample personally,
by- telephone, b}- documents or b~~ email. By these means, rules and procedures can be
esplained to emplo}-ees so the}' get an understanding about what is expected of them and what
their discretionary powers are. Should the opportunity- be given for feedback, this interaction
seems a fertile base for trust to arise (Luhmann, 1979), as feedback also gives superiors the
opportunin- to learn from their emplo}.ees. This seems self-evident, but the role of
communication is likel}- essential for management and trust (Sarbaugh-Thompson ~k Feldman,
1998).
~~11ere the relationship is laid benveen trust in higher levels in the organization,
considerate management, consistenc}- in rule maintenance and communication, it is not exactly-
clear how these three aspects relate to each other. The understanding of this relationship is
important because it could help organizations to enhance emplo~-ees' trust in the organization.
Hence, the central yuestion in this stud~- is: How do considerate management and
complíance with organízatíonal rules mfluence trust in higher levels wíthín the
organization and what is the role ofcommunícation in this connection?
102
Considcration, Compliance and (:ummunication: Their Impact on (~ommanclrrs' Trust
In this chapter it is the intention to stud}' these interrelations more deepl}~. Object of stud}' is
the Ro}-a1 Netherlands rlrmti- (RNL.A)'I. The arm}- regards intensive and open communication
as necessary preconditions for trust in the future functioning of the arm}. (Defenriekiutrt, Januar}-
10, 2002). The RNLA is continuouslv changing and downsizing its organization. This process
of reorganization and downsizing has been taking place since the end of the Cold ~'ar in 1990
(I~ndmacht Doctnne ParGlicatze I, 1996);'. Reorganization and downsizing cause uncertainties for
the personnel and involve continuous changes in management. In the slipstream of continuous
downsizing, management as well as trust and communication ma~~ be influenced.
2. Theoretical elaboration
Trust entails the risk an individual willingl}. runs of being hanned b}- another person's behavior,
in the belief that the other person will not take advantage of the opportunit}- to do so (e.g
Baier, 1986; Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt c`~ Camerer, 1998). hforeover, the other person's behavic,r
cannot be controlled b}- the trustor, hence a trustor leaves his fate in the hands of a trustee,
which will make a trustor wlnerable (h1a}~er, Davis 8c Schoorman, 1995). After all, the trustee
can do whatever seems most attractive to him, as the trustor has lost control.
Trust can be e~amined at various levels, like the indi~~dual (co-workers~ level or
organizational level. In co-workers' trust, the co-worker's competence, predictabilit}-, honest}-
and benevolence are at stake, dividing trust into a cognitive (competence and predictabilit}-)
and an emotional (honest}- and benevolence) component (1~4cItnight, Cummings and
Cher~~an}-, 1998). ~X1zen trust in the superior level ~~~ithin the organizauon is concerned, these
~~ In 20f11 the newh appointed commander in chief of the RNI.A concluded that commanders encountered difhculties
executing their tasks according to the mles and procedures set in management. As far as the Commander in Chief
could obsen-e, sometimes commanders did not tollow- the rules and procedures, hence tasks were carried out in
different u-acs betueen different units, uhich impaired consistenc~, and transparenc~- in procedums. In his ~-ie~L this
frustrated the urganization, on the other hand, if rules are not follou ed, one mac u.onder u hat is u rong u-ith them.
Hou commanders felt about management ~cas smdied, what their problems aere in this connection and ~rhat
recommendations the} had for impro~-ement. :;s the roles of tmst and communicatiun uere seen as indispensable for
management, these aspects ~-ere included in the research.
'' Changes have taken place since 19911. In 1991, the go~-ernment presented the Deferr.denota (Defense :~ct) 1991, in
u hich the matris strucntre ~~-irhin the Defense Department u-as abandoned and reductions were announced. In 1993,
the Defeariermta 1991 u-as adapted, resulting in the Ptioriteitemmtn 1993. Subsequentlc, het Beteid Bedn~frsoeriag Deféraie
1993 uas introduced, in u~hich corporate management u-as changed and decentraGzation of tasks along uith delegation
ot autonomc ~~'as introduced. ln 20U0 the DJenrienota ?000 u-as introduced, in ~chich a t"urthcr reduction W-as
announced, alung w~th a reneual of corporate managcment. This time, centralization was the kec issue. ln 2003 it was
announced that the Defense Department u-ould ha~re to reduce its staff bt 12000 emplocees, due to budget deficits.
~tam, if not all, reductions ine oh ed the removal of units and downsizing the organization. (Source:
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two dimensions of trust also occur, but the difference between co-workers' trust and
management trust is the follow~ing. Co-workers' trust refers to trust in other emplo}-ees who
work at more or less the same level w~ithin the organization as the individual, whereas
management trust refers to trust in the superior level that gives directions to the level at which
the individual works (Fukuvama, 1995; Tvler 8c Degoe}~, 1996; Lane 8c Bachmann, 1998).
Hence, the levels at which trustees are found also differ: in co-workers' trust the trustees are
found at the same organizational level as the trustor, whereas in trust in the superior level the
trustees are found at a superior level to that of the trustor. Tvler and Degoe}- (1996) have
found that outcome favorabilit}-, an instrumental judgment, and trustworthiness, an emotional
judgment, are highl}- important for subordinates to voluntarily- accept decisions taken bv
superior levels. Braithwaite (1998) refers to cognitive and emotional dimensions as securit}.-
oriented and harmom--oriented. She claims that knowledge about the other part}-'s activities
increases predictabilit}-, a securit}- oriented aspect of trust, which could be viewed as cogniuve.
Predictabilitv can be obsen~ed where a partv complies with its outspoken intentions. If a part5-
does not compl}. with its outspoken intentions, this mav harm a trustor's feeling about securitg.
:~foreo~-er, Braithwaite (1998) claims that shared idenuties and sharing resources rather refer to
a harmon}--oriented aspect of trust. If a trustee reveals the resources it has used to a trustor, it
displa~-s openness, an openness that ma}- appeal to the trustor's positive impression about the
trustee. A shared identit}~ seems something that is felt, rather than something cognitive. One
ma}- have the same interests, but if there is a conflict of character, there is no shared identit}-.
Somehow there is a mismatch. It ~y7ll not alwa`-s be eas}` to express what exacd} it is that docs
not match, but the feeling of disharmon}- is there, which is wh`- the shared identities and shared
resources are referred to as emotional elements of trust.
The distinction between cognitive and emotional trust is corroborated b}- Jennings
(1998), who claims that confidence in the nauonal government depends on how well it
performs (instrumental trust), whereas support for local and state government deri~-es its
strength from how u~ell the}. can link between citizenr}. and public officials (emotional trust).
The previous ma~- lead to the conclusion that trust, whether discussed at the co-workers' or
organizational superior level, has a cognitive and an emotional dimension. In this stud}- the
focus is on trust in superior levels ~t-ithin the organization, in which the t,vo dimensions,
cognitive and emotional, are included.
h ttp: ~ ~~~~~~r.mindef. n1:30280 ~ mpbundels ~ i 1-sene ~~ 1-0~ ~ d~-~ 1-0~-ht ~ofdstuk- l.htm)
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Organizaàons may be able to contribute to co-workers' trust in the wa}' the}. maintain
rules: if organizaàons maintain their rules across all personnel e~~en-handedl}-, the}' create a
safeguard against opportunisàc behavior by- other indi~riduals in the organizaàon. Baron and
Kreps (1999) argue that consistence in rule maintenance may- vary over groups; in as much that
management levels ma}- maintain rules consistently- for each group, but the nature of these
rules may differ per group. If these managerial rules and policies are consistent in the reward
structure, policies and valued beha~~ior, then an organizaàon creates a positive setting for
organizaàonal trustworthiness (Ford, 2003). Superior levels ma}- need to give direcàons
(command), set boundaries ofwhat is and what is not allowed within the organizaàon (control)
and account for their acàviàes and those of their subordinates or subordinate supervisors
(accountabilit5-). VG~tere maintaining rules within the organizaàon is concerned, the
organizaàon can be consistent in its rules for similar groups of employees, thus showing that it
treats its employees in an honest manner, which would enable organizaàonal trust to arise
among its employ-ees. This is a form of reciprocin- display~ed b}- the organizaàon that is
appreciated b}- emploj-ees (Sanders 8c Van Emmeàk, 2004).
r~lthough a certain consistenc}. in rule maintenance seems necessan~, too much
coerciveness is likely to have an undesired effect on employees. Coerciveness implies that
discipline is tradiàonal, bureaucraàc and that emplo}~ees hace little autonom}- when it comes to
work procedures (Soeters, Vi'inslow Sz ~k'eibull, 2003). Adler 8c Bor}-s (1998) have found that
coerciveness causes its emploti-ees to loose iniàaàve, whereas enabling emplo}-ees to work
fle~cibly- within a set of rules would make emplo`~ees more resilient in finding soluàons for
problems. ~'ithin an enabling organizaàon, emplo~-ees have discreàonan~ space to do their
work in accordance with norms but in a more or less empowered wa}~ (Soeters et al, 2003). The
latter ma}. be especiall}- important for the sun-ival of employees in organizaàons that ma}' tind
themselees in dangerous situaàons where trust is salient for sur~7~ra1 (~k'eick Sc Suthcliffe,
2001). Enabling emplot-ees by- giving them more discreàonan- space can only work if there is
trust (Adler 8z Bons, 1996).
Trust in superíor levels seems highl}- linked w~ith relaàonal aspects, where supeàors
and subordinates within an organizaàon in~-est energy in shared opinions and the w-illingness to
be held responsible for their tasks. This can be seen as a cultural aspect of the organizaàon,
where norms and values are shared between organizaàonal members (Soeters et al., 2003). For
management w-ithin an organizaàon, it seems useful that emplo}'ees and superior levels within
the organizaàon share more or less similar views when it comes to organizaàonal goals.
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Tr)nnies refers to such organizations as a Gemeznrchaft (Tbnnies, 1963, reprint of 1935 edition).
To make an organization into a Gemeinrcl~aft, openness and trust are indispensable (Van Lu}~k 8c
Schilder, 1997). To accomplish openness and trust, transparenc}' in management seems
necessart-, as well as an open mind towards emplo~ees' opinions (consideration) so emplo~-ees
get the impression that the}- can contribute to organizational goals. If an organization would
want its emplo}-ees to kno~ti- about organizational goals, procedures and rules, communication
seems indispensable.
According to Habermas (1998), to attain proper communication it is necessar}~ that
the speaker's utterances are intelligible to the hearer, so the hearer can understand. Hence, the
speaker makes himself understandable and comes to an understanding with the hearer, which
reyuires that the speaker ascertains that the hearer understood the message. 1~loreover, the
speaker is expected to express his intentions truthfull}~ so that the hearer can find the utterance
of the speaker credible (Habermas, 1998), imroh-ing that the speaker expresses himself in such
a manner that the hearer can trust him. Organizational superior levels suppl}- other
organizational le~-els u7th information, with the purpose of attaining or improving
organizational goals. Information is processed through the organization and management
effecti~-eness much depends on how superior le~-els can negotiate their influence on others
through communication (Hosking, 1991). This emphasizes the necessit}- of communication for
management to invoke trust among emplo~-ees. As it is, communication ma}- also impair
proper information streams if ~y-rong or inadeyuate information is communicated. As such, it ís
likel}- not to support or promote managemcnt but rather to attain the opposite effect, interfere
~~ith management. Hence, in such cases trust ma`- not arise, it mat' e~-en be broken down.
Rlthough the impression mac be given that there are onh- positi~-e results to be expected from
communication (Stoter, 1997; Sako, 1998), negative information can be communicated as ~~~ell,
such as gossip (Soeters, 1994; XX'ittek 8c ~X'ielers, 1998)j'. This boils down to the fact that
supen-isot}- le~-els ma}' attempt to transmit management intentions through communication,
but if what the}- transmit is not intelligible to the hearer, if the supervisor}- lecel does not
succeed in making itself intelligible, the understanding ~~zth other organizational leaels w7ll not
arise, and trust ~z-ill not arise. Communication thus seems to moderate betn~een the
management and the occurrence of trust.
}' Gossip has positi~-e effects on truct ~rithin a f,~reiup, but has negati~e effects on trust bet~reen groups (Tieks, 20114j.
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Nowadat~s, communication can occur in various wa}-s. Personal communication (from person
to person) and telephone communication are common wavs, as well as written communicatic~n
(documents on paper). The use of email communication seems to have increased rapidl}. o~ er
the past few }~ears (Sarbaugh-Thompson ck Feldman, 1998). Personal communication is
probabl~- essential for social integration and trust w~ithin an organization as personal
communication facilitates casual conversation easier than an}- other t}~pe of communication
(Sarbaugh-Thompson cX Feldman, 1998). These four t}Tes of communication, personal,
telephone, w-ritten and email, wrill be addressed in this stud}..
The relationship between considerate management trust and communicauon. ~'here superior
levels within an organization need to take decisions b}- planning, motivating, organizing and
control (Herse~. 8c Blanchard, 1977), these decisions are best supported b}- subordinate levels if
norms and values are shared between levels within the organization (Soeters, et al, 2003). This
would impl}- that superior levels need to take into consideration the situations at the lower
levels and give the low-er levels the possibilit}~ to find their own solutions, instead of prescribing
ever}-thing by the book (Adler 8c Bon~s, 1996). To accomplish this, superior levels ma}- need to
communícate well with their subordinate levels (Hosl:ing, 1991). Mutual understanding and
openness w~ill likelv lead to trust in the superior level (T~-ler 8c Degoey, 1996; Braithw.aite,
1998). VG~tere situations at the subordinate levels ma}~ differ and slight adjustments in rules ma}-
sometimes be necessarv for one subordinate level or another, it ma}~ be necessar}~ that a
superior level is considerate in its management and takes into account the special situation for a
subordinate leeel, if need be (Baron 8c Kreps, 1999). To give an ehample, it ma}- seem obscure
for some subordinate levels under the same superior level wh}- consideration for one of their
colleagues is displa}-ed. Communication seems necessan- to explain this, and is therefore likel}-
to moderate this connecuon bettveen management and trust. Hence, given the previous
reasoning the following h}~pothesis is formulated:
The more the superior level di.rplays cousideratrau iu its managemeut tou~ards a subordinate level, tbe mom trust
a suGordinate level has iu a supenor leve! (hypothesis 1 a).
Corrrmunicatiou Gehveen the superior level aud tbe suGordiuate leve! ís e.~c~ected to positively inf7ueuce tlie
relatiouship Gettveen mauagerneut crird trust. (hypothesis 1 b).
The relationship between compliance and trust. and the role of communication. Although rule
maintenance ma}- differ across the various subordinate levels within an organization (Baron 8c
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Kreps, 1999), managerial rules and policies need to be consistent to create organizaáonal
trustworthiness (Ford, 2003). ~loreo~-er, subordinates need to compl}~ w7th these rules and the
extent to which subordinate levels compl}- w-ith rules can be viewed as an indicator of the
extent to which the organizaáon is respected and tal:en seriousl}-. Here, it must be said that
compliance in the sense of following rules and orcíers ma}' not alwa}'s have posiáve sides onl}-,
as is sadly but clearly shown in the process in 1961 against Adolf Eichmann, who followed
orders and thus was responsible for the death of thousands of Jews in ~'orld VZ'ar Two
(Verweij, 2002). In this case, orders were blindl}~ followed without an ethical thought
concerning their consequences (murdering people). In the study at hand, where rules and
orders are issued for the sake of management w7thin the RNLA, often in peaceáme situaàons,
it ma}' generallj- be assumed that these rules are not unethical.
Persons in a leadership posiáon at superior levels are the first responsible for rules being
followed b}. their personnel, and in order to be a good example to their personnel the}' are not
expected to deviate from rules themselves. More agreement between not de~-iaáng from rules
between a superior level and subordinate levels is likeh~ to lead to more organizaáonal trust as
it shows agreement between organizaáonal levels in one common polic}- of management. If
there are differences between the way superior le~-els deviate from rules and the wa}-
subordinates de~-iate from rules, these differences ma~- primaril}~ be resolved b}- communicaáon
(Hoslting, 1991). Therefore, communicaáon ma}- have a moderaáng effect on the relation
between compliance with rules and trust.
The more conípliance with rule.r a.cupe~zor !ea'el ant! their rubordlnate levelt di.rplay, the mom they tru.rt the
organi~aizon (hypotheti.c 2aJ.
Communiration Getu'een the ruGordinate lere! and the .ruperzor level j~a.ritit~e}' influence.r the relatioruhip hetween
compliance uáth rulea and trurt. ~hypothe.ri.r 2G).
H`pothesis la and lb ma~- seem quite similar to h}~otheses 2a and 2b, howe~-er an essenáal
difference between these h}-potheses is, that in h}potheses la and lb the emphasis is on how a
superior level soleh- acts as an influence on subordinate levels' trust, whereas in h}~pothesis 2a
and 2b the emphasis is on an agreement in acáviáes between superior and subordinate levels as
an influence on subordinate le~-els' trust.
The relaáonshi-p between stáct rule orientaáon and trust and communicaáon. Rules are
supposed to give structure and certainn' within an organizaáon. A leader strictl~- sácking to
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rules ma}~ expect positive organizational outcomes. If outcomes are not positi~-e, the leader
may- doubt the correctness of the rules. ~1ien rules are issued, they may be clear and correct,
but due to changes in the law for example, rules within an organization ma}~ need to be
changed as well. This implies that superior organizational levels need to keep up to date with
changes in rules, bti. changing the rules for their own organization. The}- need to inform their
subordinate le~Tels of the latest developments in rules so the}- (the subordinate levels) can lead
their units well. Not knowing if a certain rule is still in effect ma}' make a leader at any
organizational level uncertain and ma}- negati~-el}- influence his trust in the organization, as it
will make him uncertain as to whether or not the organization consistentlt- provides him ~~~ith
the adequate information. So if a leader is placed in a situauon and needs to take a decision, he
must make sure that he has the adequate information. Communication is necessar}- to supply
him with the needed information (Hosl:ing, 1991; Habermas, 1998). If proper communication
lacks, he could be uncertain about the adequate informauon on rules and his strict rule
orientation will be questionable, hence his trust in the organization ma}- recede.
The .rironger a strict nrle ozzentak'on iy aper.ron izz a leadersbip porition, the more trust thi.r~ersou hus in tfie
agani:~atzou (hypothesz:c 3a).
Corrrmunication positively inj7ueuces the ~ect of strict nrle onentation on organitiakaral hzut (hypothesis 36~.
The research figure is as follows:
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115 Commanders'~ at several le~-els in the RNLA recei~-ed a yuesàonnaire b}' surface mail,
accompanied bv an introducton~ letter from the commander in chief of the RNL.~. 68
Commanders returned the yuesàonnaire, a response rate of 590~0. Their average age was 46
j~ears, and on a~-erage the}- had served in the RNL.~1 for 26 ~-ears. Their ranks w-ere general-
major (30~0, 2), brigadier-general (90~0, C), colonel (130~0, 9), lieutenant-colonel (380~0, 25), major
(310~0, 21) or captain (4o~o, 3). í~fost commanders w-ere men (9~0~0). 16"~o had completed the
higher militar`~ course at the Defense College, whereas 22o~o had completed the middle
management courses at the Defense College. Thet- u-ork at tlve different hierarchic le~-els
uzthin the RNLA.
For measuàng trust a scale was used. Ele~-en items were deri~-ed from Cummings and
Bromile}-'s Organizaàonal Trust Ineenton' (OTI) (1996), this yuesàonnaire is specificall~.
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useful for measuring trust betu'een units in organizations. The text in the items needed to be
slightl}' modified as the items did not specificall}- pertain to the militan- situation. The
modification included, among others, that specificall}' not the commander (at the superior
level) himself was mentioned in the yuestionnaire, thus avoiding the risk that respondents
would consider the person of the commander, as the intention was to impl}- the superior level
as a whole (the commander and his staff). An example of an item is: "The superior level alwa}~s
keeps its word towards mv unit". The answering categories were "1 - no one at the superior
level", "2 - some people at the superior level", "3 - about half of the people at the superior
level", "4 - most of the people at the superior level" and "5 - all of the people at the superior
level". These items showed a reliable scale of 10 items with an alpha of .89, representing trust
in the superior commander and his staffj'.
Five items represented considerate management. Considerate management was
operationalized as the wati' in which the superior level shows consideration in its management
towards subordinate levels when it comes to taking decisions. If management was considerate,
it could be expected that it enhances subordinate commanders' trust in the superior level. The
yuestions were derived from everyday practice in the work situation. An example: "~~en
taking difficult decisions, the superior level evenly distributes the burdens over the subordinate
levels". Possible answers were "no one at the superior level", "some people at the superior
level", "about half of the people at the superior level", "most of the people at the superior
level" and "all of the people at the superior level". A reliabiliry analysis upon these items
showed a five-item scale with an alpha of .86 (see appendix C).
Commanders were asked simply and straightforu'ardl}- if the}' deviate from rules and
if the}- noticed that the superior level deviates from rules. It was the idea behind deviaung from
rules that was important, as commanders are basicall}' expected not to deviate from rules. To
say that obedience was at stake here goes a little far, hence the scale was called compliance
(u-ith rules). If both commander and superior commander do not deviate from rules, their
compliance will not be as much yuestioned than if both do de~riate from rules. Commanders
were asked "Do }'ou deviate from rules~" and "Do you notice if }-our superior level de~riates
from rules?" Possible answers were "ves" or "no". 1'he correlation between these two items
was high (I'earson correlation -.36, p c.01, one-tailed). Hence, the two items were computed
into one concept called compliance. This new item was coded as follows: 0- both commander
}' Commanders in the arm~ are all in a leadership position over a unit.
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and his superior level deviate from rules; 1- either commander or his superior level de~7ates
from rules; 2- neither commander nor his superior level de~~iates from rules (see appendix C).
Nine work situations were presented concerning commanders' strict rule orientation.
These situations were derived from the practice of evervda~- work. These yuestions mainl}~
pertained to the extent in which commanders would follow rules, and the scale was called strict
rule orientation. The situations often posed a dilemma. Commanders were asked to circle the
answer (per situation) that was closest to what thei- would do in that situation. A factor analysis
was performed on these situations, showing four different factors, but the items were not
mutuallv exclusive: some items in one factor were also included in another factor. Factor two
included four items in which there was no doubt about the choice for the correct answer (the
other items were sometimes so doubtful that one respondent remarked that even legal officers
could not agree upon the correct answer). These four items were made into a scale which was
called strict rule orientation (eigenvalue 1.46, 16 0~o explained variance) (see appendix C).
The quesuons regarding communication concerned how commanders assessed the
frequenci- of various t}pes of communication u-ith the superior level. Four tvpes of
communication were mentioned. Firstl}-, personal communication was mentioned, meaning
personal contact benseen commander level and his superior level. Next, telephone
communication was mentioned, meaning communicating b}~ telephone bet`veen a commander
and his superior level. Third, written communicarion was mentioned, meaning communication
bv written documents, on paper. Last, email communication was mentioned, meaning
cr7mmunicating b}- electronic mail. Again, these items were dericed from ever}-da}' work
situations but the~~ could be applicable an}-where, in an}- organization, as thet~ simplti- asked
about how commanders rated the frequencv of various t}-pes of communication. For example:
"How do }-ou rate the freyuenc}- of communication utith the superior level when it comes to:
personal communication, telephone communication, written communication, email
communication?". Answering categories were far too low, too low, esactlc right, too high or
far too high. The replies "far too low" or "far too high" u-ere labeled as a ver~- poor freyuenc}-
of communication, the replies "too low" or "too high" were labeled as a poor frequenc}- of
communication and the replies "exactlv right" were, naturall}-, labeled as an exactl}. right
freyuenc}- of communication. As such, three answering categories were created. Ven- poor
frequenc}- was labeled as "0", poor frequenct- of commurucation was labeled as "1" and an
" For an oveme~r nf the questionnaires, see appendi~ C.
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exacth- right frequency- of communicaáon was labeled as "2". This was done for each type of
communicaáon.
One item concerned the statement: "In making decisions I do not only. consider the
interests of mv superior level, but also those of the R~LA as a whole". This item concerns
what commanders take into account when taking decisions. Answering categoáes were
"never", "seldom", "someámes", "often", "always". This item concerns what commanders
take into account when taking decisions. Answering categories were "never", "seldom",
"someámes", "often", "always". This item was used to validate compliance, to be discussed
later on in the chapter.
The quesáonnaire also contained a few open quesáons. One important quesáon was
an open quesáon concerning what commanders think management is all abour3~. Another
open quesáon referred to commanders' recommendaáons for improvement in management
(see appendix D).
4. Results
A correlaáon analysis between considerate management, the assessment of frequenc}- of the
four types of communicaáon, strict rule orientaáon, compliance, trust in the superior level, two
demographic variables, age and áme served in the Rl~TL~1, shows various significant
correlaáons (table 13).
]There is a significant posiáve correlaáon between trust and considerate management (.82),
trust and the assessment of frequency- of personal communicaáon (.35) and trust and the
assessment of frequencv of email communicaáon (.35). Trust correlates negaávely~ significantly~
with strict rule orientaáon (-.31). This implies that there is a connecáon
"' The Dutch Defense Department dehnes management as follows: Command, tontroland arrountaGllity of'toiporateproeertes
urthrn Ihe DeJènre o~anitiation, takln~ into aaount !he demandi Jor o~eraáonal deployment "(DP ~ 1-30, RNI~).
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between trust and considerate management for the subordinate level and between trust and
two out of four t}-pes of communication. It also shows a reverse relauonship benveen trust and
strict rule orientation: whoever strictl}~ sticks to rules does not trust the superior le~-el, or ~7ce
versa.
Another positive significant correlation is found between considerate management on one
hand and the assessment of frequenc}- of personal communication (.24), the assessment of
frequenc}- of written communication (.25) and the assessment of frequenc}- of email
communication (.36) on the other hand. There is a negative significant correlauon between
considerate management and strict rule orientaáon (-.33). VG2toever sticks to rules does not feel
there is considerate management. Compliance correlates significantl}- with the assessment of
frequenc}- of personal communication (.25) and with the assessment of frequenc}- of email
communication (.23). Strict rule orientation correlates negatively significand}- with the
assessment of frequenct- of email communication (-.36). Commanders who strictl~ stick to
rules regard the frequenc}- of email communication as more negative. The assessment of
frequency of personal communicauon correlates si~nificantly with the assessment of frequency-
of telephone communicauon (.32) and with the assessment of frequenc~~ of email
communication (.35). The three quickest t}-pes of communication (in writing letters the
message comes across slower than bi- talhing in person, mal:íng a phone call or sending an
email) are obviouslv related.
The assessment of frequenc}- of telephone communication does not correlate significandy with
an~- other t}pe of communication, or am- other aspect in the table apart from those alread}'
menuoned. The same goes for the assessment of frequenc}' of written and email
communication.
Finallv, age correlates significantlt- with time served (.96) as could be expected: the longer one
sen-es in the arm}., the older one gets.
In the method paragraph it was mentioned that the item "In malcing decisions I do
not onlv consider the interests of m~- superior level, but also those of the RI~iLA as a whole"
would be used to ~-alidate compliance. Out of 66 commanders who replied to this item, 23
state that the}- ahvati~s consider the interests of the RNLA, 36 state that the}- often consider the
interests of the R~~1LA, and onh- 7 state that they sometimes consider the interests of the
RNLA. Out of those who sa}' that thev alwavs consider the RNLA's interests (n-23), in 14
cases both commanders (at superior and subordinate leeel) do not comph- with rules. Out of
those w-ho sa~- that the}~ often consider the RNLA's interests (n-36), in 23 cases both
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commanders (at superior and subordinate lecel) do not stick to rules and in 11 cases one of the
ta~o does not compl}- w~ith rules. This is reason to believe that commanders do not think
compGance with rules is important ~tiith regard to considering the RNL.A's interests.
In a regression analt-sis the effect of considerate management on trust was tested as a
main effect, together w-ith the assessment of freyuenc}~ of four n-pes of communication. .~ge
and time sen-ed were left out, as these eariables onh- correlated with each other, not with other
variables. The regression analyses were performed accepting a p-value smaller than .10, as the
group is relati~-ely small (I'lantenga, 1981);-.
A significant effect of considerate management and the frequenc~ of personal communication
on trust was found (beta -.74; beta -.14 respecàvel}-) (table 14). This means that both
considerate management and the assessment of the frequenc}' of personal communication have
a direct significant effect on trust in the superior IeveL Therefore, hypothesis la can be
confirmed. Next, a regression anah~sis was performed with personal communication and
considerate management as main effects, as thev were significant in the first regression analy-sis,
where the frequenc~~ of personal communication was also a moderator between considerate
management and trust. To a~~oid that one ~-ariable would have a greater influence than another
due to a difference in answering categories, both variables were centered before the}~ were
calculated as an interaction ~-ariable (Aiken 8c VG'est, 1991; Tabachnick ác Fidell, 2001).
Considerate management still has a strong main effect on trust (beta -.75) and so does
personal communicaàon (beta -.18), but thc interaction effect u~as nr,t found to be
significant. The explained ~-ariance has remained the same (65 percent). Personal
communication has a direct effect on trust, but the interacàon effect between personal
communication and considerate management was not found to be significant. Therefore,
h~.pothesis lb cannot be confirmed.
' Plantenga argues that the conseyuences connected ~ti ith unjustlc taking a decision are ]ess s'erious uhen a larger alpha
is chosen than uhen a smaller alpha is chosen. In other words: someàmes it is not so wrung to choose a larger alpha as
the consequences of this choice are relaà~-elt small. It depends to u-hat extent one can afford the negaà~~e
consequrnces of a decision. If nne cannot afford rhem, a smaller alpha is recommended.
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Table 14. Results of regrescion analcscs of considerate management, compliance with rules and strict rule orientation
~cith trust as dependent variable
Variables Model ] Model 2 Model3
Considerate ~fanagement (CCvi) ?4'
Compliance((:) O l
Strict mle Orientation (SRO) -.l6
Personal Communication (P(:) 14' .23~` 23~
Telephone Communication (C(:) .04 .0 i .OG
~~'ritten Communication (~~'C) -.Ul .14 12
Email Communication (F.C) .03 .23' .18
Cbf ~ PC .07
C ' PC -.27~
C ~` EC -.Ol
SRO' PC 03
R2 65 .GS .20 18 22 I?
In the next regression anal}.sis the effect of compliance was examined, as in
h~potheses 2a and 2b. In this anal}-sis too, the various assessments of freyuenc~- of
communicaáon were first added as main effects. No effect of compliance on trust was found,
but the Erequenc}- of personal communicaáon has a significant positive effect on trust (beta -
.23), as well as the frequency of email communication (beta -.23). An R-square is found of
.20. ~Y'hen the main effect of compGance and the frequenc}' of personal communicaáon are
examined u7th the interacáon effect betu~een frequenc~- of personal communicaáon and
lt7
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compliance , the frequency of personal communicadon show-s a significant effect on trust (beta
-.28) and the interacáon between compGance and the frequenc~- of personal communication
shows a negative significant effect of -.27. The percentage of explained variance has bareh
changed, it is 18 "io now. Figure 5 shows the interaction of the assessment of the frequenc`- of
personal communication w7th compliance w-ith rules.
Figure 5. The inreracrion benieen compGance ~i~th mles and the assessment of the freyuenc~ of personal
communication as an effect on trust in the superior le~-el.
r





The effect of compliance with rules is positive for those w-ith a low assessment of frequenc}- of
personal communication. Under conditions of a higher frequenci- of communication more
compliance u7th rules leads to lower trust. This would mean that those who do not
communicate often with their superior le~-el have trust in that level, but those who often
communicate utith that superior le~~el do not.
~k~en the regression is performed with the interaction betu-een compliance and emaíl
communicarlon, a direct effect of email communication is found (beta -.32) but no significant
interaction effect was found. H}~potheses 2a can be contirmed. ~s for hypothesis 2b, the effect
was expected to be positive, but it was found negatiee instead when it comes to the frequenc}-
of personal communication. Therefore, h~-pothesis 2b cannot be confirmed.
The last regression analt~sis refers to strict rule orientation and the four npes of
communication as main effects and trust in the superior le~~el as the dependent variable
ll8
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(h}Potheses 3a and 3b). There is no significant effect of strict rule orientation, onl}~ of personal
communication (beta - .23), the R-syuare is .22.
A regression anal}'sis with strict rule orientation and the frequenc}- of persona] communication
as main effects and also the frequenc}. of personal communication as an interaction variable
shows a signilicant negative effect of strict rule orientation (beta --.23), a significant positive
main effect of personal communícation (beta -.30) but no significant interaction effect. ílgain,
personal communication has a direct influence on trust. The explained ~-ariance is smaller than
in the regression anal}~sis with main effects onl}~ (.17 compared to .22). These results mean that
we reject h}~pothesis 3a, and cannot confirm h}-pothesis 3b.
It strongl}~ appears diat personal communication directl}~ influences trust positivel}-, as
well as considerate management. Compliance with rules does not affect trust, a strict rule
orientation negativelv affects trust when in combination with an interaction effect of personal
communication. The results of the regression analyses are summarized in table 14.
Qualitative data of views about management are also aaailable, but when it comes to
the immediate superior level, not much has been written down. Commanders comment on the
higher superior level or levels, not the immediate superior level. ~kliat management is all about
according to commanders, is shown in appendix D. In their answers the words "command",
"control" and "accountability" are not often mentioned, despite the fact that the definition as
given by the Dutch Department of Defense (this is the definition given as footnote 33 vi this
chapter) can be found on the Defense intranet and these three words, command, control and
accountabilitv, are central to management. There was onle one commander who used the
definition from the DP 51-30.
As reasons for deviation from rules are given that rules are too complex and that it
takes too much time to go deeply into the rules to find ~ut what is and is not allowed. Another
important and frequently given reason is, that, in operations, rules cannot be worked w-ith, and
this is given as an excuse to deviate from rules in order to keep the organization or the unit
running. Commanders argue that rules do not support their work because rules are too rigid,
too comples, too restricting and they cause a lot of bureaucratic work.
W1ien asked for improvements in rules and regulations, the first surprising thing is
that out of G8 commanders who returned the questionnaire, onlv 24 commanders commented
on improaements in management, if it were up to them. In ~~iew of the complaints, and the
fact that man~~ commanders admitted to deviate from rules, more pro-active solutions were
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expected. Commanders ask for flexibilin-, like the permission to flesibh- deviate from rules if
necessan-. Rules should set boundaries within which a commander has some degrees of
freedom. Therefore, rules cannot be too complicated, and should not alwavs be copied from
civilian rules as these civilian rules cannot be applied one by one to the militar}- situation.
Commanders have the feeling that accountabilin- is regarded more important within the RNLA
than flexibilit}', also when their operational task is concerned. This anno}'s commanders. Last
but not least, commanders have written down their grievances about management in general.
The}~ complain about bureaucracy, too much emphasis on control and financial matters whilst
the}' as commanders are running an operational unit3", the core business of the arm}~. The}-
complain that rules are impracticable, especiall}~ in operational circumstances. There are also
complaints about inconsistencies in management like the decision to decentralize, and a few
}.ears later the decision to centralize again.
5. Discussion
The main question in this stud~- was: How do considerate management and compliance with
organizational rules influence trust in higher levels within the organization and what is the role
of communication in this connection~
Initiall~- there seems to be a positi~-e connection between trust and considerate
management, and personal and email communication. This is corrobnrared when the effect of
considerate management and of the freyuenc~- of npes of communication on trust are
examined. Considerate management positiveh- affects trust. Considerate management ma}~ be
looked upon as management in which there is more likel}- an agreement and negoáation
between the two levels. If there is room for negotiation, the subordinate level will have the
opportunit}' to express its ~-iew and in this mutual communication pattern, trust apparentl`-
arises. To speak w-ith the words of Braithwaite (1998), if the immediate superior level displa~-s
harmon}.-oriented beha~~or towards commanders, commanders regard this as trustwortht-
beha~~ior. This harmom--oriented behavior includes that a superior level takes the situauon at
the lower level into account, and is flexible in its management. It entails an enabling
organization, gi~-ing subordinate let-els the discredonart- space to work fairh- autonomoush-
`" These complaints were mainl~ uttered b~' operational unit comtnanders. Not all commanders ~rere operational unit
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(Adler 8c Borys, 1996; rldler et al., 1999; Soeters et al., 2003). The manual for leadership in the
RNL.A mentions how commanders should set goals for their subordinate levels: they consult
with them and set the goals together (Hundboek. Leidinggeven rir de KI~, 2002). This is, obvioush~
from this stud}-, a guideline that ma}- lead to more trust in superior levels, and can therefore
only- be encouraged to follow.
Compliance with rules does not affect trust at all. XX'ith compliance with rules was
meant that both commander and his superior level comply with rules. This was expected to
affect trust as commanders are expected to endorse the rules given in the organization that
the}- entered willingly-. Nowever, there was also much agreement between commanders and
their superior level not to comph~ with rules. VZ11en the effect of compliance with rules on trust
is examined, it is noticeable that personal communication and email communication both
positivel}' affect trust; hence communication again seems an essential ke}' in trust. Personal
communicaàon negatively ínfluences the effect of compliance on trust, meaning that for those
who comply~ with rules and who regard their freyuency of personal communication more
positivel}-, trust decreases. One could assume that commanders who have a tendenc}- to
compl~- with rules do not appreciate a high freyuenc}- of personal communication, the reason
ma}- be that they would consider being patronized by- their superior level in a high freyuenc}- of
communication, whereas commanders who have a tendency- not to comply with rules do not
mind having a frequent personal communication with their superior level. As such, w-ithin the
categor}- of freyuencies of personal communication, there is an opposite effect of compliance
on trust. Those who rate the freyuenc}~ of personal communication as low, find a positive
effect of compliance on trust, whereas those who rate the frequenc}- of personal
communication as right, fmd a negative effect of compliance w-ith rules on trust. Perhaps the
contents of the personal communication is related with the compliance with rules. The
contents of communication was not tested in this study~ and is a ground for further stud}'.
XX1ien it comes to strict rule orientation, its effect on trust becomes more negative
when the interaction between strict rule orientation and personal communication is included,
whereas personal communication becomes more positive. The direct influence of personal
communicauon on trust cannot be denied. The paradox between follow-ing rules bt- both
commanding levels or a strict rule orientation by- commanders themseh~es on the one hand and
personal communication on the other hand ma`- lie in a too strong connection between two
commanders.
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lecels of command, in which subordinate commanders ma}- ha~~e the feeling that their superior
le~-el is too much on top of them. The explanauon ma}- be that those who strictlt- follow rules
and have the impression that the}- are forced to follow rules will also ha~~e the feeling that the`.
are not trusted b}' the organization, making them suspicious of the intenuons of the
organization. Communication is then not desirable and perhaps even pointless. A strong
compliance with rules and a strict rule orientation belong to a coerciae organization (Adler, et
al, 1999). The coerciae organization demands that rules are followed strictl~- and no
discretionan- space is left here. Organizational members will get the impression that the}- are
not trusted and the best ~c.a}- to sun-i~-e in the organization is to follow rules stricth.. ~is
negotiation is useless in such cases, communication seems superfluous. An enabling
organization would gi~-e the opportuniry for discussing how rules need to be followed and for
eschanging ~-iews. ~Ithough the RNLA endorses initiatiee and discretionary space among
commanders in its leadership manua] (HandGoek Leidiaggeven in de KL, 2002), this apparentlt~ not
alwa}-s happens. If superior le~~els encourage subordinate le~-els to think consistentl}- about how
procedures can best be imprr,~-ed for more efficienc}-, and appl`- their ideas, the`- breed trust
and innovation among their emplo~.ees and fle}:ibilitt- within the organization. Tlvs is what
Adler et al.(1999) call the enabling bureaucracy-. In order to become an enabling organization,
trust is necessan-. The organization can onl}- receive trust if it gir-es trust first.
Referring to the stud}- at hand, if commanders see that their immediate superior levels
take their interests into account, this maintains their trust in their superior le~~els. Commanders
at superior le~-els as such giee wa}~ to thc enabling bureaucrac}', in which there is a solid place
for trust. As the remarks and replies to open yuestions show (appendix D), the enabling
bureaucrac}-, where commanders are given the space to do what seems best for the
organizauon, is appGed b~- the immediate superior le~-el, whereas the coerciee bureaucrac}-,
where cr7mmanders need to stick to rules, is applied b~- the higher superior leeels, the highest
le~-els within the organization. This agrees u-~ith the commanders' ~tiew that the higher, further
awa}- organizational le~-els (the levels abo~re the immediate superior leael) ha~-e a securir5--
oriented ~-ision, whereas their immediate superior le~-el displa~-s a rather harmon}--oriented
e-ision ( see Braithwaite, 1998). This is an essential distinction that is also reflected in
commanders' trust. Thec trust their immediate superior lecel, but not the higher superior le~-els
(appendix B). In their e`-es, rules come from the higher superior le~-els and seep through the
organization through their immediate superior level, but the immediate superior level silentl}-
allows de~-iating from rules. After all, the immediate superior le~-e1 also de~-iates from rules
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itself. Referring to Ti;nnies (1963), it seems that the Genrein.rchaft is present with the immediate
superior organizational levels, but not towards higher organizational levels.
Communication is directl}- related w-ith trust, especiall}~ with personal and email
communication. Personal communication is probabl}' not hard to understand: if one speaks
directl}~ with another person one can see the expression on his face, hear the intonation in his
voice and react instantl}-. As Sarbaugh-Thompson and Feldman (1998) argue, personal
communication within an organization is good for building trust, as in personal
communication not onh formal matters are discussed but also small talk, which adds to a
mutual understanding. judgments can be made about the other person's trustworthiness by
what is said, intonation and body language. This is more difficult with email communication, as
this includes words only~. Words may be emphasized bti- setting them bold, italic or
underscored, but the body~ language that is involved in personal communication lacks. ~~G~y~
email commurucation prevails over telephone communication, whereb}- one can at least hear
the other person's intonation, is maybe a feature of the present time, where much is done by~
email. Sarbaugh-Thompson and Feldman (1998) have found that email communication has
increased rapidl}- since its introduction. However, the}~ also found that email communication
has pushed aside personal communication somewhat, and that this comes at the expense of
personal contact and casual talk within an organization, which they regard important for good
mutual understanding as well. Email communication is quick and not time dependent: the two
participants in the interaction need not be present at the same time to interact. This makes
email an easy means to communicate. Perhaps email communication is used more often than
telephone communication, which is also quite personal.
6. Conclusions and recommendations
The RNLi~ claims that it is managed by- "guiding b}- main principles" (Van Baal, 2004), which
would imply- an enabling bureaucrac}-. The wa}- commanders experience it, in practice this
"guiding b}- main principles" does not always happen, they- look upon the levels above their
immediate superior level in the RNL.~ as a coerciae bureaucrac}', but they would like it to be
more enabling. ~lzereas the RNLr1 needs to operate tlexibly for accomplishing its missions, an
enabling attitude should be applied more throughout the organizauon.
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Organizational uust can be enhanced if superior levels within the organization displa}-
considerate management towards their lower level commanders and are willing to adjust their
management, and apply~ sufficient personal communication in their management. Hence, rules
and procedures should sometimes be deviated from if necessarv for proper operation, and
superior levels should accept this. This is not as impossible as it mav seem. The RNLA is
already~ heading into the direction of becoming an enabling organizauon Soeters et al., 2003)
but practice lags behind. If the Ri~iLA trusts its employ-ees to perform to the best interest of
the organization and enables them with discretionar}~ space, trust throughout the organization
is likelv to increase. As such, the organization will become a high reliability~ organization (~X'eick
8c Suthcliffe, 2001) as it can expect its members to do whatever it takes to get the job done,
even if this means deviating from rules. This is essential for an organization that operates under
dangerous circumstances. The RNL.A is one of those high reliability~ organizations as
mentioned b~- VUeick and Suthcliffe (2001). Dforeover, when commanders come across a
situation that they are not sure of how to deal with, superior levels can increase their
subordinate commanders' rsust by personally communicaung with them. Communicating by
email could be a good replacement if personal communication seems impossible at that
moment.
The study has some limitations. The number of respondents was not quite high, only
68. Hence, di~~ding the frequencies of communication in three groups (very~ poor, poor and
exactly- right) resulted in relativelv small groups. The results must be approached with caution,
but they- do give reason for further research.
Moreover, the items concerning trust and management were sometimes a bit close in their
meaning, which may- have caused the high level of explained variance in trust when the effect
of considerate management on trust was examined. The meanings were close perhaps because
considerate management is quite close to benevolence and honesty., the emotional aspects of
trust.
The items concerning the frequency- of communication have lost some of their meaning when
thev were recoded. The value "1" was given when a frequenc}- of communication was either
much too high or much too low, whereas originall~- a distinction was made between a much
too high or much too low freyuency- of communication. The same goes for the values 2,
meaning a too high or too lou- frequencv of communication.
In general, the findings of the study- open grounds for further stud~- w-ithin
organizations into the role of management, communication and trust. The possibilities for an
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enabling or coercive bureaucrac}~ could be further explored, along ~ti~ith the role of
communication to improve organizauonal trust.
~?5
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The central research yuestion in this book is: "How can the development of trust among
sen~icemen in the earious stages of their longer lasting relationship be explained?" The answer
to this yuestion was sought in four studies.
Chapter one addresses the yuestion what extent four beliefs, competence belief,
predictabilit}- belief, honesty belief and benevolence belief are components of trust.
Components of trust are essential as trust is a sensitive subject and, as such, likel}~ to be subject
to social desirabilit}- in sun-e}'s. Soldiers assess if the}- can trust other soldiers b}' other soldiers'
perceived competence, predictability, honest}- and benevolence. Competence entails skills
learned in training, yuality of work and assessed professionalism. Predictabilit}- refers to the
extent to which the}~ can count on each other and the wat~ in which the}- expect their collea~ues
to react in different situations. Honesn~ is assessed bv the extent to which soldiers think their
colleagues follow up in doing what the}- say, and their openness amongst themselves.
Exchanging ideas and open discussions form part of honesty among soldiers. The fourth
aspect, benevolence belief, is assessed b}. the extent to which the}- expect their colleagues to
work accuratelti-, bt. their willingness to help each other and the general opinion that they co-
operate yuite well in the platoon. This aspect incorporates an extent of altruistic behavior, as
the willingness to assist does not require reciprocit}- from the recipient The four aspects
cannot be considered as separate aspects, as a positive result on one aspect and a negative
result on another aspect could, for example, mean that someone is competent but not willing
to co-operate, and trust would not arise.
Referring to the central research yuesuon, in order to explain trust four beliefs should
be examined. Trust can further be explained b~- two aspects that precede trust formation. The
tlrst aspect is disposition to trust. In chapter one, two and three is shown how disposition to
trust, the general trust a person has in other people, influences the emergence of trust. People
with a low disposition to trust are likel}- to develop less trust in others than people w-ith a
higher disposition to trust.
As for trust ~~7thin organizations, the wa}~ the organization maintains its rules can
make a difference for trust formation. For interpersonal trust, an organization creates a
safeguard against untrusnvorthv and opportunistic beha~rior b~- consistendv maintaining rules.
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~X1io crosses the line will be retributed. This is thought to be an incenáve for soldiers to be
trustworth~-.
In the longer lasáng mutual relationship, these components and antecedents remain,
as is shown in chapter two. Throughout a deplo~-ment, trust appears to be fairly stable. Trust
appears to follow a flat line mainlt', i.e. a constant pattern: high trust in the beginning implies
high trust halfwa}- during deplo}-ment and at the end. Likewise, low trust in the beginning
implies lo~~- trust halfw-ay during deplo}-ment and at the end. Moreover, the order of the four
beliefs, competence belief, predictabilin- belief, honest,- belief and benevolence belief, hardh-
changes over six months, whereas the two emoáonal beliefs, honesty belief and benevolence
belief, appear to be more important throughout deployment than the two cogniá~-e beliefs.
The different results between units can be explained b}- differences in how the missions
started. In the unit that went to C}~prus as well for the first mission to Bosnia things went
rather smoothh~ and the local situaáon was quite stable, stabilit}~ reflected in trust development.
Although tensions grew in Bosnia towards the end of the deployment, b}' then the
interpersonal relaáons had grou~n m be pretn- stable. In Cyprus, things grew a httle tense
between the Dutch soldiers and the Briásh but apparent]}- not enough to influence their trust.
As for the second mission to Bosnia, the soldiers knew there were tensions and irregulariáes in
the deplo}~ment area the~- would be going to. Moreover, the~ had to deal with uncertaináes
about their comrades as they did not all know each other so well at that time. Therefore, their
trust deaelopment ma}- have had a difficult stan and ma}- not have recovered from that.
Although there are differences between the first and thc sccond deplo}-ment to Bosnia, the
prominence of the emoáonal beliefs is e~~ident in both missions, as well as in the unit that went
to Cyprus, where emoáonal beliefs were prominent at the beginning and at the end of the
deployment. It seems that trust is rather emoáonal than cogniáve.
Another remarkable aspect in the de~-elopment of trust is, how disposiáon to trust,
which was thought to be fairl}- stable, follow a pattern similar to that of trusáng beliefs. The
questlon arises if disposiáon to trust, apart from being an antecedent, is influenced by trust,
whereas it appears that trust is influenced b}~ disposiáon to trust or in other words: is there a
mutual relaáon between trust and disposiàon to trust~ This is an avenue for further research.
Chapter three shows how task-oriented aspects (competence) are not onl}- salient for
trust in colleagues, but also for trust in superiors. Leaders need to show that the}- know what to
do and how to do it when thev and their unit find themseh-es in dangerous situaáons.
Apparenth-, this knowledge gives subordinates the impression that their leader is comperent
132
Discus~ion
enough to minimize danger as much as possible, meanwhile not loosing the focus on what
needs to be done, the task of the team. This appears to enhance their trust in the leader.
tllthough it could not be confirmed that relation-oriented leadership in the absence of
risk invokes trust among subordinates, there are several relation-oriented aspects - in the sense
of experiences with the leader, attention for the group - that imroke trust. This is reason to
believe that some relation-oriented behavior is indeed essential for trust formation in evet-~-dav
situations among subordinates in their superior.
In the fourth chapter the effect of management and communication on trust were
examined. The RNLA endorses management b}- which commanders have some discretionar}~
space, however, in practice many commanders are held accountable for little details in their
actions; hence these commanders have the percepuon that the}- are being stricd}~ held to rules.
The conseyuence is that commanders, in order to avoid reprimands, stricd}- stick to rules
which works against the flexibility of the organization, a flexibility that is necessar}. because the
RNL~ is a high reliabilit}- organization. Moreover, it works against their trust in the
organization. In brief, the organization claims to be enabling but in practice it seems not to
have reached this stage }-et. This enabling stage, including negotiation, room for discussion,
consideration, is essential for trust, as is shown in the strong effect of considerate management
on trust. Superior organizational levels showing consideration towards their subordinate levels
will invoke trust. This is also shown in little details, like understanding that situaáons at a
subordinate level have changed, and acting accordingly. This will lead to trust at that
subordinate level, and trust is needed to make the RNLA an enabling organization. The
organization shows that it trusts its subordinate levels by gi~ting then discretionar}~ space and
their own responsibilit}-, and not so much demanding accountabilit}- for details aftenvards
(although sometimes accounting will be necessan-).
There also seems a role for communication in relation to trust. More personal
communication between superior and subordinate level leads to more trust between them.
However, when it comes to compliance with rules an opposing effect occurs: in low personal
communication, the effect of compliance with niles is positive, hence when there is more
compliance w~ith rules there is more trust. Opposite, when there is much personal
communication more compliance w~th rules leads to less trust. Hence, low personal
communication does not need to be a negative aspect, since it can lead to more trust if there is
more compliance with rules. Here, there ma}' be mutual understanding w7thout sa}ring too
much. ~'ords are superfluous.
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Trust appears to be well measured b}- a twelve-item scale, ruling out the chances of
social desirabilitc. when the direct question "Do ti~ou trust }'our colleague" is asked. .~part from
this scale, other alread}' e~sring questionnaires like that of johnson-George and Swap (1982)
and Cummings and Bromile}~ (1996) are useful for measuring trust.
The four components reflect aspects menáoned in the Dutch arm}- Code of Ethics.
Arm`~ personnel intend this Code of Ethics as a means to an end of moral conduct. This gi~-es
the arm}- the opportunity to promote trustworth}~ behavior b}' its personnel in educating it in
the Code of Ethics. In a time when arm~- ethics get increasing attention within the army (Van




Emotional beliefs prevail over cognitive beliefs when trust is measured over a longer period of
time. This would imply that trust it is mainly an emotional matter, raising the question of how
an organizauon can promote trust. It is likely~ that maintenance of rules can conrribute to this
as it appears to be an antecedent of trust throughout deployment, though the results
demonstrate that its influence is smaller than that of disposition to trust. If leaders consistentl}-
maintain the niles for all personnel, the}- notice that their personnel trusts their colleagues
more than if tules were not maintained even-handedlv. There seems to be a parado.r- between
consistently maintaining rules on one hand and being considerate in rules on the other hand.
Being consistent towards those with little discreuonary space will give them a safeguard against
untrustworthy behavior from others. Hence, maintaining rules consistentl}- enhances trust
among employees. If superior levels are considerate towards those with discretionary space,
such as leaders in the organization, giving them autonom}-, the leaders will get the opportunit}-
to use their capabilities. The organization displays harmon}--oriented behavior, enabling its
leaders, hence giving way to flea:ibilin-, which is necessary for a high reliability organizarion.
Moreover, when commanders come across a situation the}- do not know how to deal with,
superior levels can increase their subordinate commanders' trust b}- personallj- communicating
with them. Communicating b}~ email could be a good replacement if personal communication
seems impossible at that moment.
Trust can be measured b}~ using a scale in which competence belief, predictabilitt- belief,
honest}~ belief and benevolence belief are incorporated. The scale used in this book are all
useful. The use of a scale rules out the risks of social desirabilin~ when asl:ing a direct question
about trust.
As was alread}- said: not onlv the armv can draw its conclusions from this stud}., but
other organizations as well. It is my sheer conviction that trust can be promoted b~. laving
emphasis on competence, predictabilit}', honest}~ and benevolence of personnel. These four
aspects should not be separated, the}- belong together or else the balance would be lost and it
would be no longer trust we are talking about, but one of the aspects in which the other(s) get
lost in the fog. This penains to all personnel, throughout all la}'ers of the organization. One
could even relate this to areas outside organizations, to everydav life. In communicating ~4~ith
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people in shops, retailers, banks or ~~-hate~-er transacáons and contacts occur in human life,




Leaders, also future leaders such as officer-cadets, should focus on good task-fulfillment. This
is already an important part of the officers' training, but the specific skills for arms and services
now have to be mastered in six months, whereas this used to be one }'ear. But not onl}- task
fulfillment, also being a good human being, communicating well with others, taking an interest
in those one is responsible for, relating to them will increase trust formation.
In order to reduce uncertaint}- among personnel that goes on a tnission, the unit
about to come home could send a small advance part}- from the deplo}-ment area home to
inform the upcoming unit cíirectl}- about the mission and what is going on in the area. This
should be done in combination with staff inembers of the Operational Staff, who have a
broader view on deplo}'ments in general.
Large organizations like an army should be aware not to let coerciveness take over in
a bureaucratic organizauon. Enabling commanders, giving them discretionarv space w~ill
contribute to their trust. Personal communication, with email communicauon in the second
place, can support trust formation.
Disposition to trust is evidendv an antecedent of trust. ~`hereas trust is necessart-
w7thin an organization, it would seem ad~-isable to include a measurement for disposiuon to
trust in the selection process, in which the preference could be given to candidates with a not




A limitation is that in some studies the items neecíed to be translated from English into Dutch,
and also the items needed to be modified from the civil situation into the militarti- situation.
This ma}- have negativelj. affected the validity of some items.
The number of respondents was not alwa}-s quite high. Although a substantial number of
respondents participated in the studies in chapters one and two, these numbers were reduced
when the respondents w~ere di~-ided into groups. The same goes for the stud~- in chapter four,
where 68 respondents participated, but the di~-ision into ~-arious frequencies of communication
resulted in relatively small groups.
Also, the scales are sometimes a bit small. Perhaps in future studies they could be extended
w-ith a few items without losing the meaning of the scale.
In chapter four, the items concerning trust and management were sometimes a bit close in
their meaning, which ma}- ha~-e caused the high le~-el of explained cariance in trust when the
effect of considerate management on trust was examined. The items concerning the freyuenc`-
of communicauon, also in chapter four, ha~-e lost some of their meaning when the~- w-ere
recoded.
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Although trust can generall~- be considered a fairly consistent, stable but rather emotional
aspect ín exisring interpersonal relaáons, situations seem to contribute to trust development:
one ma}- be personall`- prepared, but if interpersonal relations are relativel}' new and if
irregularities are expected, this ma}~ increase uncertaint}- and influence trust. Such situations
should be studied more closeh- in both a surve~- and simultaneous inten7ews on the spot.
Participating observation and interviews ma}- give more background and in-depth information.
As for rule maintenance, from the yuestionnaire it can be more or less derived how
tules were maintained, but it is recommended to interview semicemen on the spo~ to gather
information about the wav rules reallv are maintained.
rlpart from disposition to trust and maintenance of rules, it ma}~ be expected that
other elements are lilcel}- to precede the formation of trust. A search for these elements opens
fields for further stud}- into trust. This basically refers to all studies in this book. The book
builds on previous research, but it can also be seen as a start for further research into the effect
of trust within organizations.
The connection between disposition to uvst and trusting beliefs is, concluding from
chapters one and three, that disposiuon to trust precedes trust. In chapter two was shown how
disposition to trust and trust follow the same pattern, hence in future studies it is
recommended that this connection is further examined. Especiall}- interesting would be to
examine how trust influences disposition to trust, as such an influence would impl}- that
disposition to ttust can be changed by trust.
The frequencti- of communication types, and not their contents was tested. It is





In this stud}- I have examined how the de~-elopment of trust among servicemen in the various
stages of their longer lasting mutual relauonship can be explained. The study was done among
sen-icemen within the Rot-al Netherlands ~1rmv.
To find an answer to the research question, I first looked for components of trust and trust
antecedents, using a model that has been developed b}~ 1~1cltnight, Cummings and Chervan}-
(1998). As antecedents of trust, aspects that precede trust formation before an}~ interpersonal
interaction ma}- have taken place, the disposition to trust and the maintenance of rules w~thin a
militar}- unit have been found to be essenàal. The disposition to trust is the trust a person
generall}~ has in others, regardless whether one knows this other person or not. This trust
formation takes place from early childhood and is generall}- assumed to be little subject to
change. However, when examining trust development over time among soldiers, this
disposiuon to trust seems to change in line with a change in trust. The question is now, if
disposition to trust influences trust or if trust intluences disposition to trust. The former has
been the starting point in this stud}-, the latter may not be excluded in future studies.
1~laintenance of rules, the other antecedent, pertains to the wa}- in which unit command
maintains the rules across all personnel. tllthough rules are necessar}~ for good functioning of a
unit, unit commanders ma}. differ in their rule maintenance. t1n even-handed manner of
maintaining rules appears to positivelv influence interpersonal trust among senricemen.
However, rule maintenance should not be that strict so that those subject to the rules have no
discretionar}- space left Vi-~ten commanders were asked their opinion about rule maintenance,
they claímed that, though officiall}- the}- had discretionar}- space to decide about several aspects
under their command, it turned out that bureaucrac}- produces so man}~ rules and procedures
that somehour the}- alwa}-s seem to deviate from rules. The}- think there are too man}- rules and
ask for more responsibilit,-. In other words, the organization, in this case the armti-, should be
more enabling. Somewhere between maintenance of rules and enabling a balance must be
found so the optimum of unít functioning can be reached.
Leadership is essential within the arm}- since there are so many hierarchical levels of command.
Hence, it was asked what leadership st}~le would be most appropriate to invoke trust among
subordinates. Two possibilities were given, derived from a model by Hunt and Phillips (1991):
a task-oriented leadership st}-1e in dangerous situations and a relation-oriented leadership stti.le
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in barracks (not dangerous) situations. Subordinates appear to prefer a task-oriented leadership
sn-le in the dangerous situation over a relation-oriented leadership stt-le in a barracks situation
when it comes to their trust in their commander. Howe~-er, the relation-oriented effect of
subordinate trust in their commander must not be tuled out, since subordinates also indicated
that the experiences thet- had w-ith their commander, be it attention for their personal situation,
a compliment for good work, have much influence on their trust in the platoon commander.
Trust, the central topic in this studti-, was mainl~- measured b}- measuring four aspects in the
trustee: the trustor's belief that the trustee is competent, predictable, honest and bene~~olent.
These aspects are related to each other: one w-ithout the other mat~ undermine trust, or may
cause that trust does not arise. A competent person (the trustee) cannot be trusted if he
appears not to be w~illing to use his competence in favor of a trustor, or if he appears to be
dishonest, or unpredictable. A predictable person can be trusted, pro~-ided that he is competent
in the task concerned, and unlling to assist (clisplat- benevolence). An honest person is maybe
the most appealing to trustors, but honestt- alone is not enough if beneeolence, or competence,
or predictabilin-, or all three aspects are missing in that person. Benev~lence does no good to
trust in the absence of competence or predictabilit}-. How can someone be trusted if he is
sometimes w-illing to assist another person, and other times not~
The de~-elopment of trust among senricemen in their longer lasting relationship can be
explained b}~ their disposition to trust, bt' the wa}- commanders maintain rules and b}- task-
oriented leadership in risk~- situations. Moreover, trust can be measured bti- measuring four




In deze studie heb ik onderzocht hoe de ontwikkeling van vertrouwen onder mílitairen in de
verschillende stadia van hun langere onderlinge relatie kan worden verklaard. De studie werd
verricht onder militairen bij de Koninklijke Landmacht.
In eerste instantie ben ik op zoek gegaan naar componenten van vertrouwen en antecedenten
van vertrouwen. Daarbij heb ik gebruík gemaakt van een model dat werd ontwikkeld door
McKnight, Cummings en Chervany (1998). Twee antecedenten van vertrouwen, aspecten die
vooraf gaan aan het genereren van vertrouwen, nog voordat enige interpersoonlijke interactie
heeft plaatsgevonden, zijn gevonden: de disposiue voor vertrouwen en de handha~7ng van
regels binnen een eenheid. De dispositie voor vertrouwen is het vertrouwen dat iemand van
kindsbeen af ontwikkeld ten opzichte van anderen in het algemeen. Er wordt aangenomen dat
de dispositie voor vertrouwen nauwelijks verandert tijdens een mensenleven. F.n toch is
geconstateerd in het onderzoek naar de ontwikkeling van vertrouwen tijdens drie uitzendingen
dat de dispositie voor vertrouwen verandert op dezelfde manier als vertrouwen zelf verandert.
De vraag rijst nu of de dispositie het vertrouwen beïnvloedt, of andersom. Het eerste is
uitgangspunt geweest in deze studie, maar de andere mogelijkheid mag in toekomsuge studies
niet worden uitgesloten.
De handhaving van regels, het andere antecedent, heeft betrekking op de manier waarop de
eenheidscommandant de regels handhaaft onder het personeel. Hoewel regels noodzakelijk zijn
om een eenheid goed te laten functioneren, kunnen eenheidscommandanten wel verschillen in
de manier waarop zij de regels handhaven. Een gelijkmatige manier, waarbij een ieder op
soortgelijke wijze wordt behandeld, Gjkt de beste manier om vertrouwen van ondergeschilaen
onderling te bevorderen.
Echter, de handhaving van regels moet ook weer niet zo strak zijn dat degene op wie de regels
van toepassing zijn geen enkele beslissingsruimte en initiatief ineer hebben. Toen
commandanten om hun mening werd gevraagd voor wat betreft de handha~~ng van regels,
klaagden zij dat het officiële beleid wel is dat zij beslissingsruimte hadden, maar dat de
bureaucraáe zo veel regels produceert dat zij op een of andere manier altijd wel van regels
afwijken. Zij zijn dan ook van mening dat er te veel regels zijn en vragen om meer
aerantwoordelijkheid. Met andere woorden: de organisatie, in dit geval de Koninklijke
Landmacht, moet meer ruimte bieden en minder d~~~ingend zijn. Ergens tussen die handhaving
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van regels en het bieden van ruimte moet een optimum gevonden worden voor het
functioneren van een eenheid.
I,eiderschap is essenueel binnen de landmacht, aangezien er zo veel hiërarchische niveaus zijn.
Daarom werd gevraagd ~relke leiderschapsstijl het meest geschikt zou zijn om vertrouwen van
ondergeschikten te winnen. Er werden twee mogelijkheden gegeven, ontleend aan een model
van Hunt en Phillips (1991): een taakgerichte leiderschapsstijl in gevaarlijke situaties en een
relatiegerichte leiderschapsstijl in een kazernesituatie (ongevaarlijke situatie). Het blijkt dat
ondergeschikten de voorkeur geven aan een taakgerichte leiderschapsstijl in gevaarlijke
situaties, boven een relatiegerichte leiderschapsstijl op de kazerne. Toch moet het
relatiegerichte effect van vertrouwen van ondergeschikten in hun commandant niet onderschat
worden, want ondergeschikten gaven ook aan dat hun en~aringen met hun commandant (een
compliment, of aandacht voor hun persoonlijke situatie) grote im-loed hebben op hun
vertrouwen in hun commandant.
Vertrouw-en, het centrale ondenverp in deze studie, u-erd voornamelijk gemeten door vier
aspecten te meten: de aanname van een persoon dat iemand die vertrouwd wordt competent is,
voorspelbaar, eerlijk en wehvillend. Deze aspecten zijn aan elkaar gerelateerd: de een zonder de
ander doet geen eertrouwen ontstaan, ~f kan het vertrouwen verminderen. Een competent
persoon kan niet vertrouwd worden als hij niet bereid blijkt zijn competenties te gebruiken tcn
gunste van de ander, of als hij oneerlijk of onvoorspelbaar is. Een voorspelbaar persoon kan
vertrouu~d worden, op voorwaarde dat hij competent is in die speciíieke taak, en bereid om te
helpen (wehvillendheid toont). Een eerlijk persoon spreekt wellicht het meest aan als het gaat
om vertrouu-en, maar eerlijkheid alleen is onvoldoende indien competentie, ~-oorspelbaarheid
of welw~illendheid ontbreken bij die persoon. ~~'elu~illendheid is nutteloos voor vertrouwen als
competentie of voorspelbaarheid afwezig zijn. Hoe kan iemand vertrouwd worden als hij de
ene keer vael bereid is om te helpen en de andere keer niet~.
De ontw-ikkeling van vertrouwen onder mílitairen tijdens hun langer durende onderlinge relatie
kan verklaard ~~~orden door hun dispositie voor vertrouwen, door de manier waarop
commandanten de regels handhaven en door taakgericht leiderschap in gevaarlijke situaues.
Daarnaast speelt hun algemeen ~-ertrouu~en in anderen een rol, en de en~aringen die
ondergeschikten met hen hebben. Daarnaast kan vertrouwen gemeten worden door het meten
van vier aspecten, namelijk competenue, voorspelbaarheid, eerlijkheid en welu-illendheid.
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Appendix A. Code of Ethics Royal Netherlands Army.
1. I try to get the best out of m}-self and am prepared to learn from m}- mistakes.
2. I show in attitude and beha~-ior that I am proud to work in the RNI~~.
3. .~1s a member of a team I need m~. team-mates and the~- need me. I therefore feel
responsible for their well-being and if necessan- I talk to them about their behavior.
4. I am responsible for a correct use of our eyuipment and mone}' that ha~-e been put in
m`~ responsibilin- and of the ser~~ices that are offered to me.
5. In all my actions I think about my own safet}- and diat of my surroundings. Therefore
I do not use drugs and limit myself in the use of alcohol.
6. I respect human rights and stick to the rules of Martial Law. I treat all people eyually
and with respect and if necessan' provide help to others in need.
7. I perform m}- tasks professionall~-, even under difficult circumstances and in life-
threatening situauons.
8. I shall never abuse the power in m}- possession. Ifordered I will use violence, but no
more than necessary to perform m}- task. Ever}-one, particularh- mv opponent, may
count on me being persistent and tenacious.
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Appendix B: Scale analyses for the components of trust, disposition to trust and
maintenance of rules.
The questionnaire comprised from the scales below was also submitted in the studti~ as
discussed in chapter two. The blocks below the line represent the non-scaling items.
Table B1. ltola:en scale anahsis fur disposirion to trust H-coefficient 39.
~nswering categories: 1- totallt dissi~~ree; 2- fairh~ disagree; 3- fairlv agree; 4- totallv agree
Item H-coefficient Mean
it is in the human nature to work together 3G 2.d4
~. ell.
~~'hen tou are reallt~ in troublr there uill ahrstcs 33 3.12
be someone to help.
If ~ ou aet with others in good faith, thev u ill
act likeuise uith tou. 4i ï.l~}
It cou are open for someone clse, that persun
uill be open for cou as well.
43 2 ~)4
Nrccr tnut strangers. (-)" -.(17 2.69
If cou don't pa~- attention, Pcople will rake -.1 S 2.2i~ ~
ad~~antagc ot vou. (-)
lf vciu want someone to perform a tas'k wcll, 0~ 2.-~
cou'll nced to esplain this task u ell and
monitor his performance. (-)
~~ hen it comes down to it, nobodv cares. (-j
-.14 L9-
If cou let someone perform a task he w-ill do it
m thr be~t cit hi. abilitie~.
2~ 3.1~
' Items marked uith an (-) were negati~~elt' formulated.
Table B2. ~[okken scale anahsis of ítems for maintenance of rules. H-coeft7cient .41.
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Item H-coefficient Ile~lu
The amipam'. ~,rder~ arc clcir about ~~ hat is 4 ï 3.2H
and u'hat is not allow ed."
In this unit there is a close u arch on us to stick
[o the rules." 38 3.9H
I think sufficient attention i~ paid t~~ ~~ur
sleeping ynarrcr~. 41 ?.61
Defcct. on eyuipmrnt arr repairrd ns suon as iui 3,27
possible.
1 am u'ell informed of the de~~elnpmentc in the ~ 1 2.14
basc.
~1} gr~~np's eyuipmenr i~ tit tur irs purpusc ?5 2.G(i
~ft' group has sufficient cyuipment tu perform
irs duties. ?I) ?.~9
I am satisfied with the inforniauon ~re get in
ad~ ancc ab~iut our compan}'s assii,mments. ?, 3.8G
i`1c home-tiont ean aluacs reach me during mc
deplncment.
?2 i.9G
" The ansu-ering categories for the tirst tu-o items are: 1- rotallc disagree; 2- fairh disagree; 3- fairh' agree; 4-
totallt agree. the answering categuries for the othcr se~'en items are: 1- totallc disagree; 2- fairh disagree; 3- neither
disagree, nor agree; 3- fairh' agree; 5- totalh agree. In urder to scale them and make ansuering categories
comparable, the first three items were ncoded as follows: 1- 1; 2- 2; 3- 4; 4- i. Thus, ansu'ering categon~ 3 is
non-existent in these items.
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Table B3. Atukken ~cale anal~ sis of items for competence belief. H-coefticient -.47
~nsu-ering categc~rir~: 1- totall} disagree; 2- fairh' disal,~ree; 3- fairlc a~ree; 4- totallc agree
Item H-coefficient Mean
Thc lecel of education is hiKh in mc platoon. 3, 2-~9
~Ic colleagues ahra}-s delicer ~ood yualin
~~~ork. ï1 I 3.111
! think mt colleagucs do a profcssional job.
;4 3.12
Table B4. ~Iokken scale analysis of items for predictabilín' belief. H-coefficient - 5'
:~nswering catel;ories: 1- torall~ disagree; 2- fairlc disal,7ee; 3- fairh af,nee; 4- totalh' al,rtee
Item H-coefficient Mean
1 knou ho~r mc cnllea~ues ~~ ill react in SG ?.81
different situations.
I kno~t- u'here I stand ~cith mt~ colleai;ues GI iJ)6
~C'ithin m~~ platoon ~c c kno~~ rhat ~~ c- can count
on each ~ther. 53 3.1 1
If somc uf us l.ne~~ bcttcn c~~~~ onc~r~ dn thcir ~Ifi 2.3~
jobs, the~~ Uould worn (-)'.
1ft colleaf;ues' bchavior is ven different. 1 do
not ahcats kno~c ~tith ~ihat thec ~cill surpri~r l~~ 2.?'
me L`'
' Items marked u'ith an (-) were negativelt formulated.
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Table B5. Dlol:ken scale anal}sis of items for honest}- beGef H-coefficient -.4G
9ns~rering categoties: 1- totallc disagree; 2- Nairh disagree; 3- fairh- agree; 4- totallt~ agree
Item H-coefficient Mean
bf~ colleagues tell uhat the~ think of ine. 4G 2.88
I can count on mt- colleagues to stick to their
promises mosr of the times. 4á 3.116
~~'ithin mc platoon u-e can openh dixuss our
ideas and rspectatious.
4' 3.15
Table BG. 1lold:en scale analcsis of irems ror benet.olencc belief. H-coefdcient -.60
~nsuering categones: 1- totalh disal,Rer; 2- fairh disagree; 3- faid~ agree; 4- totallt' agree
Item H-coefficient Mean
1 can count on mc uillea},me. not [o make mc C,0 3.OU
~cork hazder b} uorking inaccuratelc.
`t e are ah~ at s prepared to help each other.
Gl 3.1G
In m~~ platoon u r u~irk together ~ er~~ irell.
G 1 3.21
In this platoon cou arr on ~our o~rn (-). 31 1.84
` Items marked u~th an (-) u.ere negati~-elc formulated.
Non-scaling items u ere ofren but not consistendc negati~-ck formulated. .lnother reason for non-scaling can be that
items according to their contents do not fit in u ith othrr irems in the suggested scale. This is especiallc the case u~th
the items for maintenance of rules, u-here items nbout maintenance of eyuipment u ere included. Though good
equipment maintenance mac be seen as maintenance of rules as it represents consistent care for people so thec can do
their job, it is not seen as a safeguard against oppomtnistic beha~-ior bt- others.
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Table BZ Second order Atokken scale anahses on all items for beGefs together. H-coefficient -.4G
Behind each item ~re giae the beGcf it belongs to. C- competence belief, p- predictabilin~ befief, h- honesa befief,
b - bencaolencc bclicf.
Item H-coefficient Mean
The level of education is high in mt' platoon (c). 34 259
I knou~ hou. m~- colleagues u-ill react in different situarions (p). 3~ 2.81
~1t colleagues tell ti-hat die~- think of ine (h). .43 2.88
I ean count on mt~ colleagues not to make mc ~cork hardcr br
uorking inaccura[eh~ (bj. 4(1 3.(111
~Ic colleagues alu~a~ s deLi~.er good yualig work (c). ~U 3.Ill
1 can count on m~- colleagues to stick to their promises most of
the times (h). 48 3.f16
I kno~r ~chere ] stand u irh mc collea},nies (p). 4' 3.0C
~~ ithin m~~ platuun ~t e kno~~ that ~~~e can count on each orher i7 3.1 I
(P)
íl 3.12
l think mc colleagues do a professional job (c).
`t'ithin mt platoon we can openlc discuss our ideas and ~14 3.1 i
expcctations (h).
il 3.1G
~~~e are al~~~ucs prepared to help each nther Ib).
i3 3.21
7n m~ platoon ~ce ~rork tngether ~~erc ~~-ell (b).
In rhis platoon } ou are on t our own (-)'(b). -.18 1.84
1f some of us kneu better ho~~~ others do their jobs, the} uould
~~'orr~~ r-1`-I'J. -.U8 3.3i
~[t colleal,nirs' beha~~iur i. ~ en~ different. I do not alu a~ s knou-
~cith ~ihat thec ~iill ~urprisc me ~'-i'(pj. -.U8 2.37
' Items marked uith an (-) were negan~.elc formulared.
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Table B8. Jlokken scale anah.~is on the four scales of tructinK beliefs. H-coefficient -.55.
Belief H-coefficient Mean
Comhetencc belirf i( 8.91
Honesn~ belief S9 9.26
Benc~ olence belief 51 113G
Prrdictabilin bclief .~i 11.49
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Appendix C. Scales for trust in the superior level, considerate management,
compliance with rules and strict rule orientation
Trust
This scale was constructed using reliabilin- anal}~sis. The alpha was .89. .~nswering categories
were 1- no one at the superior level; 2- some at the superior le~~el; 3- about half of those at
the superior level; 4- most at the superior le~-el; 5- all at the superior le~~el.
1. i~ft- superior le~~el informs m}~ unit correctl}-.
2. M}- superior le~-el sticks to its agreements with my unit.
3. I think m}- superior le~-e1 is reliable.
4. b1}' superior level deals with m`- unit in an honest manner.
5. 1~1y superior level alwai~s keeps its word towards m}~ unit.
6. IVf}- superior level never informs m~~ unit incorrecth~.
7. Mti- superior leeel never tries to get away from agreements towards m}- unit.
8. In general, m~- superior leeel discusses expectatíons openh- with m}- unit.
9. M}. superior le~rel tries to fultill its mission at the cost of m}- unit.
1 Q M}- superior level tries to tell m~- unit ho~L- we should do our job.
Considerate management
This scale was constructed using reliabilit}- anal~-sis. The alpha was .86. ~lnswering categories
were 1- no one at the superior level; 2- some at the superior level; 3- about half of those at
the superior le~-el; 4- most at the superior level; 5- all at the superior level.
1. i~f`- superior level understands that changed circumstances ma}~ lead to different
principles
2. In taking decisions the superior level tries to put itself in our position
3. ~X1ten decisions do not lead to the desired results, m}~ superior level is prepared to
adjust its polic}-.
4. h1}- superior level tries to disco~-er u~hat determines mt- point of ~-iew.
5. l~f~- superior leeel is interested in m}- point of vie~~-.
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Compliance with rules
The correlation between these items was .36. B~- computar;on a new item was constructed with
the following answering categories: 0- both commander and his superior lecel de~riate from
rules. 1- either commander or his superior level devíates from rules. 3- neither commander
nor his superior level de~-iates from rules.
Do }'ou deviate from rules~ Yes ~ No
Do `-ou ever notice that }~our superior level deviates from rulesl Yes ~ No
Strict rule orientation
The scale was constructed using factor anal}-sis. The situations below are dilemmas for a
commander. The answering categories are labeled such that for reply- one, one point was given,
for reply tw-o, two points etcetera. The higher the point given, the more the replti~ is in
accordance with the formal rules. Eigenvalue - 1.46, percentage of explained variance 1C"ió.
1. Private van der Kolk is an attractive female clerk within }~our unit. She works in the
office of sergeant-major van Veen and captain Boll. One dati~ she complains to you about
sergeant-major van Vecn. He is making sexually intimidating jokes in her presence, and
insinuates about her and her bo~-friend. She alreadti- told him that she does not like this but he
as well as the captain said she should not fuss about it, that this is all in the game in the sen-ice.
Now she comes to ~~ou because she wants to file a formal complaint about sexual inumidation
with the armt' contidant. You appreciate sergeant-major van Veen's work very much within
}~our unit. ~~71at would ~-ou do? (eigen~-alue - .46).
1. You tell her not to fuss about it. It's all in the game when S~ou're in the service.
2. You do not believe her. Sergeant-major van Veen would not do this. You do not pay
much attention and warn her about not accusing an`-one falsely.
3. You trt' to calm her down, let her tell her stor}~ and tell her that it isn't all as bad as it
looks. You'll talk to sergeant-major van Veen and captain Boll. "~n~-thing but a
formal complaint against these men" is what t-ou think.
4. This is a serious problem. If this is true, Van Veen and Boll are in trouble and this
could hit back on cou. U talk to the men and warn them. You give private van der
Kolk the opportunitt- to call the arm~- confidant.
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2. At the shooting range you get your hot meal from the kitchen at the barracks, but the
temperature of the hot meal is too low, according to the regulations. If you sen-e this meal to
your troops, you run the risk that even'one becomes sick. ~~1iat would you do? (eigenvalue -
.50)
1. You let them eat the meal, because everyone is hungr}-. You'll make a fool of yourself
if you let yourself be intimidated b}' a few degrees of too low temperature.
2. You tell ever~~one not to eat this meal and serve sandwiches.
3. You send the food back to the kitchen and order them to prepare a new meal. This
will take approximately three hours.
4. You let them prepare hot field rations, this goes relativelv yuickh-.
3. As a prieate person you are invited for a command change of a good friend. How will
you go there? (eigenvalue - .32)
1. In an armti- car.
2. In t'our private car, but you
3. You go with a colleague who uses his private car.
4. In your private car, as it is a private in~-itation.
4. A woman in your unit asks to borrow a digital camera, owned b}' the army, for a party
in the weekend with her relatives, among whom there are manti- defense employees. ~K~at do
you do? (eigenvalue - .52)
1. Nobody uses the camera in the weekend, so why not let her have it for the weekend?
2. You already agreed that she uses it for another event in which many defense
employees parucipated. This time it is hard to refuse. You reluctandy agree.
3. "No, I cannot do this" is }`ou blunt repl`., and ~~ou do not give it to her.
4. You explain to her whv she cannot borrow the camera, and ~-ou do not gice it to her.
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Appendix D. Commanders' replies to open questions and their remarks.
Below the replies to the open questions are gi~-en, as well as the loose remarks commanders
wrote in the questionnaires.
~i1~y~ would }~ou de~riate from rules?
Rules lea~-e space for interpretation, ho~~~e~-er, if higher levels gi~~e advice the}- seem to be risk-
avoiding. I don't think rules are alwa}-s one to one applicable to the work floor, there is a
difference between nice to haee and need to ha~-e.
1~1ost rules are so comprehensive that not e~-ery-thing is known. In other words, one de~-iates
from rules without knou7ng it.
The nucleus of the problem with rules is that those who make them, ~~-ant to do this
comprehensi~-el}-: rules are ~~-ritten such that something in them can appl}- to an}- level in the
organization. ~foreo~-er, their interest seems to be that it is not their fault if mistakes are made:
mistakes are corrected b}' making new rules. Necessar}- support is not gi~-en.
Those who make rules take the commander's seat without realh- being responsible, and put
their ou,-n specialt}- in the middle, as if there is nothing else to reckon with for a commander.
The thought behind making a rule gets lost, because commanders are compelled to stick to the
formal rules. r~lso, it is not taken into account that thcre nceds to be a balance between the
risks to be taken if there are no rules and the extra effort that needs to be punt in to abide b}'
rhe rules.
A commander needs to weigh all these ~-arious aspects, and in abiding b}- a rule often loses. For
example, sometimes I call home from m~- cell phone gi~-en to me as a commander.
In certain situations it is necessan- to deli~-er work fit to measure. Rules do not gi~-e sufficient
working space, and sometimes I need to find the middle of the road between what is good for
a person and what is good for the organization.




To keep the organization running and trustworthj~.
To keep the unit running: train as }-ou fight.
A rule is incompatible with mti- assignment. Rules are partl}- unknown, especially there where
rules must be applied. Rules lead to an inefficient organizational policy.
De~~iation from rules in order to attain my unit's goals. Sometimes even rules are contradictor5-
and I have to weigh the pros and cons of which rules to appl}~.
I deviate from rules if something must be done for the unit and the RNLA is not harmed b}'
doing it so. I weigh pros and cons.
Rules can not be worked with in operations. I gi~re priorit}- to my unit's assignment.
Rules are alwa}-s restricrive. If an exercise is planned, the rules must be read first, and even
worse, the changes in rules must be looked up.
To attain m}~ goal, maintaining battle readiness.
For operational readiness.
~~~- do y-ou sa~ some rules do not support ~ou in leading-your unit~
A commander has insufficient liberty to weigh the interests of the organization against those of
his personnel. Rules are too rigid. W'eighing interests should take place more at the decentralist
levels.
i~1an~- rules as HACCP, legal status of the personnel and financial control cause a lot of
bureaucratic work. Howe~rer, the}- deli~~er little for my- unit's output.
Some rules are too complex, too much into detail, not transparent.
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There is often nothing wrong with ci~-ilian rules that need to be followed in the RNLA, but the
RNL~ often tries to be better than the ci~-ilian in abiding bt' rules. There would be fewer
problems if the central staff understood that e~en-one works according to mission-oriented
command, and accepts this.
Rules in m`- field of work (the National Territory) change all the time, are too complex and are
not supported b}' the superior levels. As a commander, one loses the grip and it is difficult to
explain changes to subordínates.
IVíuch about what is and is not allowed has been written down, ver}~ often guidelines about
exceptions for units on field exercises and in operational circumstances is lacking.
Rules restrict, rather than enable, and the financial means to follow rules are not given on time.
Rules do not support me. Support means help. Rules do not help.
I am restricted because often, necessar~- means are not gicen to abide bt' the rules.
The rules are ci~-i1 rules, good for Philips but not for the special tasks of the RNLr1. We are a
militan' organization, this demands special mentality.
~~at improvements would ~~ou make if ~-ou were allowed to set the rules within ~-our
oreanization~
Rules should be clear, not interpretable in different wavs. Should this be impossible, make sure
that the same set of rules is applicable for units of a similar ttpe. If e~ en this is impossible,
enable commanders to adapt rules to the local situation.
Rules should set boundaries, no more than that and not be too detailed.
Simpler, less bureaucratic and more aimed at results. La5- responsibilitti' and authoritt- with




Companv commanders should get a brief instructive ~~-orlcing instruction, apart from the
formal rules.
I would Gke to work according to the principles what I need to accomplish and what is the
minimum that I need to assign to m}- people in tetms of norms, formalities, authority and
procedures.
Finding a specific rule in the jungle of rules takes a lot of time and effort. A good solution
would be a good search engine with h}-perlinks on the intranet.
A practical translation of rules. Test new regulations on the work floor prior to implementing
it. VG'riting regulations down in such a manner that commanders can read and apply them
easih-.
M}- unit and m}. sub commanders should be able to train, not deal with rules all the time.
Interpret civilian rules and replace them b}- Defense rules or RNI~ rules; first implement the
preconditions, then the rules and not the other wav around.
A couple of }'ears ago the slogan was: "decentralize, unless..." Because of mainly financial
restrictions, this has changed the other way around. IV1any rules would be improved b}- "fewer
and better" if commanders at the work floor would get more inte~ral responsibilities with a
budget related to their tasks.
Rules are complicated. I had one of my men go to 1~Lilitary Court, in service dress, and gave
him a militan- private car, but I was reprimanded for doing that. I asked several military law
officers their opinions and the}- were contradicton'!
Rules should be brief, readable, and changes in rules should be transmitted u~ith notificaáon of
what has changed. And we should work inter-sen~ce.
Simplification of procedures to obtain goods, and mandates lower in the organizauon.
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Train as t-ou fight and work as ~-ou fight. ~fam- rules can simph- not be worked sti~ith.
Loose remarks:
I often ha~-e the feeling that incomplete staff ~~-ork is poured over us as commanders. Ho~ti-
orders should be elecuted is not mentioned, u-hich creates a lot of distress. Commanders need
tci figure out themselaes ~~-hat needs to be done about new regulations, this costs a lot of time.
There are no guidelines for implementation. Often the people at the general staff think that if
the~~ gi~-e an order todat-, it has been executed tomorrow, but that is impossible if rules need to
be interpreted at the work floor.
The governing model as set in 1992 has not been implemented completely-. The bureaucratic
model is still in charge.
l;conomic solutions are often not considered decisive when decision-making is at stake in the
RI~'I.,-~.
~-~t least 500~ó of the staff capacitt- in the RNT~1 is super fluent.
114am- reorganizations do not gí~~e good results as there is no consensus on the targets.
F.~-en-thing is important and has priorirt-, especialh- controllers (financial) subjects.
Apart from m}- opinion about the superior and subordinate level, I ha~-e an opinion about the
higher levels, which is a lot less positive than m~- opinion about the superior le~-e1!
Too much paper ends on the desks of the lo~cer le~~el commanders. Those who wrote these
papers think e~~er}-thing is set and done this wa}-, but that is a mistake. I feel m}-self more an
administrati~-e worker than a commander.
Apart from all reorganizations, the biggest problem is bureaucract'. The higher le~-el often is
not capable of creating the right preconditions for professional compleuon of the tasks.
Rules are necessan- and often clear, but too comprehensi~-e, not translated for practical use and
not flea:ible. The more details are written do~~~n, the more difficult rules become to understand,
which makes practical use more difficult. The mind of rules is much more important: what do
we have in mind w-ith a certain rule, ~ti-h}- does the rule e~st.
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It is difficult to abide bc rules under operaàonal circumstances, although I admit that many
rules have been made for the benefit of the employee. But sometimes the necessart- equipment
for following rules has not been given. Centralizing rules is less flexible, whereas mam.
operaàonal units have a short horizon. Often "no" is the answer.
E-mail may seem handy, but often it is thought that if a message has been communicated by
mail, that the recipient has read it. ~'ritten messages often appear to be explicable in multiple
ways. This gives problems.
If someone reports sick but the suspicion is that the person is not sick, no one is able to do
something about it. Drug use can only be punished if a person is caught in the act of using.
The US Arm~- has a different policy, wh`- do we do not the same~
Higher levels do not have sufficient insight in the consequences of their decisions at the lo~aer
levels. I do not trust the higher le~-el sufficiently to go to war with them. There is an extra la~-er
in the organizaàon between the top and the work floor that slows processes and changes down
to a speed that is hazardous to the survival of the organizaàon.
Intranet proaides regulaàons for personnel, but not the changes, so I need to check daily if
changes have been implemented.
Sometimes situaàons are not in compliance with regulations but are admitted because a
reorganizaàon is upcoming.
Rules take a lot of àme to read and understand, whereas my priority is with my personnel.
Rules are necessary, but they do not make e~eryday work easier.
The RNL..~ claims it is a company, but it is not. hfan}- commanders do not take their
responsibiliàes. There is no stabilin- in leaders' ~7sion: they switch betu.een superfluous
personnel and a shortage of personnel; someàmes we must centralize, then again decentralize;
:~foney is given for the wrong purposes: no ammuniàon, but lots ofmoney for extra rewards.
(...)
The addiàonal ~-alue of staffs is limited. There must come more responsibiliàes at the lower
lecels. The bureaucracy is humongous.
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There is no mone}- to deal with the most urgent problems, this minimizes the support for
regulations among lower lerel commanders as the}- do not see improvement. ViWe should be
able to sw-itch benveen budgets, depending on where the mone}' is most needed. There should
be a better balance betu~een personnel care and practicabiliri- of regulations. Man}~ rules cannot
be combined with operational tasks.
I deviate from rules if operational circumstances demand it. New rules are made but old rules
still ea:ist. All rules limit m}. operational process. Rules do not support me, however, the}- are
important for the well being of my personnel. Some rules are too strict, the}- limit m}-
possibilities.
Rules should be less rigid and pracácable. Possibilities should be given to deviate from rules, if
legally possible.
M}. superior staff is ven- reliable and wants to accomplish the goals together. Thev are open
and honest, and appreciate a positivel}~ critical approach.
I have good contact with m}~ subordinate commanders, there is open communication, and the~
are honest. VG'e are one team.
The last couple of years I notice a policy of "covering myself up" and an unwillin~ness to
eapress one's opinion. Dishonest}- increases, in which one's own career prevails, at the expense
of openness. Consequentl}-, those who are criucal are often seen as dislo}-al. The distance
between the general staff in The Hague and the work floor seems bigger than ever before!




Appendix E. Questionnaire for trust in the platoon commander, task-oriented
leadership, relation-oriented leadership, experiences with the platoon
commander and disposition to trust.
Questionnaire for trust in the platoon commander.
Answering categories were 2- true; 1- not true; ll - I don't know. Items w-ith (-) were
negatively formulated and recoded before scaling anal}ses were performed. Items one through
seven formed a scale, the other item was excluded.
1. If the platoon commander compliments me, I wonder if he is serious (-).
2. I assume the platoon commander is honest.
3. If I ~vant to confide in the platoon commander, I am sure he will listen to
me.
4. If I tell the platoon commander something, he will not tell it to others in a
different u~av.
5. If the platoon commander promises me something, I am sure that he sticks
to it.
6. If the platoon commander knows mv weak sides, he will not take advantage
of them.
7. If the platoon commander knows I did something wrong, he will not
criticize me in front of others.
8. If the platoon commander would laugh about something I do or sa}-, I know
he ridicules me.
Questionnaire for task-oriented leadership in the field.
rlnswering categories were 2- t-es, he w~ll do that; 1- no, he wtill not do that; 0- I don't
know. Items with (-) were negati~-elti- formulated and recoded before scaling analyses were
performed. Items one through four formed a scale, the other items were rejected or excluded.
The field situation was: You are on field exercise with the entire company.. It is an important
exercise. In the second week everyone gets tired due to bad weather conditions and lots of
rain. There is a lot of mud and }'our platoon is preparing for the next assignment. One of the
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drivers should driee his truck to another unit. He is a bit short of àme. He tries to dri~-e awac,
but the vehicle gets stuck in the mud. B~- trying harder to dri~-e off, the right wheels get stuck
tou-ard a hill, and the ~-ehicle is heehng o~-er. As there are a lot of personnel around, it is a
dangerous situaàon. How do ti-ou think y-our platoon commander will react?
1. He gi~~es direcàons to others
2. He leads the situaàon and assigns tasks to ecery-one.
3. He asks the utmost of ecen-one to get the vehicle out
4. He defines in detail what needs to be done and how to do it.
~. He tries a new way- to get the ~~ehicle out.
6. He shows much annoy-ance if some ways to deal with the problem do not work.
7. He makes evert-one hurry~ to extremes to get the job done (-)
8. He encourages the sergeants to tn- harder.
9. He asks ideas from sergeants.
1 Q He lets the sergeants solve the prublem (-).
11. He hurries e~-ert.one because he does not ~~-ant to perform worse than the other
platoons.
12. He tries to motivate the platoon by~ saying much needs to be done.
13. He does not in~-oh-e and leaves the situaàon to the sergeants (-).
14. From a distance he watches what the sergeants will do (-).
The items in the scale (one through four) were matched with the items submitted to the
platoon commander. These items were:
1. I gi~~e direcàons to everyone.
2. I assign tasks to ecery-one.
3. I ask every.one's paràcipaàon to get the ~-ehicle out.
4. I define to the finest detail what needs to be done.
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Questionnaire for relation-oriented leadership in the barracks.
Answering categories were 2- yes, he will do that; 1- no, he will not do that; 0- I don't
know. Items with (-) were negatively formulated and recoded before scaling anal}~ses were
performed. Items one through six formed a scale, the other items were rejected or excluded.
The barracks situation was: You have just returned from field exercise with }-our platoon. This
week maintenance of equipment is scheduled. Everl~one is bust' cleaning and repairing
equipment, clothing and weapons. It will be a few weeks before vour unit goes on field exercise
again. The company commander says the companv is not working hard enough and comments
on this to his platoon commander. ~~at do tou think the platoon commander's reaction
toward the platoon will be?
1. He gives a compliment if someone works well.
2. He lets us work extremel}- hard, more than we can handle (-).
3. (~thers make suggesuons to improve our work, but he wants it done his wa}-
(-)-
4. If a sergeant makes a mistake he becomes ver}~ angr}- (-).
5. He holds a"pep talk", as morale is important for good results.
6. He discusses a better wav to do things with his sergeants.
7. He remains friendl}' with even-one in the platoon.
8. He blames the sergeants in front of evervone (-).
9. He reassígns tasks without discussing this with an}.one (-).
10. lf something goes wrong he criticizes the way in which it is done, not the
person who does it.
The items in the scale (one through six) were matched with the items submitted to the platoon
commander. These items were:
L I gice a compliment if someone works well.
2. I put m}- people to work reall}~ hard (-).
3. I demand that even-thing is done m}- wa}', despite suggestions from others (-).
4. I blame a sergeant if something goes wrong (-).
~. I hold a"pep talk", as morale is important for good results.
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6. I discuss with m~- sergeants wa}-s for impro~~ement.
Questionnaire for experiences with the platoon-commander
.~ns~cering categories were 2-}-es, he will do that; 1- no, he will not do that; 0- I don't
kno~c. Items u-ith (-) were negati~-el`~ formulated and recoded before scaling analyses were
performed. Items one through eight formed a scale, the other items were rejected or excluded.
1. He has reu~arded me once for good work.
2. He is interestecí in mS- personal situation.
3. He regularl}. tells us how satisfied he is with our work as a group.
4. He makes sure there is a good team spirit.
5. The platoon's interests come first ~~~ith him.
6. He works on his own career, at the cost of the platoon (-).
Z Once when I wanted to leave earlv because m}~ girl friend was ill, he let me
take time off for that (-).
8. He looks after safe work procedures for all of us.
9. He has put me on report wrongl}..
10. He has let me cío much simpler work than m~- actual job.
Questionnaire for disposition to trust.
.~nswering categories were 2- true; 1- not true; 0- I don't know. Items u-ith (-) were
negati~-e1}- formulated and recoded before scaling anal}-ses u~ere performed. Items one through
three formed a scale, the other items were rejected or excluded.
1. If it comes down to it, nobod}- cares ~ahat happens to }-ou (-).
2. Ne~-er trust strangers (-).
3. If }-ou don't watch out, people u-i11 take ad~-antage of t'ou (-).
4. It is in people's nature to want to co-operate.
~. If }-ou are in real trouble, someone in }-our social surroundings ~;-ill help t-ou.
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L ~'emouwen schept eenhc7d (dit proefschrik).
2. Decentralisatie van bevoegdhcdcn aan leidingf;evendcn binnrn een organisatie leidt tot
een grorere hoeveelheid regels, met tot gevolg minder beslissingsvrijheid voor diezelfde
Icidinggcvenden (dit proefschrift).
3. Contrulc is goed, vertrouwen is beter (dit proefschrift).
Algemetrt
4. Indien miGfeiren alleen zouden worden beoordeeld op hun capaciteiten, zouden er meer
vrouwelijke commandanten in de krijgsmacht zijn.
5. Sommige juristen verdienen een goed belegdr butrrham ;ran het vertrouwen dat mensen
ten onrechte in elkaar hebben t;esteld.
G. De groei van de dienstverlenende sector in Ncdcrland is omgel-eerd evenredig met dc
daadwerkelijk geleverde lzvaliteit van de dienstverlening door bedrijven en instanties.
7. Als de Nederlandsc regering zichzelf in een volgcnde kabinetsperiode met 30 ",'ó salaris
vemjkt, ternijl het volk de buikriem moet aanhalen, is de kans op vertrouwen in de
rcgering minimaal.
8. Uit dc interactie tussen mrnsen en paarden wonlt dwdelijk dat deskundigheid,
voorspelbaarheid, eetlijl-heid en welw~illendheid de juiste componenten van vertrouwen
zijn.
9. Het paard van Troje was een nachtmeme.
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